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   ABSTRACT	  	  Sproat,	  Ethan	  M.	  Ph.D.,	  Purdue	  University,	  December	  2013.	  Inexorable	  Burden:	  Rhetoric	  and	  Togetherness.	  Major	  Professor:	  Thomas	  Rickert.	  	  	  	  This	  dissertation	  employs	  philology	  and	  cultural	  analysis	  to	  reassess	  longstanding	  notions	  in	  rhetorical	  theory	  and	  moral	  philosophy	  (via	  classical	  rhetoric	  and	  technical	  communication).	  In	  particular,	  I	  use	  diachronic	  analyses	  of	  the	  terms	  telos,	  
symbouleutikon,	  and	  sympheron	  (from	  Aristotle	  to	  present)	  as	  a	  theoretical	  springboard	  to	  reassess	  more	  contemporary	  issues	  in	  rhetoric	  and	  technical	  communication.	  The	  technical	  communication	  topics	  this	  dissertation	  covers	  include	  criticisms	  of	  expediency	  as	  a	  motive	  in	  technical	  communication;	  the	  changing	  landscape	  of	  instruction	  manual	  composition;	  the	  role	  of	  purpose-­‐completion	  and	  stakeholder	  awareness	  in	  visual	  rhetoric;	  and	  the	  futility	  of	  advancing	  ideology-­‐free	  technical	  writing	  pedagogies.	  More	  theoretical	  topics	  this	  dissertation	  covers	  include	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  notions	  of	  rhetorical	  “war”	  and	  entelechy;	  the	  pluralistic	  underpinnings	  of	  Kantian	  moral	  philosophy;	  and	  the	  rhetorical	  utility	  of	  democratic	  inefficiency.	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  CHAPTER	  1.	  THE	  END	  OF	  DELIBERATION:	  COMPLETING	  DECISIONS	  TOGETHER	  THROUGH	  CONFERRING	  	  “Words	  dissemble	  /	  Words	  be	  quick	  /	  Words	  resemble	  walking	  sticks.	  /	  Plant	  them	  they	  will	  grow	  /	  Watch	  them	  waiver	  so.	  /	  I’ll	  always	  be	  a	  word	  man	  /	  Better	  than	  a	  bird	  man.”	  	   —Jim	  Morrison,	  An	  American	  Prayer	  	  “I	  never	  attack	  persons,—I	  avail	  myself	  of	  the	  person	  merely	  as	  a	  powerful	  magnifying	  glass	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  make	  visible	  a	  general,	  but	  creeping	  and	  elusive	  calamity.”	  —Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  Ecce	  Homo	  	  	  
The	  Problem	  of	  Rhetoric	  in	  Postmodern	  Composition	  Like	  Nietzsche,	  I	  do	  not	  attack	  individual	  scholars.	  Even	  so,	  much	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  an	  extended	  response	  to	  Steven	  Katz’s	  criticism	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  as	  articulated	  in	  his	  1992	  article	  “The	  Ethic	  of	  Expediency.”	  A	  couple	  years	  ago,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  personally	  interact	  with	  Katz	  as	  he	  chaired	  a	  panel	  I	  participated	  in	  at	  an	  academic	  conference.	  During	  our	  conversations	  then	  and	  a	  few	  since,	  Katz	  has	  been	  incredibly	  helpful	  in	  further	  explaining	  his	  ideas	  and	  in	  patiently	  listening	  to	  my	  own.	  I	  see	  now	  that	  Katz	  and	  I	  agree	  on	  quite	  a	  bit	  in	  regard	  to	  how	  we,	  as	  teachers	  and	  scholars	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  composition,	  ought	  to	  approach	  the	  motives	  that	  guide	  and	  direct	  written	  communication.	  We	  differ,	  however,	  in	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  some	  of	  these	  motives.	  For	  example,	  Katz	  sees	  Cicero	  as	  a	  corrective	  influence	  on	  misguided	  ideas	  we	  inherit	  from	  Aristotle.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  see	  Cicero	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  runaway	  rhetorical	  terminology	  that	  got	  derailed	  sometime	  after	  (or	  during)	  Aristotle’s	  time.	  Because	  of	  our	  individual	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historical	  perspectives,	  Katz	  views	  the	  Aristotelian	  origins	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  as	  being	  driven	  by	  self-­‐interest	  and	  expediency.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  see	  the	  Aristotelian	  origins	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  as	  drawing	  on	  terminology	  that	  acknowledges	  the	  inexorable	  togetherness	  of	  deliberation.	  	  I	  share	  this	  brief	  summary	  of	  my	  collegial	  association	  with	  Katz	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  when	  Katz	  and	  I	  personally	  deliberate	  about	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  understand	  the	  history	  of	  rhetoric,	  our	  deliberation	  is	  a	  representative	  anecdote	  of	  sorts	  that	  exhibits	  the	  very	  tension	  we’re	  deliberating	  about.	  He	  and	  I	  are,	  in	  short,	  deliberating	  together	  about	  whether	  we	  are	  individuals	  deliberating	  together	  or	  whether	  we	  are	  individuals	  deliberating	  together.	  The	  distinction	  is	  slippery	  and	  not	  altogether	  definable.	  However,	  as	  I’ll	  explore	  through	  this	  dissertation,	  rhetoric	  that	  favors	  individualism	  over	  togetherness	  minimizes	  the	  communal	  qualities	  of	  humans	  that	  make	  rhetoric	  possible	  in	  the	  first	  place;	  and	  individualist	  rhetoric	  is	  also	  an	  early	  step	  toward	  validating	  atrocity.	  	  Second,	  my	  personal	  deliberation	  with	  Katz	  is	  also	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  larger	  argument	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Rhetoric	  and	  Composition	  about	  the	  efficacy	  and	  utility	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  history	  of	  rhetoric	  in	  a	  field	  of	  knowledge	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  embracing	  the	  more	  definitionally	  amorphous	  moniker	  “Writing	  Studies.”	  As	  I’ll	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  momentarily,	  Steve’s	  argument	  in	  “Ethic	  of	  Expediency”	  is	  that	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  in	  contemporary	  technical	  communication	  has	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historically	  served	  to	  minimize	  or	  disregard	  human	  suffering	  that	  sometimes	  results	  from	  valuing	  expediency	  over	  human	  needs.	  The	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  Aristotelian	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  and	  if	  the	  motives	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  are	  suspect	  then	  the	  motives	  of	  technical	  writing	  are	  suspect	  as	  well.	  Steve’s	  argument	  is	  a	  useful	  (albeit	  extreme)	  metonymy	  for	  other	  critiques	  of	  rhetoric’s	  usefulness	  to	  contemporary	  writing	  scholarship	  and	  pedagogy.	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  introduction	  or	  this	  dissertation	  to	  map	  out	  the	  history	  of	  the	  growing	  academic	  divide	  between	  Rhetoric	  and	  Writing	  (for	  a	  still-­‐topical	  treatment	  of	  this	  divide,	  see	  issues	  5.1-­‐5.2	  of	  Enculturation	  featuring	  the	  work	  of	  a	  veritable	  list	  of	  who’s-­‐who	  in	  rhetoric	  and	  composition;	  or	  see	  Horner	  and	  Lu’s	  2010	  article	  “Working	  Rhetoric	  and	  Composition”	  in	  College	  English).	  I	  only	  mention	  the	  divide	  as	  current	  context	  for	  this	  dissertation	  that	  deals	  with	  very	  old	  ideas.	  Over	  the	  last	  few	  decades,	  the	  relevance	  of	  ancient	  histories	  of	  rhetoric	  to	  scholarship	  about	  writing	  and	  communication	  has	  evolved	  from	  defining	  the	  discipline	  in	  the	  1960s	  to	  suspiciously	  reifying	  hierarchies	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  Indeed,	  a	  panel	  at	  the	  most	  recent	  MLA	  convention	  titled	  “Aristotle	  Is	  Not	  Our	  Father:	  Conversations	  in	  Cultural	  Rhetorics”	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  far	  ancient	  rhetoric’s	  esteem	  is	  falling.	  The	  panel’s	  program	  description	  asserts	  that,	  The	  project	  of	  cultural	  rhetorics	  is,	  generally,	  to	  emphasize	  rhetorics	  as	  cultural	  and	  cultures	  as	  persistently	  rhetorical.	  In	  practice,	  cultural	  rhetorics	  scholars	  investigate	  and	  understand	  meaning-­‐making	  as	  it	  is	  situated	  in	  very	  specific	  cultural	  communities.	  By	  “cultural	  communities,”	  we	  mean	  any	  place/space	  where	  groups	  organize	  under	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  -­‐-­‐	  American	  Indian	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communities,	  workplace	  communities,	  digital	  communities,	  crafting	  communities,	  etc.	  (Powell	  et	  al.)	  	  In	  short,	  the	  history	  of	  rhetoric	  cannot	  be	  tied	  to	  any	  one	  history	  or	  cultural	  community	  because	  rhetoric	  emerges	  from	  all	  histories	  and	  cultural	  communities.	  If	  we	  limit	  our	  historical	  understandings	  of	  rhetoric	  to	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Greeks,	  we	  neglect	  the	  rich	  rhetorical	  traditions	  and	  practices	  of	  many,	  many	  cultures	  and	  peoples.	  As	  Victor	  Vitanza	  reminds	  us,	  History	  is	  the	  gift	  that	  keeps	  on	  giving	  to	  us,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  a	  very	  subtle,	  expensive	  giving.	  It	  is	  a	  gift	  that	  I	  and	  others	  have	  misgivings	  about.	  The	  History—as	  historians	  of	  rhetoric	  write	  it—gives	  a	  so-­‐called	  gift	  of	  remembrance	  and	  yet	  creates	  the	  conditions	  for	  forgetting.	  Some	  would	  give	  The	  History	  so	  that	  some	  of	  us	  could	  forget	  it,	  be	  free	  of	  it!,	  all	  together.	  Others	  are	  more	  seemingly	  beneficent	  in	  their	  giving	  so	  that	  we	  might	  remember.	  Yes,	  How	  to	  give,	  to	  gift?,	  is	  the	  question	  that	  needs—desires—to	  be	  reopened	  here	  and	  elsewhere.	  The	  issue	  of	  remembering	  as	  forgetting	  is	  the	  issue	  here.	  (13-­‐14)	  	  Whenever	  a	  or	  the	  history	  of	  rhetoric	  gets	  written,	  it	  gets	  done	  by	  virtue	  of	  exclusion.	  The	  postmodern	  conceit	  provides	  access	  to	  voices	  heretofore	  silenced	  by	  
official	  histories.	  But	  this	  is	  still	  a	  shallow	  victory—or	  a	  puddle	  of	  the	  same	  defeat—if	  only	  because	  inclusion	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  having-­‐been-­‐excluded	  reifies	  the	  officiousness	  that	  originally	  determined	  exclusion,	  for	  officiousness	  is	  always	  the	  power	  we	  fight.	  Vitanza’s	  Third	  Sophistic	  project	  provides	  hope	  for	  breaking	  this	  perpetually	  dichotomy.	  	  However,	  I	  confess	  a	  sort	  of	  scholarly	  wistfulness	  about	  those	  ancient	  Greeks,	  particularly	  Aristotle.	  This	  is	  in	  opposition	  somewhat	  to	  my	  progressive	  personal	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politics,	  which	  have	  led	  me	  to	  appreciate	  and	  value	  the	  study	  of	  non-­‐Western	  rhetorics	  because	  no	  culture’s	  stories	  or	  practices	  should	  be	  excluded	  or	  denied	  access	  to	  university	  curriculum.	  Indeed,	  when	  I	  think	  about	  the	  term	  university,	  I	  am	  drawn	  toward	  a	  related	  entelechy	  in	  the	  term	  uni-­‐verse—or	  all	  verse,	  all	  logos,	  all	  rhetoric	  converged	  into	  one.	  In	  a	  sense,	  if	  we	  deny	  one	  culture’s	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  university,	  we	  deny	  that	  culture’s	  place	  in	  the	  universe.	  Yet,	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  progressive	  leanings,	  I	  find	  myself	  drawn	  to	  a	  form	  of	  rhetorical	  conservatism	  regarding	  the	  Greeks	  in	  general	  and	  Aristotle	  in	  particular.	  	  I	  am	  not	  alone	  in	  making	  this	  sort	  of	  post-­‐postmodern	  sentiment.	  Valuable	  postmodern	  innovations	  have	  greatly	  expanded	  our	  cultural	  appreciation	  and	  understanding	  of	  gender,	  culture,	  history,	  politics,	  sex,	  language,	  religion,	  learning,	  race,	  science,	  art,	  technology,	  ethics,	  and	  many	  other	  aspects	  of	  humans’	  conditions.	  Yet,	  we	  who	  have	  inherited	  this	  postmodern	  landscape	  find	  ourselves	  sometimes	  unsettled	  with	  a	  sort	  of	  critical	  indigestion.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  Larry	  McCaffery	  in	  
Review	  of	  Contemporary	  Fiction,	  David	  Foster	  Wallace	  explains	  this	  post-­‐postmodern	  discomfort	  this	  way:	  For	  me,	  the	  last	  few	  years	  of	  the	  postmodern	  era	  have	  seemed	  a	  bit	  like	  the	  way	  you	  feel	  when	  you’re	  in	  high	  school	  and	  your	  parents	  go	  on	  a	  trip,	  and	  you	  throw	  a	  party.	  You	  get	  all	  your	  friends	  over	  and	  throw	  this	  wild	  disgusting	  fabulous	  party.	  For	  a	  while	  it’s	  great,	  free	  and	  freeing,	  parental	  authority	  gone	  and	  overthrown,	  a	  cat’s-­‐away-­‐let’s-­‐play	  Dionysian	  revel.	  But	  then	  time	  passes	  .	  .	  .	  and	  you	  gradually	  start	  wishing	  your	  parents	  would	  come	  back	  .	  .	  .	  .	  It’s	  not	  a	  perfect	  analogy,	  but	  the	  sense	  I	  get	  of	  my	  generation	  of	  writers	  and	  intellectuals	  or	  whatever	  is	  that	  it’s	  3:00	  a.m.	  .	  .	  .	  and	  we’re	  wishing	  the	  revel	  would	  end.	  The	  postmodern	  founders’	  patricidal	  work	  was	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great,	  but	  patricide	  produces	  orphans,	  and	  no	  amount	  of	  revelry	  can	  make	  up	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  writers	  my	  age	  have	  been	  literary	  orphans	  throughout	  our	  formative	  years.	  We’re	  kind	  of	  wishing	  some	  parents	  would	  come	  back.	  And	  of	  course	  we’re	  uneasy	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  wish	  they’d	  come	  back.	  .	  .	  .	  And	  the	  uneasiset	  feeling	  of	  all,	  as	  we	  start	  gradually	  to	  realize	  that	  parents	  in	  fact	  aren’t	  ever	  coming	  back—which	  means	  we’re	  going	  to	  have	  to	  be	  the	  parents.	  (McCaffery	  150)	  	  Wallace	  recognizes	  the	  benefits	  and	  the	  burden	  facing	  those	  of	  us	  who	  have	  inherited	  the	  postmodern	  intellectual	  project.	  We	  benefit	  from	  being	  free	  (or	  knowing	  how	  to	  become	  free)	  from	  the	  traditional	  hierarchies	  that	  limited	  and	  restricted	  former	  ways	  of	  thinking.	  Yet	  we	  also	  face	  the	  burden	  of	  defining	  an	  intellectual	  project	  that	  resists	  static	  definition—of	  further	  developing	  institutional	  scholarship	  that	  remains	  suspect	  of	  institutional	  development—of	  passing	  on	  an	  intellectual	  inheritance	  to	  future	  thinkers	  who,	  like	  us,	  will	  doubt	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge	  merely	  because	  it	  is	  inherited.	  The	  postmodern	  condition	  is	  thus	  inhabited	  by	  a	  perpetual	  Generation	  Zero.	  	  
Methodology	  and	  Rhetoric’s	  Elusive	  Calamity	  One	  possible	  way	  of	  moving	  forward	  in	  such	  a	  condition	  may	  be	  through	  reappropriation.	  Postmodernism	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  hyper-­‐modernism	  in	  which	  old	  things	  are	  often	  viewed	  in	  only	  new	  ways—or	  old	  ideas	  like	  rhetoric	  are	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  cultures	  and	  perspectives	  that	  may	  be	  very	  old	  but	  are	  nonetheless	  new	  to	  rhetoric’s	  traditional	  frameworks.	  One	  aspect	  of	  the	  postmodern	  intellectual	  project	  is	  that	  some	  ideas	  may	  have	  become	  so	  old	  that	  reintroducing	  them	  may	  be	  revolutionary	  (which	  leads	  our	  minds	  to	  another	  entelechy—revolutionary	  ideas	  often	  revolve	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from	  old	  to	  new	  to	  old	  to	  new).	  Hence,	  I	  find	  myself	  agreeing	  with	  those	  MLA	  panelists:	  Aristotle	  is	  not	  our	  father,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  study	  Aristotle	  in	  some	  form	  of	  misguided	  effort	  to	  reclaim	  some	  pristine	  past	  before	  ideas	  of	  rhetoric	  were	  corrupted.	  Such	  efforts	  are	  both	  impossible	  and	  nonsensical.	  Instead,	  I	  look	  at	  Aristotle’s	  terms	  for	  rhetoric	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  uncover	  possible	  implications	  for	  rhetorical	  ideas	  that	  emerged	  long	  after	  Aristotle.	  I	  have	  since	  realized	  that	  the	  sort	  of	  translational	  reappropriation	  I	  have	  thus	  pursued	  is	  a	  blend	  of	  old-­‐school	  philology	  mingled	  with	  more	  current	  notions	  of	  cultural	  analysis.	  	  Philology	  literally	  means	  the	  “love	  of	  words,”	  but	  as	  a	  field	  of	  inquiry	  it	  has	  a	  varied	  and	  complex	  history	  itself.	  In	  brief,	  philology	  is	  a	  research	  methodology	  that	  employs	  diachronic	  analysis—or	  analyzing	  how	  words	  and	  terminologies	  develop	  across	  time	  and	  cultures.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  employ	  philology	  in	  diachronic	  analyses	  of	  ancient	  Greek	  terms—specifically	  telos,	  symbouleutikon,	  and	  
sympheron—to	  note	  changes	  in	  the	  ways	  notable	  thinkers	  have	  addressed	  topics	  associated	  with	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  specifically	  and	  rhetoric	  more	  generally.	  Philology	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  “correct	  interpretation	  of	  texts.”	  Any	  postmodern	  critic	  understands	  the	  futility	  of	  relegating	  any	  text	  to	  any	  single	  interpretation.	  Rather,	  philology	  is	  useful	  in	  mapping	  how	  texts	  have	  been	  appropriated	  via	  diverse	  interpretations.	  Furthermore,	  philological	  study	  helps	  contemporary	  thinkers	  embrace	  and	  own	  the	  implications	  of	  their	  own	  appropriations	  of	  a	  text.	  I	  use	  philology	  in	  this	  sense	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  show	  how	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alternate	  notions	  of	  telos,	  symbouleutikon,	  and	  sympheron	  may	  help	  shore	  up	  critical	  gaps	  in	  both	  contemporary	  rhetorical	  theory	  and	  post-­‐Enlightenment	  moral	  philosophy.	  Ultimately,	  I	  believe	  my	  findings	  help	  indicate	  the	  unavoidable	  intersections	  and	  inter-­‐reliance	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics.	  	  My	  philological	  interest	  in	  Aristotle	  began	  when	  I	  read	  Steven	  Katz’s	  essay	  “The	  Ethic	  of	  Expediency:	  Classical	  Rhetoric,	  Technology,	  and	  the	  Holocaust.”	  Katz’s	  main	  argument	  in	  this	  essay	  hinges	  on	  historical	  and	  quasi-­‐philological	  interpretations	  of	  
expediency	  itself.	  Since	  it	  was	  first	  published	  in	  College	  English	  in	  1992,	  Katz’s	  essay	  has	  been	  anthologized	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “central	  works”	  of	  technical	  communication	  (see	  Johnson-­‐Eilola	  and	  Selber	  in	  the	  Bibliography),	  has	  been	  enshrined	  in	  an	  annotated	  bibliography	  of	  “essential	  works”	  in	  the	  journal	  Technical	  Communication	  (see	  Alred	  in	  the	  Bibliography),	  and	  has	  been	  the	  direct	  subject	  of	  a	  years-­‐long	  discussion	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	  Technical	  Writing	  &	  Communication	  (see	  Moore	  [2004],	  Katz	  [2006],	  and	  Ward	  [2009]).	  To	  say	  the	  least,	  Katz’s	  essay	  and	  his	  view	  of	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  key	  rhetorical	  terms	  has	  significantly	  influenced	  the	  field	  of	  technical	  writing.	  By	  and	  large	  this	  is	  understandable	  and	  largely	  deserved.	  	  Katz	  begins	  his	  essay	  with	  the	  translated	  text	  of	  an	  actual	  memo	  written	  in	  June	  1942	  that	  requests	  technical	  upgrades	  for	  Saurer	  gas	  vans	  used	  by	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  as	  tools	  of	  mass-­‐murder.	  The	  author	  of	  this	  memo,	  a	  midlevel	  bureaucrat,	  writes	  a	  well-­‐reasoned	  deliberative	  appeal	  to	  his	  superior	  for	  design	  changes	  to	  the	  Saurer	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gas	  vans	  that	  would	  make	  the	  vans	  more	  efficient	  death	  devices	  and	  easier	  to	  clean	  after	  use.	  After	  sharing	  this	  horrifying	  example	  of	  deliberative	  argument,	  Katz	  suggests,	  “Here,	  as	  in	  most	  technical	  writing	  and	  .	  .	  .	  in	  most	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  expediency,	  on	  technical	  criteria	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end”	  (257).	  And	  Katz	  follows	  this	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  all	  the	  way	  back	  to	  Aristotle.	  Katz	  further	  suggests	  that	  for	  Aristotle,	  “expediency	  seems	  to	  become	  an	  ethical	  end	  in	  itself.	  Expediency	  is	  always	  the	  good—‘utility	  is	  a	  good	  thing’	  Aristotle	  says,	  concluding:	  ‘any	  end	  is	  a	  good’”(261).	  Katz’s	  criticism	  of	  Aristotle	  hinges	  on	  Aristotle’s	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  expediency	  or	  utility.	  I’ll	  discuss	  momentarily	  what	  Aristotle	  actually	  said	  in	  Greek,	  but	  Katz’s	  main	  ethical	  observation	  is	  sound:	  “the	  ethical	  problem	  represented	  in	  [Nazi	  technical	  rhetoric	  is]	  a	  problem	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric—defined	  by	  Aristotle	  as	  that	  genre	  of	  rhetoric	  concerned	  with	  deliberating	  future	  courses	  of	  action”	  (258).	  Through	  his	  line	  of	  argument,	  Katz	  describes	  a	  causal	  chain	  that	  looks	  something	  like	  this:	  as	  Aristotle	  portrayed	  it,	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  is	  driven	  by	  expediency;	  current	  technical	  communication	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  as	  handed	  down	  from	  Aristotle	  through	  the	  Romans	  through	  the	  development	  of	  the	  classical	  education	  in	  modern	  Europe;	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  in	  current	  technical	  communication	  (along	  with	  all	  its	  damaging	  aspects)	  is	  thus	  an	  intellectual	  descendent	  of	  Aristotle;	  hence,	  if	  the	  rhetorical	  motives	  of	  technical	  communication	  are	  suspect,	  then	  the	  rhetorical	  motives	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  whole	  are	  suspect	  as	  well.	  Katz	  explains	  it	  this	  way:	  “the	  ethic	  of	  expediency…	  which	  Aristotle	  first	  treated	  systematically	  in	  the	  Rhetoric…	  was	  rhetorically	  embraced	  by	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the	  Nazi	  regime	  and	  combined	  with	  science	  and	  technology	  to	  form	  the	  ‘moral	  basis’	  of	  the	  holocaust;”	  and	  as	  Katz	  asserts,	  “it	  is	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  that	  enables	  deliberative	  rhetoric”	  (258). 	  I	  do	  not	  dispute	  most	  of	  Katz’s	  claims.	  I	  believe	  Katz	  is	  absolutely	  correct	  that	  an	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  tends	  to	  motivate	  much	  of	  technical	  communication	  and	  that	  such	  an	  ethic	  has	  historically	  motivated	  much	  of	  deliberative	  discourse.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  essay,	  Katz	  indicates	  the	  path	  ahead	  for	  those	  who	  sympathize	  with	  his	  argument,	  “In	  the	  gruesome	  light	  of	  the	  holocaust,	  then,	  we	  should	  question	  whether	  expediency	  should	  be	  the	  primary	  ethical	  standard	  in	  deliberative	  discourse,	  including	  scientific	  and	  technical	  communication”	  (272).	  Conscientious	  rhetoricians	  and	  educators	  can	  only	  conclude	  that,	  of	  course,	  it	  should	  not.	  Katz	  then	  looks	  to	  Cicero	  and	  Quintilian	  for	  corrective	  measures	  against	  Aristotelian	  expediency.	  Katz	  argues	  that	  in	  light	  of	  “Cicero's	  advocacy	  of	  a	  rhetoric	  grounded	  in	  a	  knowledge	  of	  everything	  and	  Quintilian's	  definition	  of	  the	  orator	  as	  ‘a	  good	  man	  skilled	  in	  speaking,’	  we	  can	  and	  should	  teach	  the	  whole	  panoply	  of	  ethics	  in	  deliberative	  discourse	  in	  our	  rhetoric	  and	  writing	  courses”	  (272).	  Katz	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  rhetoric	  instruction	  ought	  to	  understand	  the	  ethical	  motives	  of	  individual	  and	  community	  happiness	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ethical	  weight	  of	  “humanitarian	  concerns.”	  	  In	  short,	  Katz	  argues	  that	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  left	  to	  its	  own	  expedient	  devices	  will	  continue	  to	  cause	  (and	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  institutional	  causes	  of)	  human	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suffering;	  thus,	  conscientious	  teachers	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  writing	  must	  integrate	  ethics	  into	  rhetoric	  curriculum	  to	  offset	  deliberative	  rhetoric’s	  historical	  tendency.	  Katz’s	  suggested	  path	  toward	  ethical	  equilibrium	  is	  by-­‐and-­‐large	  the	  same	  approach	  used	  in	  many	  current	  American	  textbooks	  on	  technical	  communication.	  For	  example,	  the	  current	  flagship	  technical	  communication	  textbooks	  offered	  through	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  (The	  Essentials	  of	  Technical	  Communication),	  Thompson	  Wadsworth	  (Technical	  Communication:	  A	  Reader-­‐Centered	  Approach),	  and	  Pearson	  Longman	  (Technical	  Communication	  Today)	  all	  contain	  significant	  robust	  treatments	  of	  ethical	  dilemmas	  and	  responsibilities	  facing	  technical	  writers.	  Also,	  the	  Society	  for	  Technical	  Communication	  has	  adopted	  a	  code	  of	  Ethical	  Principles	  (dated	  1998)	  that	  repeatedly	  asserts	  the	  importance	  of	  “the	  public	  good”	  (STC	  Board).	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  we	  can	  go	  as	  far	  to	  say	  that	  Katz’s	  work	  has	  been	  directly	  and	  explicitly	  influential	  in	  any	  of	  these	  venues.	  Rather,	  it	  appears	  that	  Katz’s	  critiques	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  and	  advocacy	  of	  ethics	  in	  rhetorical	  practice	  are	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  phenomenon	  in	  technical	  writing	  education	  and	  the	  technical	  writing	  professions	  to	  integrate	  ethics	  into	  technical	  writing	  practice.	  	  And	  herein	  lies	  rhetoric’s	  elusive	  calamity	  (to	  borrow	  Nietzsche’s	  words)—that	  ethics	  is	  in	  toto	  something	  entirely	  different	  from	  rhetoric—that	  rhetoric	  is	  somehow	  so	  obviously	  without	  moral	  qualities	  that	  we	  must	  rebuild	  our	  educational	  and	  professional	  efforts	  to	  adapt	  rhetoric	  to	  ethical	  concerns—that	  ethics	  is	  that	  which	  must	  be	  added	  to	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  corrective	  to	  rhetoric’s	  destructive	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inclinations.	  Rhetoric’s	  peculiar	  situation	  in	  regards	  to	  ethics	  is	  thus	  both	  elusive	  and	  calamitous—elusive	  because	  we	  have	  forgotten	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  pervasively	  ethical—calamitous	  because	  it	  is	  rhetoric’s	  divorce	  from	  ethics	  that	  precedes	  and	  makes	  possible	  rhetoric	  being	  used	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  atrocity.	  Both	  these	  claims	  require	  some	  initial	  explaining,	  but	  the	  longer	  explanation	  for	  each	  is	  one	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  First,	  claiming	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  pervasively	  ethical	  is	  different	  from	  asserting	  that	  ethics	  is	  pervasively	  rhetorical.	  This	  latter	  idea	  is	  one	  that	  many	  rhetorical	  theorists	  are	  already	  comfortable	  with.	  Nietzsche	  offers	  a	  compelling	  modernist	  account	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  basis	  of	  notions	  of	  good	  and	  evil.	  In	  his	  early	  essay	  “Truth	  and	  Lying	  in	  an	  Extra-­‐Moral	  Sense,”	  Nietzsche	  fully	  anticipates	  the	  linguistic	  turn	  in	  philosophy	  with	  his	  observations	  about	  knowledge-­‐production	  in	  terms	  of	  rhetorical	  tropes.	  “What	  is	  truth?”	  Nietzsche	  asks.	  In	  this	  concept	  of	  truth,	  Nietzsche	  also	  clumps	  all	  our	  notions	  of	  the	  good	  (as	  well	  as	  reality,	  the	  mind,	  artifice,	  science,	  and	  all	  other	  arenas	  of	  thought	  and	  inquiry).	  Nietzsche	  responds	  that	  all	  truth	  including	  goodness	  is,	  “A	  mobile	  army	  of	  metaphors,	  metonyms,	  anthropomorphisms,	  in	  short,	  a	  sum	  of	  human	  relations	  which	  were	  poetically	  and	  rhetorically	  heightened,	  transferred,	  and	  adorned…	  Truths	  are	  illusions	  about	  which	  it	  has	  been	  forgotten	  that	  they	  are	  illusions,	  worn-­‐out	  metaphors,	  without	  sensory	  impact”	  (“On	  Truth”	  250).	  In	  this	  account,	  ethics	  (along	  with	  all	  other	  knowledge)	  is	  a	  verbally	  created	  thing,	  so	  of	  course	  ethics	  is	  rhetorical.	  But	  this	  is	  also	  no	  different	  from	  saying	  everything	  is	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rhetorical.	  That	  may	  very	  well	  be	  true,	  but	  such	  a	  perspective	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  study	  epistemology	  or	  ontology	  (much	  less	  rhetoric	  or	  ethics)	  in	  any	  sort	  of	  external	  manner.	  If	  our	  ways	  of	  knowing	  are	  inescapably	  also	  our	  ways	  of	  being,	  we	  can	  only	  view	  our	  ways	  of	  knowing	  and	  being	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  This	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  claims	  regarding	  the	  human	  penchant	  for	  constructing	  vocabularies.	  People,	  he	  asserts,	  “seek	  for	  vocabularies	  that	  are	  reflections	  of	  reality.	  To	  this	  end,	  they	  must	  develop	  vocabularies	  that	  are	  selections	  of	  reality.	  And	  any	  selection	  of	  reality	  must,	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  function	  as	  a	  deflection	  of	  reality”	  (Grammar	  59).	  Further	  on	  in	  his	  Grammar,	  Burke	  also	  explains,	  “it	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  us,	  without	  contradiction,	  to	  recreate	  in	  words	  a	  world	  which	  is	  itself	  not	  verbal	  at	  all”	  (130).	  Burke	  stops	  short	  of	  asserting	  that	  language	  is	  the	  very	  stuff	  of	  which	  knowledge	  is	  made	  (which	  seems	  to	  be	  Nietzsche’s	  claim).	  Rather,	  Burke	  asserts	  that	  our	  ways	  of	  talking	  about	  (i.e.	  our	  rhetoric	  of)	  realms	  of	  knowledge	  are	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  those	  realms	  of	  knowledge.	  Ethics	  as	  a	  realm	  of	  knowledge	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  rhetoric	  that	  surrounds	  ethics.	  I	  could	  share	  other	  accounts,	  but	  Nietzsche	  and	  Burke	  should	  suffice	  to	  show	  that	  the	  notion	  that	  ethics	  is	  rhetorical	  has	  currency	  in	  rhetorical	  theorists’	  circles.	  	  Instead,	  I	  assert	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  pervasively	  ethical.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  whenever	  and	  wherever	  rhetoric	  emerges,	  it	  does	  so	  directed	  by	  a	  general	  telos	  of	  communal	  betterment.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  always	  used	  to	  better	  society.	  Nor	  does	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this	  preclude	  the	  reality	  that	  bad	  people	  use	  rhetoric	  to	  accomplish	  harmful	  things.	  Rather,	  when	  people	  experience	  rhetoric,	  they	  experience	  a	  process	  whereby	  this	  emerges	  as	  more	  preferable	  or	  better	  than	  that.	  And	  the	  process	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  communal	  in	  that	  it	  always	  engages	  notions	  of	  what	  will	  be	  preferable	  or	  better	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  isolated	  community	  of	  an	  individual	  with	  her	  surroundings	  or	  a	  public	  community	  of	  two	  or	  more	  people.	  Rhetoric	  in	  this	  sense	  occurs	  in	  the	  ambient	  agency	  of	  an	  environment	  on	  the	  survival	  decisions	  of	  a	  lone	  Robinson	  Crusoe,	  and	  it	  occurs	  in	  dynamic	  interpersonal	  communications	  and	  chaotic	  public	  assemblies.	  Rhetoric	  is	  thus	  ethical	  in	  that	  it	  always	  and	  already	  engages	  people	  with	  competing	  notions	  of	  what	  is	  good	  or	  right.	  Some	  may	  object	  at	  this	  generalization	  with	  a	  call	  for	  nuance—that	  rhetoric	  deals	  with	  situational	  notions	  of	  the	  good	  while	  ethics	  deals	  with	  more	  general	  notions	  of	  the	  good—that	  rhetoric	  relies	  on	  relative	  perspectives	  of	  good	  while	  ethics	  strives	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  good	  regardless	  of	  perspective.	  But	  this	  criticism	  splits	  disciplinary	  hairs.	  Ethical	  theorists	  are	  as	  diverse	  and	  divergent	  from	  one	  another	  as	  rhetorical	  theorists	  are	  among	  themselves.	  Having	  taught	  Ethics	  for	  years	  at	  a	  state	  university,	  I	  encountered	  hundreds	  of	  students	  who	  repeatedly	  got	  frustrated	  with	  the	  sheer	  number	  and	  difference	  of	  rational	  ethical	  theories.	  Students	  would	  get	  used	  to	  Kant’s	  categorical	  imperative	  just	  in	  time	  to	  begin	  grappling	  with	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  utilitarianism	  which	  would	  be	  supplanted	  with	  curriculum	  about	  Simone	  de	  Beauvoir’s	  existential	  gender	  ethics	  which	  would	  be	  followed	  by	  divine	  command	  theories	  which	  would	  be	  followed	  by	  social	  contract	  ethics	  with	  Hobbes	  or	  economic	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ethics	  with	  Marx	  and	  so	  forth.	  To	  mitigate	  my	  students’	  frustration,	  I	  tried	  to	  teach	  them	  that	  the	  study	  of	  ethics	  is	  the	  effort	  to	  understand	  different	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  right	  and	  wrong.	  In	  this	  same	  vein,	  the	  study	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  the	  effort	  to	  understand	  the	  ways	  people	  accept	  different	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  right	  and	  wrong.	  Thus	  in	  practice,	  if	  ethics	  is	  understanding	  perspectives	  of	  good	  and	  bad,	  rhetoric	  is	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	  people	  attain	  those	  perspectives.	  	  I	  develop	  these	  ideas	  more	  thoroughly	  throughout	  this	  dissertation.	  But	  for	  now,	  the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  rhetoric	  lead	  back	  to	  utilizing	  philology	  to	  understand	  Katz	  and	  his	  treatment	  of	  Aristotle.	  I	  found	  Katz’s	  ethical	  conclusions	  unsettling—not	  because	  I	  had	  any	  sort	  of	  allegiance	  to	  Aristotle	  but	  because	  I	  sensed	  a	  larger	  dilemma	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  rhetoric	  itself,	  which	  I	  sketched	  in	  brief	  just	  above.	  Since	  Katz’s	  analysis	  hinged	  so	  much	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  expediency,	  I	  looked	  closer	  at	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  to	  see	  if	  I	  could	  see	  the	  same	  things	  that	  Katz	  saw.	  What	  I	  actually	  found	  surprised	  me.	  	  
A	  Philology	  of	  Deliberation	  One	  of	  the	  key	  passages	  from	  Aristotle	  that	  Katz	  quotes	  is	  from	  Bekker	  number	  1362a	  of	  the	  1984	  Roberts	  translation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric.	  I	  include	  below	  four	  different	  English	  translations	  of	  the	  same	  part	  of	  1362a.	  In	  each	  translation	  below,	  I	  have	  indentified	  three	  different	  terms	  that	  have	  been	  translated	  differently	  from	  the	  original	  Greek.	  In	  Greek,	  these	  terms	  are	  telos,	  symbouleutikon,	  and	  sympheron.	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Literally	  translated,	  telos	  means	  “completion”	  or	  “the	  completion	  of	  something;”	  
symbouleutikon	  means	  “the	  bringing	  together	  of	  decisions	  or	  wills;”	  and	  sympheron	  means	  “bringing	  or	  bearing	  together.”	  To	  identify	  these	  terms	  in	  each	  of	  the	  English	  translations	  below,	  I	  underlined	  translations	  for	  telos	  with	  a	  straight	  line,	  translations	  for	  symbouleutikon	  with	  a	  dotted	  line,	  and	  translations	  for	  sympheron	  with	  a	  waved	  line.	  	  The	  first	  translation	  of	  1362a	  is	  from	  the	  1926	  Freese	  translation	  (available	  online	  as	  part	  of	  Tufts	  University’s	  Perseus	  Project):	  But	  since	  the	  aim	  before	  the	  deliberative	  orator	  is	  that	  which	  is	  expedient,	  and	  men	  deliberate,	  not	  about	  the	  end,	  but	  about	  the	  means	  to	  the	  end,	  which	  are	  the	  things	  which	  are	  expedient	  in	  regard	  to	  our	  actions;	  and	  since,	  further,	  the	  expedient	  is	  good,	  we	  must	  first	  grasp	  the	  elementary	  notions	  of	  good	  and	  expedient	  in	  general.	  	  The	  second	  is	  from	  the	  1932	  Cooper	  translation:	  Now	  the	  aim	  of	  one	  who	  gives	  counsel	  is	  utility	  [what	  is	  expedient];	  for	  men	  deliberate,	  not	  about	  the	  ends	  to	  be	  attained,	  but	  about	  the	  means	  of	  attaining	  these;	  and	  the	  means	  are	  expedient	  things	  to	  do.	  Since	  this	  is	  so,	  and	  since	  anything	  expedient	  is	  a	  good,	  we	  must	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  elementary	  notions	  of	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘expedient’	  in	  general.	  (Cooper	  29,	  brackets	  in	  original)	  	  Next	  is	  from	  the	  1984	  Roberts	  translation	  (this	  is	  the	  version	  Katz	  quotes):	  Now	  the	  deliberative	  orator’s	  aim	  is	  utility:	  deliberation	  seeks	  to	  determine	  not	  ends	  but	  the	  means	  to	  ends,	  i.e.	  what	  is	  most	  useful	  to	  do.	  Further,	  utility	  is	  a	  good	  thing.	  We	  ought	  therefore	  to	  assure	  ourselves	  of	  the	  main	  facts	  about	  goodness	  and	  utility	  in	  general.	  (Roberts	  2165)	  	  Finally,	  this	  is	  from	  the	  2007	  Kennedy	  translation	  (the	  most	  widely	  accepted	  current	  English	  translation):	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But	  since	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  deliberative	  speaker	  is	  the	  advantageous	  [sympheron],	  and	  since	  [people]	  do	  not	  deliberate	  about	  this	  objective	  but	  about	  means	  that	  contribute	  to	  it	  and	  these	  [means]	  are	  things	  advantageous	  in	  terms	  of	  actions,	  and	  since	  the	  advantageous	  is	  a	  good,	  one	  should	  grasp	  the	  elements	  of	  good	  and	  advantageous	  in	  the	  abstract.	  (Kennedy	  61,	  brackets	  in	  original)	  	  Without	  exception,	  each	  of	  these	  translations	  follows	  the	  early	  lead	  of	  Cicero	  in	  translating	  what	  Aristotle	  taught	  about	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  Cicero’s	  early	  work	  on	  rhetoric	  De	  Inventione	  along	  with	  the	  Rhetorica	  ad	  Herennium	  (once	  attributed	  to	  Cicero)	  together	  formed	  “perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  element	  in	  the	  classical	  rhetorical	  corpus	  for	  medieval	  intellectuals,	  writers,	  and	  speakers”	  (Ward	  3).	  In	  other	  words,	  perhaps	  more	  than	  any	  other	  ancient	  rhetorical	  theorist,	  Cicero	  influenced	  the	  sort	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  rhetorical	  education	  that	  modern	  Europe	  inherited	  through	  the	  medieval	  and	  renaissance	  eras.	  In	  Hubbell’s	  1949	  translation	  of	  De	  Inventione,	  Cicero	  explains	  Aristotle’s	  approach	  to	  some	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  rhetoric	  this	  way,	  “it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  the	  end	  in	  the	  forensic	  type	  is	  equity,	  i.e.	  a	  subdivision	  of	  the	  larger	  topic	  of	  ‘honor.’	  In	  the	  deliberative	  type,	  however,	  Aristotle	  accepts	  advantage	  as	  the	  end,	  but	  I	  prefer	  both	  honor	  and	  advantage”	  (323-­‐25).	  In	  this	  passage	  I’ve	  identified	  terms	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  Aristotle	  passages	  just	  above.	  In	  the	  original	  Latin,	  end	  is	  a	  translation	  of	  a	  form	  of	  finis,	  which	  literally	  means	  “end”	  or	  “goal.”	  Advantage	  is	  a	  translation	  of	  utilitatem—literally	  “utility.”	  Finally,	  deliberative	  is	  a	  translation	  of	  deliberativo,	  which	  combines	  de—“concerning”	  or	  “in	  respect	  to”—with	  libro—first	  person	  subjective	  of	  “to	  consider”	  or	  “I	  consider”	  (note:	  libro	  is	  also	  a	  cognate	  of	  libero,	  a	  verb	  meaning	  “to	  free,”	  but	  both	  libro	  and	  libero	  are	  also	  cognates	  of	  liber,	  which	  refers	  to	  parchment	  or	  
	  	  
18	  
documentation;	  a	  Roman	  citizen	  was	  a	  citizen	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  free	  male	  and	  owning	  documents	  that	  pronounced	  his	  citizenship;	  deliberation	  in	  ancient	  Rome	  was	  thus	  a	  discourse	  that	  free,	  documented	  males	  participated	  in).	  See	  Table	  1	  for	  a	  descending	  comparison	  of	  these	  terms	  along	  with	  their	  literal	  translations	  from	  the	  original	  Greek	  and	  Latin.	  	  
Table	  1:	  Aristotle’s	  Terms	  in	  Greek,	  Latin,	  and	  English	  Aristotle’s	  terms	   Telos	   Symbouleutikon	  (syn	  +	  boule)	   Sympheron	  (syn	  +	  phero)	  Literal	  Translation	  from	  Greek	   completion	   together	  +	  decisions	  or	  together	  +	  wills	   together	  +	  bear	  or	  “confer”	  Cicero’s	  Translation	   finis	   deliberativo	  
de	  +	  libro	   utilitatem	  Literal	  Translation	  from	  Latin	   end,	  goal	   I	  consider	   utility	  Freese	  Translation	   aim,	  end	   deliberative,	  deliberate	   expedient	  Cooper	  Translation	   aim,	  ends	   gives	  counsel,	  deliberate	   utility,	  expedient	  Roberts	  Translation	   aims,	  ends	   deliberative,	  deliberation	   utility	  Kennedy	  Translation	   objective	   deliberative,	  deliberate	   advantageous	  	  These	  translational	  differences	  would	  be	  no	  more	  than	  curiosities	  of	  classical	  scholarship	  if	  classical	  and	  contemporary	  mis/treatments	  of	  these	  terms	  were	  not	  so	  influential	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  deliberation	  specifically	  and	  rhetoric	  more	  generally.	  The	  translational	  differences	  are	  simply	  striking.	  	  The	  post-­‐Cicero	  terms	  construct	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  this	  way:	  the	  end,	  aim,	  or	  objective	  of	  what	  I	  consider	  is	  utility	  or	  that	  which	  is	  expedient	  or	  advantageous.	  Or	  in	  a	  more	  concise	  form,	  the	  motives	  for	  post-­‐Cicero	  deliberation	  can	  be	  described	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like	  this:	  in	  the	  arguments	  I	  consider,	  my	  objective	  is	  whatever	  is	  expedient	  or	  useful.	  Indeed,	  the	  very	  terms	  end,	  deliberation,	  and	  utility	  are	  quasi-­‐direct	  Latin	  cognates	  with	  no	  clear	  parallel	  connection	  to	  Aristotle’s	  terms.	  The	  English	  term	  end	  is	  used	  in	  all	  its	  goal-­‐oriented,	  “finish-­‐line”	  connotations	  from	  the	  Latin	  finis.	  The	  English	  term	  deliberation	  is	  used	  in	  all	  of	  its	  singular	  “I	  consider”	  connotations	  from	  the	  Latin	  deliberativo.	  Further,	  Aristotle’s	  term	  sympheron	  has	  a	  direct	  Latin	  translation	  in	  the	  word	  confero,	  which	  is	  entirely	  supplanted	  with	  that	  which	  is	  useful	  (utility)	  or	  expedient	  in	  the	  Latin	  term	  utilitatem.	  Supplanting	  sympheron	  with	  utilitatem	  is	  especially	  odd;	  since,	  confero	  is	  a	  literal	  Latin	  translation	  of	  
sympheron.	  The	  individual	  components	  of	  symperhon	  and	  confero	  are	  fairly	  commensurable:	  syn	  and	  con	  both	  mean	  “together”	  in	  Greek	  and	  Latin	  respectively	  while	  the	  latter	  components	  pher	  and	  fer	  are	  etymologically	  identical—they	  both	  mean	  “to	  bear”	  (or	  “to	  bring”	  or	  “to	  carry”).	  And	  a	  direct	  English	  cognate	  of	  
sympheron	  and	  confero	  is	  the	  verb	  to	  confer	  or	  the	  nouns	  conferring	  and	  conference.	  	  Thus,	  a	  more	  direct	  and	  sensible	  translation	  using	  Aristotle’s	  terms	  constructs	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  in	  a	  much	  different	  way:	  the	  completion	  of	  decisions	  together	  is	  bearing	  together.	  Or	  we	  might	  rephrase	  it	  this	  way:	  to	  complete	  decisions	  together,	  communicators	  bear	  together.	  Or	  in	  a	  less	  clunky	  manner:	  to	  complete	  decisions	  together,	  communicators	  confer	  with	  each	  other.	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By	  the	  time	  Cicero	  was	  theorizing	  rhetoric,	  deliberation	  had	  lost	  this	  Greek	  emphasis	  of	  togetherness	  in	  decision-­‐making	  and	  gained	  the	  Roman	  emphasis	  of	  the	  individual	  making	  decisions.	  It	  should	  be	  no	  small	  wonder	  then	  why	  the	  Greeks	  failed	  to	  produce	  a	  long	  line	  of	  Caesars	  (Aristotle’s	  pupil	  Alexander	  being	  the	  closest	  exception—perhaps	  even	  the	  missing	  deliberative	  link).	  Whatever	  caused	  the	  Roman	  shift	  away	  from	  togetherness	  toward	  individual	  expediency,	  the	  rhetorical	  fallout	  is	  readily	  apparent	  in	  the	  outright	  replacing	  telos	  for	  finis,	  sympheron	  for	  
utilitas,	  and	  symbouleutikon	  for	  delibero.	  With	  those	  three	  changes	  in	  place,	  every	  interpretation	  and	  reading	  of	  “deliberative”	  rhetoric	  forever	  after	  is	  already	  flavored	  and	  tilted	  toward	  individual	  expediency	  and	  away	  from	  togetherness.	  	  I	  am	  reminded	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  frustrated	  observations	  about	  the	  construction	  of	  truth:	  “If	  someone	  hides	  an	  object	  behind	  a	  bush,	  then	  seeks	  and	  finds	  it	  there,	  that	  seeking	  and	  finding	  is	  not	  very	  laudable	  .	  .	  .	  If	  I	  define	  the	  mammal	  and	  then	  after	  examining	  a	  camel	  declare,	  ‘See,	  a	  mammal,’	  a	  truth	  is	  brought	  to	  light,	  but	  it	  is	  of	  limited	  value”	  (“On	  Truth”	  251).	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  let’s	  say	  I	  define	  “completion”	  (telos)	  in	  terms	  of	  “a	  goal”	  or	  “objective”	  (finis),	  and	  I	  define	  “conferring”	  or	  “bearing	  together”	  (sympheron)	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  expediency	  or	  utility	  (utilitas).	  While	  I’m	  at	  it,	  I’ll	  further	  define	  the	  bringing	  together	  of	  wills	  or	  making	  decisions	  together	  (symbouleutikon)	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  “I	  consider”	  (delibero).	  After	  I	  do	  this,	  I’ll	  examine	  this	  refitted	  “deliberative”	  rhetoric	  and	  see	  how	  it	  encourages	  me	  to	  seek	  as	  my	  “objective”	  what	  “I	  consider”	  to	  be	  “expedient.”	  I	  may	  very	  well	  declare	  at	  this	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point,	  “See,	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  encourages	  folks	  to	  be	  right	  bastards	  to	  each	  other.”	  But	  such	  an	  observation	  is	  not	  laudable	  and	  is	  of	  limited	  value.	  	  As	  of	  yet,	  I	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  find	  the	  ancient	  source	  of	  these	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  Aristotle’s	  rhetoric	  was	  translated	  and	  taught	  from	  Greece	  to	  Rome.	  Between	  Aristotle’s	  time	  and	  Cicero’s,	  Hermagoras	  was	  arguably	  the	  most	  influential	  teacher	  of	  rhetoric	  who	  emphasized	  most	  significantly	  the	  role	  of	  stasis	  in	  forming	  arguments.	  But	  Hermagoras	  does	  not	  greatly	  transform	  Aristotle’s	  terms.	  Perhaps	  the	  change	  occurred	  somewhere	  in	  the	  Etruscan	  pre-­‐Roman	  tradition,	  which	  was	  contemporary	  to	  ancient	  Athens	  and	  was	  apparently	  highly	  literate,	  going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  wrap	  their	  dead	  in	  linen	  books,	  like	  the	  Liber	  Linteus	  (Enos	  20).	  Or	  perhaps	  the	  change	  was	  more	  contemporary	  to	  Cicero—perhaps	  by	  the	  unknown	  author	  of	  the	  Rhetorica	  Ad	  Herennium	  who	  teaches	  deliberation	  in	  the	  same	  way	  Cicero	  does.	  But	  regardless	  of	  how	  the	  translation	  leap	  was	  made,	  Cicero	  is	  an	  early	  notable	  critic	  of	  Aristotle’s	  deliberative	  rhetoric—being	  perhaps	  the	  first	  critic	  to	  suggest	  that	  some	  additional	  ethical	  component	  was	  needed	  to	  temper	  and	  bridle	  the	  damaging	  impulse	  of	  expediency	  or	  utilitas.	  	  The	  frustration	  from	  a	  historical	  perspective,	  however,	  is	  that	  expediency	  as	  a	  motive	  was	  added	  to	  Aristotelian	  deliberation.	  To	  proceed	  from	  this	  in	  Aristotle:	  to	  complete	  decisions	  together,	  communicators	  confer	  with	  each	  other—to	  this	  in	  Cicero:	  in	  the	  arguments	  I	  consider,	  my	  objective	  is	  whatever	  is	  expedient	  or	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useful—frankly	  boggles	  the	  mind.	  Aristotle’s	  terminology	  of	  telos,	  symbouleutikon,	  and	  sympheron	  indicates	  possible	  (if	  not	  obvious)	  corrective	  influences	  to	  the	  damaging	  influence	  of	  expediency	  in	  rhetorical	  practice.	  For	  instance,	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  as	  symbouleutikon	  emphasizes	  togetherness	  in	  decision	  making	  instead	  of	  individuals	  verbally	  combating	  each	  other	  to	  get	  their	  way;	  or,	  the	  purposes	  of	  rhetoric	  in	  terms	  of	  telos	  suggests	  that	  rhetoric	  can	  be	  taught	  and	  practiced	  as	  a	  process	  of	  completing	  discussions	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  objective-­‐oriented	  contest;	  or,	  rhetoric	  can	  be	  motivated	  by	  the	  impulse	  to	  confer	  with	  one	  another	  in	  terms	  of	  
sympheron	  instead	  of	  motivated	  by	  situational	  expediency.	  	  Indeed,	  Aristotle’s	  terminology	  directly	  confronts	  the	  common	  penchant	  he	  sees	  in	  deliberative	  orators	  to	  “never	  admit	  that	  they	  are	  advising	  things	  that	  are	  not	  advantageous	  [to	  the	  audience]	  or	  that	  they	  are	  dissuading	  [the	  audience]	  from	  what	  is	  beneficial;	  and	  often	  they	  do	  not	  insist	  that	  it	  is	  not	  unjust	  to	  enslave	  neighbors	  or	  those	  who	  have	  done	  no	  wrong”	  (Kennedy	  49,	  brackets	  in	  original).	  In	  a	  footnote,	  Kennedy	  explains	  that	  in	  this	  section,	  “Aristotle	  again	  recognizes	  that	  in	  practice	  deliberative	  orators	  are	  often	  indifferent	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  injustice	  to	  others	  of	  some	  action”	  (49).	  Kennedy	  further	  explains	  that	  Aristotle	  advocates	  an	  attitudinal	  shift	  away	  from	  such	  harmful	  rhetoric:	  “Since	  Aristotle	  has	  said	  in	  [Rhetoric	  Book	  I,	  Chapter	  1,	  Section	  12]	  that	  we	  must	  not	  persuade	  what	  is	  bad,	  he	  would	  presumably	  recommend	  that	  a	  speaker	  seek	  to	  identify	  the	  enlightened,	  long-­‐term	  advantage	  to	  the	  audience,	  not	  immediate	  expediency”	  (Kennedy	  49).	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The	  Question	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Continued	  Relevance	  But	  these	  observations	  face	  significant	  institutional	  difficulty;	  since,	  from	  Cicero’s	  time	  at	  least,	  Aristotle	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  expediency.	  And	  this	  perspective	  is	  understandable.	  Even	  though	  Aristotle’s	  terms	  for	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  connote	  togetherness,	  Aristotle	  still	  described	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  with	  a	  definite	  expediency	  edge	  to	  it.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  stretch	  to	  read	  all	  of	  his	  Rhetoric	  as	  a	  treatise	  supporting	  communal	  togetherness.	  Too	  many	  sections	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  are	  directly	  about	  a	  skilled	  speaker	  using	  rhetorical	  tools	  to	  convince	  audiences	  regardless	  of	  the	  particular	  topic	  at	  hand.	  Also,	  Aristotle’s	  separation	  of	  his	  Ethics	  (and	  Politics)	  from	  the	  Rhetoric	  indicates	  that	  he	  instituted	  what	  is	  perhaps	  the	  earliest	  and	  most	  influential	  divide	  between	  ethics	  and	  rhetoric.	  	  A	  defender	  of	  Aristotle	  might	  interject	  and	  point	  out	  that	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  was	  part	  of	  an	  integrated	  curriculum	  that	  included	  the	  Ethics	  and	  Politics	  (see	  Clayton	  191;	  Johnstone	  1-­‐2;	  Self	  130),	  and	  there	  are	  certainly	  key	  terms	  shared	  among	  all	  three	  works	  (telos,	  symbouleutikon,	  and	  sympheron	  among	  them).	  Thus	  we	  can’t	  fully	  understand	  the	  Rhetoric	  without	  understanding	  the	  Ethics	  and	  Politics.	  This	  may	  be	  true	  (I	  am	  certainly	  inclined	  to	  believe	  so),	  but	  this	  still	  does	  not	  mitigate	  two	  fundamental	  difficulties.	  The	  chief	  difficulty	  remains	  that	  rhetoric	  in	  general	  (and	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  specifically)	  was	  a	  distinct	  enough	  discipline	  for	  Aristotle	  that	  he	  saw	  ethics	  as	  something	  to	  be	  mastered	  in	  tandem	  with	  rhetoric	  instead	  of	  as	  
	  	  
24	  
part	  of	  the	  same	  discipline.	  Secondly,	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  clearly	  prepares	  its	  readers	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  ancient	  Athenian	  political	  system,	  which,	  by	  Aristotle’s	  time,	  had	  favored	  verbally	  astute	  rhetors	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  less-­‐rhetorically	  prepared	  participants—i.e.	  Athenian	  politics	  favored	  expediency	  over	  communal	  togetherness.	  An	  extension	  of	  this	  difficulty	  is	  the	  unavoidable	  observation	  that	  Aristotle’s	  divisions	  of	  rhetoric—deliberation	  chief	  among	  them—have	  no	  direct	  corollary	  venues	  outside	  of	  the	  lawmaking	  assemblies,	  judicial	  courts,	  and	  customary	  rituals	  that	  were	  specific	  to	  Aristotle’s	  time	  and	  situation.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  difficulties—that	  rhetoric	  was	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  thing	  than	  ethics	  for	  Aristotle—can	  be	  addressed	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  second	  difficulty—that	  Aristotle’s	  rhetoric	  was	  specific	  only	  to	  his	  time,	  location,	  and	  cultural	  practices.	  	  As	  James	  Crosswhite	  recounts,	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  advances	  a	  strong	  criticism	  in	  this	  vein	  in	  response	  to	  Chaim	  Perelman	  who	  described	  rhetoric’s	  scope	  as	  reaching	  to	  all	  modes	  of	  communication	  (private,	  public,	  inward,	  and	  outward).	  Instead,	  Ricoeur	  believes	  that	  this	  concept	  is	  too	  broad	  .	  .	  .	  .	  that	  rhetoric	  was	  born	  with	  the	  legal	  reforms	  that	  took	  place	  in	  sixth	  century	  BCE	  .	  .	  .	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  forever	  conditioned,	  shaped,	  and	  limited	  by	  the	  typical	  discursive	  situations	  in	  which	  it	  arose,	  [specifically]	  Aristotle’s	  famous	  three:	  the	  deliberative,	  the	  judicial,	  and	  epideictic	  contexts	  and	  genres	  of	  rhetoric.	  [Further,	  while	  Ricoeur]	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  is	  an	  internal	  tendency	  of	  rhetoric	  to	  move	  beyond	  these	  contexts,	  .	  .	  .	  he	  also	  believes	  that	  the	  generative	  seats	  of	  rhetoric	  provide	  an	  unconquerable	  constraint	  on	  rhetoric’s	  ambitions.	  Rhetoric	  will	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always	  have	  a	  historical	  and	  situational	  and	  quasi-­‐institutional	  character.	  (Crosswhite	  18)	  	  Crosswhite	  has	  deep	  reservations	  with	  Ricoeur’s	  account	  of	  rhetoric	  because	  ancient	  rhetoric	  developed	  not	  only	  as	  a	  specific	  political	  practice	  but	  also	  as	  an	  art	  that	  could	  be	  taught	  according	  to	  situation	  or	  need.	  This	  adaptable	  quality	  of	  rhetoric	  indicates	  how	  flexible	  the	  concept	  of	  rhetoric	  has	  been	  since	  its	  inception.	  	  Rhetoric	  as	  a	  term	  emerged	  in	  the	  public	  practice	  of	  the	  ancient	  Athenian	  Assembly.	  The	  Assembly	  fluctuated	  in	  size	  from	  3000-­‐6000	  male	  citizens	  who	  gathered	  on	  a	  hillside	  near	  the	  Acropolis.	  Any	  male	  citizen	  could	  participate	  each	  day,	  but	  the	  number	  was	  capped	  at	  6000.	  As	  Paul	  Woodruff	  explains,	  Any	  adult	  male	  citizen	  could	  speak;	  the	  right	  to	  speak	  in	  Assembly,	  known	  as	  parrhesia,	  was	  the	  most	  precious	  of	  all	  privileges	  of	  Athenians.	  Nevertheless,	  ordinary	  citizens	  rarely	  used	  the	  privilege,	  leaving	  it	  to	  those	  active	  in	  politics	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  Assembly.	  Such	  speakers	  were	  known	  as	  rhetors;	  that	  were	  able	  to	  exert	  special	  influence	  without	  holding	  public	  office,	  simply	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  speaking	  ability.	  (33)	  	  Rhetoric	  as	  a	  term	  arises	  from	  rhesis,	  which	  means	  “speaker”	  or	  “speech”	  and	  has	  remained	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  term	  in	  Western	  cultures	  to	  describe	  the	  art	  of	  speaking,	  writing,	  or	  arguing.	  Orators	  schooled	  in	  rhetoric	  were	  “those	  who	  had	  absorbed	  and	  put	  into	  practice	  a	  training	  in	  public	  speaking,	  whether	  it	  was	  exercised	  in	  the	  law	  courts,	  .	  .	  .	  deliberations	  and	  public	  assemblies”	  or	  elsewhere	  (Ward	  7).	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Considering	  rhetoric	  thus	  in	  its	  terminological	  infancy,	  it	  would	  seem	  odd	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  teachable	  skills	  that	  made	  public	  rhetoric	  possible	  were	  only	  used	  in	  the	  specific	  public	  settings	  of	  the	  Assembly	  or	  the	  courts	  or	  other	  ceremonial	  venues.	  Indeed,	  it	  seems	  a	  bit	  absurd	  to	  imagine	  Greek	  citizens	  skilled	  in	  getting	  their	  way	  in	  the	  public	  Assembly	  and	  not	  using	  those	  same	  skills	  in	  all	  their	  other	  interactions.	  As	  Crosswhite	  further	  explains,	  The	  early	  history	  of	  rhetoric,	  the	  history	  of	  its	  origin,	  was	  connected	  not	  only	  with	  specific	  changes	  in	  political	  institutions	  [like	  the	  Assembly]	  and	  social	  practices	  but	  also	  with	  new	  conceptions	  of	  education	  and	  of	  the	  spefici	  nature	  of	  human	  beings.	  From	  the	  beginning,	  rhetoric	  had	  exceeded	  its	  institutional	  origins.”	  (19)	  	  Eugene	  Garver	  offers	  a	  similar	  observation	  with	  a	  challenging	  question:	  “Even	  in	  Aristotle’s	  time,	  most	  rhetorical	  speeches	  did	  not	  fall	  under	  one	  of	  the	  three	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric.	  Today,	  the	  proportion	  of	  rhetoric	  that	  is	  deliberative,	  judicial,	  or	  epideictic	  is	  even	  smaller.	  Why	  does	  this	  not	  demonstrate	  the	  irrelevance	  of	  Aristotle’s	  
Rhetoric?”	  (Garver	  17).	  Garver	  answers	  this	  challenge	  by	  comparing	  Aristotle’s	  
Rhetoric	  to	  his	  Ethics	  texts.	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  and	  Ethics	  texts	  were	  educational	  texts	  that	  were	  about	  “aspiration	  rather	  than	  obligation”	  (17).	  	  Aristotle	  focuses	  on	  “the	  three	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric	  even	  [though]	  most	  of	  the	  time	  speakers	  find	  themselves	  in	  persuasive	  situations	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  these	  kinds”	  because	  the	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric	  “tell	  us	  what	  rhetoric	  should	  and	  can	  be”	  (17-­‐18).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  charge	  that	  Aristotle’s	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric	  do	  not	  expressly	  apply	  to	  most	  situations	  would	  have	  been	  obvious	  to	  Aristotle	  about	  most	  situations	  during	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his	  life.	  What	  Aristotle’s	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric	  give	  his	  readers	  are	  situational	  types	  in	  which	  certain	  rhetorical	  motives	  find	  completeness.	  Aristotle’s	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric	  are	  theoretical	  divisions	  only	  that	  provide	  a	  philosophic	  approach	  to	  his	  overall	  theories	  of	  rhetoric.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  Aristotle	  divides	  rhetoric	  into	  three	  kinds	  only	  in	  Book	  I	  of	  his	  Rhetoric.	  As	  Garver	  explains,	  Aristotle	  in	  Book	  II	  and	  Book	  III	  “can	  examine	  all	  sorts	  of	  rhetoric	  without	  worrying	  about	  whether	  a	  given	  argument	  is	  deliberative,	  judicial,	  or	  epideictic	  .	  .	  .	  .	  And	  certainly	  is	  we	  look	  at	  the	  
Rhetoric	  2,500	  years	  later,	  Book	  I	  will	  seem	  outdated—another	  word	  for	  contextually	  bound—in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Rhetoric	  does	  not”	  (8).	  	  This	  realization	  helps	  us	  recognize	  two	  useful	  aspects	  of	  Aristotle’s	  rhetoric.	  The	  first	  is	  obvious:	  the	  specific	  contexts	  for	  Aristotle’s	  three	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric	  are	  outdated	  and	  inapplicable	  to	  most	  situations	  past	  and	  present.	  But	  the	  second	  aspect	  is	  subtle	  and	  much	  more	  critical	  to	  understanding	  Aristotle’s	  relevance	  to	  rhetoric	  today:	  Aristotle	  recognized	  that	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  human	  activity	  is	  inclined	  toward	  completing	  itself.	  For	  Aristotle,	  everyday	  instances	  of	  individuals	  deliberating	  about	  one	  course	  of	  action	  over	  another	  are	  incomplete	  in	  that	  such	  instances	  address	  only	  a	  few	  individuals.	  However,	  deliberations	  that	  affect	  all	  individuals	  (such	  as	  happened	  in	  the	  Assembly)	  are	  more	  complete	  examples	  of	  deliberation.	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This	  is	  why	  rhetoric	  is	  subordinate	  to	  politics	  for	  Aristotle.	  As	  Garver	  further	  explains	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  rhetoric	  for	  Aristotle,	  “Laws	  should	  determine	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  .	  .	  .	  [But]	  since	  laws	  cannot	  determine	  everything,	  rhetoric	  is	  necessary.	  In	  this	  regard,	  politics	  is	  definite	  and	  rhetoric	  indefinite”	  (12).	  Yet,	  for	  rhetoric	  to	  affect	  political	  subjects,	  it	  must	  necessarily	  draw	  on	  phronesis,	  or	  the	  indefinite	  practical	  wisdom	  and	  practical	  virtue	  shared	  by	  a	  population.	  Aristotle	  develops	  the	  idea	  of	  phronesis	  most	  thoroughly	  in	  his	  Ethics,	  but	  he	  also	  treats	  phronesis	  in	  his	  Rhetoric	  suggesting	  that	  the	  “good”	  in	  rhetorical	  situations	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  those	  things	  “which	  living	  things	  would	  choose,	  in	  each	  case,	  if	  they	  had	  practical	  wisdom	  [i.e.	  phronesis]”	  (Kennedy	  69).	  	  In	  his	  Ethics,	  Aristotle	  differentiates	  between	  this	  sort	  of	  practical	  wisdom	  and	  mere	  cleverness	  (in	  the	  following	  Bartlett	  and	  Collins	  translation,	  phronesis	  is	  translated	  as	  “prudence”).	  For	  Aristotle,	  cleverness	  “is	  of	  such	  a	  character	  as	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  doing	  what	  is	  conducive	  to	  the	  target	  posited	  and	  so	  of	  hitting	  it.	  If,	  then,	  the	  target	  is	  a	  noble	  one,	  the	  cleverness	  is	  praiseworthy;	  but	  if	  base,	  it	  is	  mere	  cunning.	  Hence	  we	  assert	  that	  even	  the	  prudent	  are	  terribly	  clever,”	  for	  as	  Aristotle	  explains,	  prudence	  “does	  not	  exist	  without	  this	  capacity	  [i.e.	  cleverness].”	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  someone	  trying	  to	  be	  prudent	  “does	  not	  acquire	  the	  characteristic	  of	  prudence	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  virtue,”	  for	  “this	  end	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  someone	  if	  he	  is	  not	  good.	  For	  corruption	  distorts	  and	  causes	  one	  to	  be	  mistaken	  about	  the	  principles	  bound	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up	  with	  action.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  manifest	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  good	  to	  be	  prudent”	  (Bartlett	  and	  Collins	  132).	  	  Besides	  being	  an	  excellent	  argument	  for	  the	  unity	  of	  ethics	  and	  rhetoric,	  Aristotle’s	  opposition	  of	  phronesis	  to	  cleverness	  clearly	  illustrates	  the	  anti-­‐expediency	  motive	  that	  Aristotle	  tried	  to	  articulate	  for	  rhetoric.	  As	  Garver	  explains,	  “the	  defect	  of	  cleverness	  is	  not	  that	  it	  is	  directed	  towards	  bad	  ends.	  Its	  flaw	  consists	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  no	  ends	  of	  its	  own	  but	  must	  be	  directed	  to	  ends	  outside	  itself”	  (12).	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  phronesis	  or	  practical	  wisdom	  is	  divorced	  from	  rhetoric,	  then	  rhetoric	  is	  guided	  only	  by	  cleverness	  which	  has	  no	  aims	  other	  than	  to	  get	  its	  own	  way.	  Cleverness	  is	  the	  actual	  elusive	  characteristic	  behind	  Stephen	  Katz’s	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  Rhetoric	  driven	  by	  practical	  wisdom	  simply	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  expediency	  Katz	  decries.	  	  But	  practical	  wisdom	  is	  somewhat	  ephemeral,	  based	  as	  it	  is	  on	  the	  collective	  wisdom	  and	  virtue	  of	  a	  given	  population.	  For	  Aristotle,	  this	  is	  especially	  true	  in	  terms	  of	  laws	  and	  other	  subjects	  that	  cannot	  or	  do	  not	  determine	  everything	  in	  their	  respective	  realms.	  In	  such	  situations,	  we	  must	  rely	  on	  rhetoric	  as	  directed	  by	  practical	  wisdom,	  for	  there	  is	  no	  other	  guide	  on	  which	  to	  rely.	  But,	  as	  Garver	  points	  out,	  this	  peculiar	  set	  of	  conditions	  situates	  rhetoric	  as	  “an	  art	  of	  persuasion	  concerning	  subjects	  without	  corresponding	  definite	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  an	  art	  for	  considering	  issues	  about	  which	  there	  is	  no	  art”	  (13).	  This	  is	  why	  rhetoric	  benefits	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from	  being	  moored	  to	  a	  political	  identity,	  such	  as	  through	  deliberation,	  which	  has	  its	  
completion	  in	  publicly	  discursive	  settings	  like	  the	  Assembly.	  Without	  a	  political	  identity	  through	  which	  practical	  wisdom	  can	  be	  directed,	  rhetoric	  has	  only	  cleverness	  to	  rely	  on,	  which	  is	  the	  first	  damning	  step	  toward	  Katz’s	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  	  And	  politically	  moored	  rhetoric	  is	  in	  constant	  danger	  of	  being	  commandeered	  by	  cleverness.	  Of	  Aristotle’s	  three	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric,	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  is	  the	  most	  political.	  Aristotle	  clearly	  favored	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  as	  the	  most	  rational	  of	  his	  three	  kinds	  of	  rhetoric.	  This	  is	  because	  in	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  inasmuch	  as	  practical	  wisdom	  is	  the	  guiding	  motive	  for	  all	  involved,	  Aristotle	  asserts	  “nothing	  is	  needed	  except	  to	  show	  that	  circumstances	  are	  as	  the	  speaker	  says”	  (Kennedy	  33).	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  traditional	  liberalism,	  which	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  Enlightenment.	  Sharon	  Crowley	  describes	  this	  sort	  of	  traditional	  liberalism	  and	  traditional	  liberals	  this	  way:	  Liberals	  can	  be	  persuaded	  by	  empirical	  facts,	  particularly	  if	  these	  are	  marshaled	  by	  authoritative	  sources	  and	  couched	  in	  appeals	  to	  reason,	  such	  as	  definition,	  analogy,	  induction,	  and	  the	  like.	  The	  thinkers	  who	  conceptualized	  liberalism	  trusted	  evidence	  provided	  by	  the	  senses.	  Furthermore,	  they	  made	  a	  rigorous	  distinction	  between	  facts	  and	  values	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  values	  are	  invented	  without	  recourse	  to	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  are	  hence	  untrustworthy.	  (315)	  	  Traditional	  liberalism,	  however,	  faces	  frequent	  attacks—most	  often	  from	  “right-­‐wing	  discourse	  whose	  persuasiveness	  usually	  depends	  on	  nonfactual	  proofs”	  (Crowley	  315).	  This	  was	  certainly	  true	  of	  Nazi	  propaganda	  that	  dehumanized	  Jews	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and	  those	  who	  did	  not	  otherwise	  culturally	  meld	  with	  conservative	  views	  of	  the	  
Volksdeustche.	  And,	  as	  Crowley	  argues,	  this	  is	  also	  true	  of	  contemporary	  American	  right-­‐wing	  rhetoric	  that	  asserts	  an	  array	  of	  nonfactual	  proofs	  supporting	  falsehoods	  about	  Iraqi	  WMD,	  birth	  control,	  human	  sexuality,	  and	  other	  hot-­‐button	  social	  and	  political	  topics.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  what	  Crowley	  calls	  “pure	  rhetoric”	  with	  no	  basis	  in	  factual	  argument,	  Crowley	  now	  styles	  herself	  a	  “recovering	  liberal”	  with	  deep	  reservations	  of	  Aristotelian	  rhetoric.	  “The	  problem	  for	  Aristotle,	  and	  for	  us,”	  she	  asserts,	   is	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  not	  logic;	  its	  realm	  is	  human	  affairs	  rather	  than	  numbers	  or	  symbols.	  Rhetoric	  is	  the	  art	  of	  finding	  the	  available	  means	  of	  persuasion,	  and	  Aristotle	  teaches	  us	  that	  those	  means	  of	  persuasion	  reside	  in	  the	  common	  sense	  of	  the	  community	  [or	  phronesis,	  practical	  wisdom].	  .	  .	  .	  When	  fabrications	  and	  misrepresentations	  constitute	  the	  common	  sense,	  bad	  things	  are	  bound	  to	  happen	  because	  these	  argumentative	  tactics	  are	  driven	  not	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  find	  all	  of	  the	  available	  arguments	  but	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  silence	  all	  of	  the	  available	  opposition.	  (325)	  	  While	  Crowley	  laments	  the	  ineffectualness	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  tradition	  we’ve	  inherited	  from	  Aristotle,	  the	  sort	  of	  clever	  “pure	  rhetoric”	  she	  describes	  is	  more	  clearly	  of	  ancient	  Roman	  origin.	  As	  the	  nameless	  Roman	  author	  of	  the	  Rhetoric	  Ad	  
Herennium	  asserts	  centuries	  after	  Aristotle,	  “when	  we	  have	  submitted	  our	  arguments	  and	  destroyed	  those	  of	  the	  opposition,	  we	  have,	  of	  course,	  completely	  fulfilled	  the	  speaker’s	  function”	  (Caplan	  33).	  That	  is	  the	  motive	  that	  underlies	  the	  political	  rhetoric	  gone	  awry	  that	  Sharon	  Crowley	  laments.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  mindset	  that	  propels	  the	  destructive	  ethic	  of	  expediency,	  which	  Stephen	  Katz	  decries.	  	  
	  	  
32	  
In	  response	  to	  theorists	  like	  Crowley	  and	  Katz,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  sorts	  of	  rhetoric	  they	  critique	  are	  not	  modes	  of	  communication	  that	  have	  become	  too	  rhetorical	  or	  purely	  rhetorical.	  Instead,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  such	  communication	  is	  
not	  rhetorical	  enough.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  rhetorical	  incompleteness	  about	  arguments	  and	  technical	  communication	  which	  merely	  seek	  to	  convince	  and	  expedite	  desired	  actions.	  	  I	  use	  variations	  of	  the	  term	  complete	  in	  reference	  to	  Aristotle’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  telos.	  And	  I	  do	  so	  not	  in	  any	  effort	  to	  reclaim	  some	  sort	  of	  Aristotelian	  ideal.	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  in	  reclaiming	  Aristotle.	  Instead,	  I	  find	  in	  some	  of	  his	  terms	  a	  great	  many	  corrective	  implications	  for	  the	  sort	  of	  rhetoric	  gone	  awry	  that	  theorists	  like	  Crowley	  and	  Katz	  observe.	  Again,	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  in	  merely	  recreating	  Aristotle’s	  conceptual	  and	  rhetorical	  tools.	  Instead,	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  learn	  much	  from	  looking	  at	  the	  conceptual	  and	  rhetorical	  tools	  that	  Aristotle	  used	  to	  create	  his	  own.	  	  
Chapter	  Summaries	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  specifically	  focus	  on	  the	  three	  embattled	  concepts	  surrounding	  Aristotle’s	  description	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric:	  telos,	  symbouleutikon,	  and	  
sympheron.	  Each	  of	  the	  next	  three	  chapters	  focuses	  on	  each	  of	  these	  terms	  in	  order	  and	  explores	  some	  of	  the	  corrective	  implications	  of	  each.	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Chapter	  2	  explores	  how	  a	  reappropriated	  notion	  of	  telos-­‐as-­‐completion	  enriches	  our	  understanding	  of	  rhetorical	  theory	  and	  practice—specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  notions	  of	  rhetorical	  “war”	  and	  entelechy.	  Chapter	  3	  explores	  how	  a	  rhetorically	  deliberative	  understanding	  of	  symbouleutikon	  ultimately	  reveals	  the	  pluralistic	  underpinnings	  of	  Kantian	  moral	  philosophy.	  As	  goes	  Kant,	  so	  goes	  much	  of	  the	  subsequent	  history	  of	  Ethics.	  Or	  in	  other	  words,	  Chapter	  3	  explores	  the	  rhetorical	  basis	  for	  Ethics	  writ	  large.	  Chapter	  4	  explores	  a	  reappropriated	  notion	  of	  
sympheron-­‐as-­‐bearing-­‐together	  and	  reveals	  the	  rhetorical	  utility	  of	  democratic	  inefficiency.	  Chapter	  5	  employs	  the	  reappropriated	  notions	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  to	  expressly	  technical	  communication	  materials—specifically	  instruction	  manuals	  and	  visually	  composed	  graphs	  and	  charts.	  Chapter	  6	  concludes	  this	  dissertation	  and	  is	  a	  study	  of	  principles	  of	  symbouleutikon	  in	  university	  writing	  instruction—especially	  in	  terms	  of	  civic	  engagement	  and	  service	  learning.	  Chapter	  6	  also	  unapologetically	  explores	  the	  necessity	  of	  ideology	  in	  education.	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  CHAPTER	  2.	  THE	  END	  OF	  CONFLICT:	  TELOS	  AND	  THE	  RHETORIC	  OF	  “WAR”	  	  “Every	  question	  selects	  a	  field	  of	  battle,	  and	  in	  this	  selection	  it	  forms	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  answers.”	  —Kenneth	  Burke,	  Philosophy	  of	  Literary	  Form	  	  “Holding	  one	  of	  those	  things	  in	  your	  hands,	  cleaning	  the	  barrel	  and	  shoving	  rounds	  into	  clips,	  really	  brings	  you	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  with	  what	  a	  desperate,	  last-­‐ditch	  measure	  they	  really	  are.	  I	  mean,	  if	  it	  gets	  to	  the	  point	  where	  we	  are	  shooting	  people	  and	  vice	  versa,	  then	  we	  have	  completely	  screwed	  up.”	  —Neal	  Stephenson,	  Cryptonomicon	  
	  
Beginning	  with	  Ends	  This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  end—specifically,	  telos.	  Working	  definitions	  of	  telos	  tend	  to	  posit	  telos	  as,	  “the	  end	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  which	  something	  exists	  or	  is	  done,	  or	  what	  it	  is	  that	  motivates	  an	  agent	  or	  an	  activity	  to	  achieve	  an	  end	  result”	  (Wallace	  114).	  This	  specific	  definition	  comes	  from	  William	  A.	  Wallace’s	  essay	  “Aitia:	  Causal	  Reasoning	  in	  Composition	  and	  Rhetoric”	  which	  appeared	  immediately	  after	  James	  Kinneavy’s	  field-­‐altering	  essay	  on	  “Kairos:	  A	  Neglected	  Concept	  in	  Classical	  Rhetoric”	  in	  the	  1986	  collection	  of	  essays	  Rhetoric	  and	  Praxis.	  In	  his	  essay,	  Wallace	  primarily	  aims	  to	  explore	  how	  a	  recovered	  understanding	  of	  aitia,	  which	  translates	  as	  cause,	  could	  “relate	  to	  written	  exposition	  and	  persuasion”	  (107).	  However,	  a	  recovered	  and	  reappropriated	  notion	  of	  telos	  (which	  Wallace’s	  briefly	  overviews)	  is	  significant	  in	  its	  own	  right	  to	  enriching	  our	  understanding	  of	  rhetorical	  theory	  and	  practice.	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The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  an	  extended	  definition	  of	  telos.	  But	  for	  the	  moment,	  telos	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  purpose-­‐completion,	  or	  those	  qualities	  of	  rhetorical	  situations	  that	  indicate	  how	  we	  know	  certain	  rhetorical	  situations	  have	  been	  completed	  and	  others	  have	  begun.	  To	  identify	  qualities	  of	  telos	  in	  a	  rhetorical	  situation	  is	  not	  just	  to	  ask,	  “Why	  are	  we	  arguing?”	  but	  to	  also	  ask,	  “What	  sort	  of	  rhetorical	  situation	  are	  we	  even	  engaged	  in?”	  Thus,	  romantic	  partners	  caught	  in	  a	  cruel,	  name-­‐calling	  quarrel	  with	  each	  other	  may	  pause	  in	  deference	  to	  their	  feelings	  of	  affection	  and	  ask	  one	  another,	  “What	  are	  we	  doing	  here?”	  This	  is	  a	  question	  of	  
telos	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  shift	  their	  situation	  from	  an	  argument	  of	  mutual	  emotional	  hurt	  to	  a	  possible	  discussion	  of	  mutual	  emotional	  healing.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  question,	  “What	  are	  we	  doing	  here?”	  might	  rhetorically	  complete	  the	  telos	  of	  one	  situation	  and	  begin	  the	  telos	  of	  another	  situation.	  	  Contemporary	  rhetoric’s	  most	  developed	  notions	  of	  telos-­‐like	  qualities	  of	  rhetorical	  situations	  in	  this	  sense	  come	  from	  Kenneth	  Burke.	  Burke	  latches	  onto	  Aristotle’s	  neologism	  entelechy	  (which	  is	  partly	  derived	  from	  telos)	  to	  identify	  the	  purpose-­‐completion	  qualities	  of	  symbolic	  action.	  Burke’s	  notions	  of	  attitude	  and	  purification	  also	  relate	  to	  telos,	  though	  Burke	  doggedly	  retains	  his	  own	  idiosyncratic	  vocabulary	  and	  terminology.	  Burke’s	  most	  idiosyncratic	  yet	  useful	  terminology	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  his	  well-­‐known	  motto	  Ad	  Bellum	  Purificandum,	  or	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War.”	  In	  short,	  as	  human’s	  inclination	  to	  complete	  purposes	  (i.e.	  telos)	  emerges	  from	  conflict	  or	  a	  natural	  state	  of	  war,	  Burke	  via	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  explains	  how	  
	  	  
36	  
rhetorical/verbal/symbolic	  conflict	  can	  be	  harnessed	  to	  negate	  the	  destructive	  qualities	  of	  physical	  conflict	  and	  war.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  ends	  (i.e.	  telos)	  of	  rhetorical	  conflicts	  can	  bring	  about	  the	  end	  (i.e.	  cessation)	  of	  physical	  conflicts.	  Before	  exploring	  Burke’s	  contributions	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  telos,	  a	  review	  of	  relevant	  scholarship	  would	  be	  helpful	  in	  explaining	  why	  telos	  has	  been	  neglected.	  	  Though	  telos	  as	  an	  explicit	  rhetorical	  term	  may	  be	  neglected,	  concerns	  of	  purpose	  and	  motivation	  crop	  up	  all	  over	  studies	  and	  practices	  of	  Rhetoric.	  As	  Wallace	  rightly	  observes,	  “most	  [college	  freshmen’s]	  papers	  and	  themes	  tend	  to	  deal	  with	  subjects	  wherein	  purposes	  and	  ends	  and	  goals,	  and	  their	  proper	  or	  improper	  attainment,	  constitute	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  their	  discourse”	  (115).	  This	  is	  certainly	  just	  as	  true	  today	  as	  it	  was	  a	  quarter	  century	  ago.	  Also,	  purpose	  as	  a	  concern	  in	  specific	  writing	  projects	  is	  a	  constant	  theme	  in	  technical/professional	  communication	  and	  in	  ESL/TESOL	  scholarship.	  Motivation	  as	  a	  term	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  Psychology	  and	  Education	  has	  garnered	  enough	  recent	  scholarly	  attention	  to	  fill	  a	  substantial	  book	  of	  essays	  Writing	  and	  Motivation,	  which	  purports	  to	  be,	  “the	  first	  book	  which	  exclusively	  deals	  with	  motivational	  aspects	  of	  academic	  writing”	  (Hidi	  and	  Boscolo	  1).	  And	  of	  course,	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  A	  Grammar	  of	  Motives	  begins	  with	  purpose	  and	  motivation	  in	  its	  introductory	  question:	  “What	  is	  involved,	  when	  we	  say	  what	  people	  are	  doing	  and	  why	  they	  are	  doing	  it?	  An	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  book”	  (x).	  Certainly,	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  entire	  Motives	  project	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  long	  answer	  to	  the	  question,	  “What	  are	  all	  the	  varied	  purposes	  of	  purpose	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itself?”	  At	  any	  rate,	  if	  purposes	  and	  motives	  and	  ends	  and	  goals	  are	  everywhere	  in	  rhetorical	  practice,	  whence	  our	  lack	  of	  discussion	  about	  telos	  specifically?	  I	  see	  at	  least	  four	  general	  possibilities.	  	  First,	  perhaps	  we	  feel	  overly	  familiar	  with	  telos.	  In	  his	  provocative	  introduction	  to	  the	  term	  kairos,	  Kinneavy	  asserts,	  “Anyone	  in	  the	  field	  of	  rhetoric	  has	  undoubtedly	  already	  encountered	  .	  .	  .	  telos	  [which]	  hardly	  need[s]	  justification	  in	  such	  a	  symposium”	  (79).	  Kinneavy	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  “But	  kairos	  is	  not	  listed	  in	  Lahnham’s	  A	  
Handlist	  of	  Rhetorical	  Terms,	  nor	  in	  the	  four	  volumes	  of	  the	  Dictionary	  of	  the	  History	  
of	  Ideas,	  nor	  in	  the	  two	  volumes	  of	  The	  Great	  Ideas:	  A	  Syntopicon,	  which	  accompanies	  the	  Great	  Books	  of	  the	  Western	  World	  series”	  (80).	  Yet,	  while	  kairos	  has	  since	  been	  added	  to	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  Lahnham’s	  Handlist	  (Lahnham	  94),	  telos	  is	  still	  absent	  from	  Lahnham’s	  Handlist	  and	  the	  other	  works	  that	  Kinneavy	  laments	  have	  excluded	  
kairos	  (which	  was	  apparently	  lesser	  known	  than	  telos	  at	  the	  time	  he	  wrote).	  	  Or	  perhaps	  we	  are	  more	  comfortable	  discussing	  telos	  in	  the	  specific,	  as	  in	  specific	  rhetorical	  purposes/ends/goals,	  rather	  than	  rhetorical	  purpose/ends/goals	  in	  general	  or	  abstract.	  Consider,	  for	  instance,	  the	  handful—literally	  four—sources	  with	  the	  search	  term	  “telos”	  that	  can	  be	  found	  (as	  of	  October	  2012)	  through	  CompPile—the	  most	  comprehensive	  online	  “inventory	  of	  publications	  in	  writing	  studies,	  including	  post-­‐secondary	  composition,	  rhetoric,	  technical	  writing,	  ESL,	  and	  discourse	  analysis”	  (CompPile	  2012).	  Each	  article	  searchable	  with	  “telos”	  in	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CompPile	  treats	  telos	  in	  terms	  of	  situation-­‐specific	  purposes	  and	  goals	  but	  is	  not	  about	  telos	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  term	  in	  general.	  Similar	  searches	  in	  larger	  multi-­‐discipline	  search	  engines	  (e.g.	  Ex	  Libris’s	  MetaLib)	  return	  similar	  results	  for	  combined	  search	  terms	  “rhetoric”	  and	  “telos.”	  Plus,	  particularly	  in	  technical	  and	  professional	  communication,	  purpose	  as	  a	  term	  tends	  to	  get	  treated	  in	  the	  same	  way—as	  situation-­‐specific	  goals	  and	  ends—not	  as	  a	  guiding	  disciplinary	  term	  (for	  a	  smattering	  of	  examples	  see	  Cubbison;	  Myers;	  McAdon;	  Plung;	  and	  Nelson	  in	  the	  Bibliography).	  	  Also	  perhaps	  for	  many	  rhetoric	  scholars,	  telos-­‐in-­‐general	  is	  uncomfortably	  connected	  to	  the	  troubled	  study	  of	  teleology,	  the	  name	  of	  which	  is	  derived	  from	  telos	  and	  is	  the	  philosophic	  study	  of	  purposes	  in	  nature.	  Postmodern	  rhetorical	  sensibilities	  may	  clash	  with	  any	  such	  metanarratives	  that	  seek	  to	  establish	  universal	  perspectives	  over	  something	  so	  unavoidably	  subjective	  as	  purpose.	  Certainly,	  the	  idea	  of	  purpose-­‐in-­‐general	  carries	  almost	  sinister	  implications	  for	  individual	  minority	  purposes	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  accord	  with	  “more	  general”	  majority	  purposes.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  understanding	  telos	  as	  purpose-­‐in-­‐general	  can	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  individual	  purposes	  (just	  as	  understanding	  kairos	  as	  context-­‐in-­‐general	  helps	  us	  better	  understand	  individual	  contexts).	  And	  I	  know	  of	  no	  other	  more	  profound	  teleological	  claim	  than	  this:	  regardless	  of	  what	  purposes	  may	  or	  may	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  nature,	  and	  for	  all	  our	  varied	  and	  infinitely	  individual	  purposes,	  it	  is	  yet	  an	  inexorable	  quality	  of	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humans	  that	  we	  articulate	  purposes	  (see	  also	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan	  and	  Morgan	  58–59	  and	  70–71).	  In	  regards	  to	  humans,	  an	  understanding	  of	  telos-­‐in-­‐general	  begins	  with	  that	  observation.	  	  Finally,	  perhaps	  we	  neglect	  telos	  as	  an	  explicit	  rhetorical	  term	  because	  other	  disciplines	  have	  developed	  parallel	  terminology	  to	  address	  many	  of	  the	  same	  issues.	  I	  am	  particularly	  referring	  to	  discussions	  of	  intentionality	  in	  Analytic	  Philosophy	  (and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  in	  Continental	  traditions).	  Intentionality	  is	  that	  quality	  of	  mental	  states	  that	  directs	  mental	  activity	  toward	  this	  or	  that	  concern.	  Not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  most	  everyday	  uses	  of	  intention,	  intentionality	  is	  the	  ability	  mental	  states	  have	  to	  be	  about	  something	  or	  other.	  Discussions	  of	  intentionality	  tend	  to	  sidestep	  ancient	  Greek	  considerations	  entirely—thus	  failing	  to	  intersect	  telos	  at	  all—because,	  as	  Victor	  Caston	  observes,	  “According	  to	  the	  standard	  narrative	  .	  .	  .,	  contemporary	  interest	  in	  intentionality	  traces	  back	  through	  Husserl	  and	  Brentano	  to	  late	  scholastic	  philosophy,	  and	  from	  there	  to	  Arabic	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Avicenna	  and	  Alfarabi”	  (23).	  And	  though	  Caston	  has	  pursued	  threads	  of	  intentionality	  in	  ancient	  Greek	  thought	  (including	  a	  forthcoming	  book	  on	  Aristotle	  and	  intentionality),	  philosophic	  discussions	  of	  intentionality	  by-­‐and-­‐large	  ignore	  references	  to	  telos	  or	  its	  philosophic	  cousin	  teleology.	  Though	  not	  overtly	  stated	  in	  it,	  Caston’s	  work	  suggests	  a	  significant	  contributing	  reason	  to	  the	  disciplinary	  disunity	  of	  intentionality	  and	  telos.	  Caston	  argues	  that,	  “Augustine	  is	  the	  lynchpin	  that	  connects	  the	  two	  traditions”	  of	  ancient	  Greece	  and	  Medieval	  Scholasticism	  (45).	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Augustine’s	  emphasis	  of	  intentio	  (of	  the	  individual	  will	  and	  the	  Divine	  will)	  posits	  a	  decidedly	  isolated	  individual	  foundation	  for	  future	  discussions	  of	  intentionality.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  telos,	  as	  Aristotle	  specifically,	  is	  a	  very	  socially	  shared	  thing.	  	  
A	  Philology	  of	  Telos	  Before	  wandering	  too	  far	  afield,	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  pause	  here	  and	  consider	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  ancient	  development	  of	  telos.	  Such	  a	  diachronic	  analysis	  reveals	  how	  telos	  has	  been	  utilized	  in	  Rhetoric	  anciently	  and	  how	  a	  reappropriated	  sense	  of	  
telos	  can	  contribute	  to	  Rhetoric	  today.	  Usually,	  telos	  is	  defined	  as	  end	  or	  goal	  or	  purpose.	  But	  this	  most	  common	  of	  definitions	  falls	  short	  of	  its	  most	  basic	  meaning:	  
completion.	  	  Martin	  Heidegger	  offers	  useful	  translations	  of	  telos	  (and	  its	  cognates	  telios,	  teleion,	  and	  entelecheia)	  in	  his	  early	  lectures	  on	  Aristotle.	  When	  speaking	  specifically	  about	  
telos,	  Heidegger	  translates	  Aristotle’s	  Metaphysics	  16.1021b.29	  this	  way:	  “Tέλος	  [i.e.	  
telos],	  constituting	  the	  end	  as	  being-­‐completed,	  means	  also	  that	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  which	  something	  is,	  the	  for-­‐the-­‐sake-­‐of-­‐which	  as	  what	  is	  outermost”	  (Basic	  Concepts	  57).	  With	  telos	  thus	  defined	  as	  “the	  end	  as	  being-­‐completed,”	  Heidegger	  further	  posits,	  “τέλος	  is	  a	  basic	  category	  of	  human	  beings”	  (Basic	  Concepts	  57).	  Heidegger’s	  strong	  claim	  is	  supported	  by	  his	  translation	  of	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  Aristotle’s	  
Metaphysics	  (16.1021b.28),	  “On	  this	  account,	  even	  the	  end	  of	  life,	  death,	  is	  called	  consummation	  in	  view	  of	  a	  carrying-­‐over	  constituting	  a	  being-­‐completed	  [i.e.	  telos]	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of	  life”	  (Basic	  Concepts	  57).	  Heidegger’s	  particular	  understanding	  of	  telos	  stems	  from	  his	  understanding	  of	  telos	  in	  larger	  Greek	  contexts.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  translation,	  Homer	  uses	  telos	  in	  terms	  of	  fulfillment	  or	  coming	  to	  pass	  or	  doom	  or	  consummation.	  All	  instances	  involve	  some	  sort	  of	  conflict	  whether	  expressly	  or	  implicitly.	  In	  the	  battle-­‐ridden	  Iliad,	  for	  example,	  telos	  often	  refers	  to	  the	  doom	  (or	  destiny)	  of	  death	  that	  the	  capricious	  gods	  inflict	  on	  mortals.	  In	  these	  instances,	  mortal	  efforts	  are	  pitted	  in	  conflict	  (or	  at	  least	  subservient	  to)	  the	  will	  of	  the	  gods.	  In	  other	  instances	  throughout	  the	  Iliad,	  telos	  refers	  to	  the	  culmination	  of	  battles	  between	  or	  among	  warriors.	  In	  these	  instances,	  human	  efforts	  are	  pitted	  against	  each	  other	  in	  literal	  physical	  conflict.	  In	  a	  few	  intriguing	  instances	  in	  Homer,	  
telos	  refers	  to	  consummation—as	  in	  a	  conversation	  Odysseus	  has	  with	  Antinous	  (one	  of	  the	  chief	  suitors	  of	  Odysseus’s	  wife	  Penelope).	  In	  Odyssey	  Book	  17,	  lines	  475-­‐6,	  the	  Murray	  translation	  has	  Odysseus	  exclaim,	  “Ah,	  if	  for	  beggars	  there	  are	  gods	  and	  avengers,	  may	  the	  doom	  of	  death	  come	  upon	  Antinous	  before	  his	  marriage.”	  The	  actual	  Greek	  phrase	  here	  is	  “πρὸ	  γάμοιο	  τέλος	  θανάτοιο	  κιχείη”	  which	  places	  τέλος	  (i.e.	  telos)	  right	  between	  marriage	  and	  death	  thus	  punning	  on	  the	  “fulfillment”	  characteristics	  of	  both	  death	  and	  sex.	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  completion	  qualities	  of	  telos	  were	  solidly	  part	  of	  Greek	  semantics	  when	  Aristotle	  employed	  the	  word	  in	  his	  Rhetoric.	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Telos-­‐as-­‐completion	  nuances	  our	  understanding	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  in	  profound	  ways.	  According	  to	  George	  Kennedy’s	  translation,	  Aristotle	  begins	  his	  well-­‐known	  three	  divisions	  of	  rhetoric	  with	  this:	  The	  species	  [eide]	  of	  rhetoric	  are	  three	  in	  number;	  for	  such	  is	  the	  number	  [of	  classes]	  to	  which	  the	  hearers	  of	  speeches	  belong.	  A	  speech	  consist	  of	  three	  things:	  a	  speaker	  and	  a	  subject	  on	  which	  he	  speaks	  and	  someone	  addressed,	  and	  the	  objective	  [telos]	  of	  the	  speech	  relates	  to	  the	  last	  (I	  mean	  the	  hearer).	  (Kennedy	  47,	  unless	  otherwise	  noted,	  brackets,	  italics,	  and	  parentheses	  are	  part	  of	  Kennedy’s	  translation)	  	  And	  then	  after	  briefly	  introducing	  the	  three	  species	  of	  deliberative,	  judicial,	  and	  epideictic,	  Aristotle	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that,	  “the	  ‘end’	  of	  each	  of	  these	  is	  different,	  and	  there	  are	  three	  ends	  for	  the	  three	  [species]”	  (Kennedy	  49).	  Kennedy	  notes	  that	  “end”	  in	  this	  sentence	  is	  telos.	  Kennedy’s	  translation	  goes	  on	  to	  relate	  the	  particular	  
telos	  of	  each	  species	  of	  rhetoric:	  the	  telos	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  is	  the	  advantageous	  and	  the	  harmful;	  the	  telos	  for	  judicial	  rhetoric	  is	  the	  just	  and	  the	  unjust;	  and	  the	  telos	  for	  epideictic	  (praise	  and	  blame)	  rhetoric	  is	  the	  honorable	  and	  the	  shameful	  (Kennedy	  49).	  	  Two	  features	  of	  Aristotle’s	  rhetorical	  notion	  of	  telos	  stand	  out	  immediately	  from	  his	  text:	  first,	  speakers	  and	  audiences	  share	  telos;	  second,	  telos	  refers	  to	  species	  of	  purposes—i.e.	  telos	  is	  a	  source	  from	  which	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  subject-­‐specific	  purposes	  emerges.	  It	  is	  significant	  that	  conventional	  notions	  of	  purpose	  and	  aim	  do	  not	  neatly	  fit	  with	  either	  of	  these	  features	  of	  telos.	  This	  is	  because	  purpose	  and	  aim	  are	  typically	  unidirectional	  and	  individual	  concepts	  from	  speaker	  to	  audience	  or	  from	  audience	  to	  speaker.	  Indeed,	  unless	  the	  word	  shared	  (or	  some	  other	  identifier)	  is	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used	  when	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  purposes	  and	  aims	  of	  multiple	  agents,	  we	  tend	  to	  assume	  that	  all	  purposes	  and	  aims	  are	  individual	  and	  potentially	  clashing.	  Telos-­‐as-­‐completion,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  no	  conventional	  baggage	  that	  prevents	  it	  from	  being	  a	  multidirectional	  concept	  shared	  by	  speakers	  and	  audiences.	  	  It	  is	  evident	  from	  Aristotle	  that	  speakers	  and	  audience	  share	  telos.	  Kennedy	  recognizes	  the	  speaker-­‐audience	  connection	  of	  telos	  in	  a	  translational	  note:	  “Telos,	  the	  final	  objective	  of	  the	  speaker	  and	  his	  art,	  which	  is	  actualized	  in	  the	  persuasion	  of	  the	  audience”	  (49,	  note	  82).	  But	  Kennedy’s	  note	  clings	  to	  the	  conventional	  view	  of	  
telos-­‐as-­‐purpose.	  If	  telos	  means	  completion,	  then	  the	  question	  is	  not	  necessarily,	  “what	  purpose	  does	  the	  speaker	  and	  audience	  share?”	  but	  instead,	  “what	  will	  complete	  this	  situation	  between	  this	  speaker	  and	  this	  audience?”	  A	  more	  colloquial	  formulation	  of	  this	  question	  of	  telos	  might	  be	  phrased	  as,	  “Where	  is	  their	  conversation	  heading?”	  Telos	  is	  thus	  a	  sort	  of	  meta-­‐purpose	  that	  binds	  speaker	  and	  audience	  together	  in	  a	  mutually	  agreed	  upon	  activity	  (in	  which	  agreement	  may	  be	  implicit	  or	  explicit).	  The	  primacy	  of	  telos	  in	  Aristotle’s	  rhetoric	  makes	  sense	  in	  this	  light.	  Before	  participants	  can	  proceed	  with	  the	  subject	  matter	  (stasis)	  or	  even	  the	  art	  (techne)	  of	  any	  activity,	  they	  must	  discern	  what	  sort	  of	  activity	  they	  are	  even	  participating	  in.	  	  This	  primary	  rhetorical	  concern	  of	  telos	  bumps	  into	  concerns	  of	  kairos.	  And	  while	  contextual	  appropriateness	  definitely	  affects	  the	  direction	  of	  every	  rhetorical	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activity,	  it	  is	  equally	  true	  that	  introducing	  a	  new	  rhetorical	  activity	  also	  affects	  what	  is	  appropriate	  in	  rhetorical	  situations.	  Consider	  two	  drunken	  strangers	  exchanging	  punches	  on	  a	  sidewalk	  outside	  a	  bar.	  While	  their	  activity	  may	  break	  cultural	  appropriateness	  writ	  large,	  their	  mutual	  agreement	  to	  exchange	  blows	  (their	  telos)	  certainly	  establishes	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  their	  brawl	  in	  their	  situation.	  Notice	  how	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  their	  situation	  could	  change	  if	  mutual	  friends	  interrupt	  them	  and	  hold	  them	  apart	  with	  the	  question,	  “What’s	  going	  on	  here?”	  If	  the	  fighters	  respond	  in	  any	  way	  other	  than	  throwing	  another	  punch,	  that	  question	  rhetorically	  completed	  the	  telos	  of	  their	  agreement	  to	  physically	  hurt	  each	  other	  and	  may	  begin	  a	  still	  unpleasant	  but	  distinctly	  different	  telos	  of	  agreeing	  to	  hurl	  accusations	  (or	  some	  other	  similar	  activity).	  Notice	  also	  that	  situation-­‐specific	  purposes,	  while	  not	  exactly	  irrelevant,	  can	  be	  fluid	  depending	  on	  the	  rhetorical	  activity.	  The	  fight	  example	  above	  could	  happen	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  resolve	  (i.e.	  complete)	  a	  perceived	  insult,	  misunderstanding,	  previous	  suffered	  wrong,	  or	  almost	  any	  other	  situational	  purpose.	  But	  regardless	  of	  situation-­‐specific	  purpose	  in	  this	  sense,	  such	  fights	  ultimately	  happen	  because	  one	  or	  more	  individuals	  agree	  with	  one	  or	  more	  other	  individuals	  to	  begin	  throwing	  punches.	  That	  agreement	  is	  the	  telos	  of	  their	  situation.	  	  
Telos	  and	  Stasis	  
Telos	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  pre-­‐argument	  agreement—a	  shared	  intention	  by	  at	  least	  two	  participants.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  stasis,	  which	  has	  come	  to	  inform	  conventional	  notions	  of	  purpose	  more	  than	  telos,	  and	  which	  fully	  matured	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after	  Aristotle	  via	  Hermagoras	  and,	  later,	  Cicero	  and	  Quintilian.	  Sharon	  Crowley	  and	  Debra	  Hawhee	  explain	  stasis	  this	  way:	  “Seen	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  two	  disputants,	  .	  .	  .	  the	  stasis	  marks	  the	  place	  where	  two	  opposing	  forces	  come	  together,	  where	  they	  rest	  or	  stand	  in	  agreement	  on	  what	  is	  at	  issue”	  (53).	  And	  therein	  lies	  the	  nuanced	  significance	  between	  telos	  and	  stasis:	  stasis	  addresses	  subject	  matter	  while	  
telos	  addresses	  rhetorical	  direction.	  Crowley	  and	  Hawee	  use	  contemporary	  debates	  about	  abortion	  to	  show	  how	  disputants	  can	  formulate	  their	  arguments	  from	  the	  mutual	  agreement	  as	  to	  what	  sort	  of	  subject	  matter	  to	  discuss.	  But	  telos	  determines	  what	  sort	  of	  “discussion”	  even	  happens,	  whether	  it	  be	  a	  debate,	  an	  editorial	  exchange,	  a	  public	  protest,	  an	  argument	  among	  friends,	  a	  tearful	  decision	  at	  home,	  or	  (tragically)	  violence	  against	  medical	  practitioners.	  	  Admittedly,	  the	  distinction	  between	  telos	  and	  stasis	  may	  seem	  fuzzy,	  but	  consider	  a	  notable	  moment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Republican	  Presidential	  Primary	  during	  a	  debate	  televised	  on	  CNN	  on	  January	  26,	  2012.	  Wolf	  Blitzer	  moderated	  an	  exchange	  between	  two	  of	  the	  candidates,	  Newt	  Gingrich	  (former	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House)	  and	  Mitt	  Romney	  (former	  Governor	  of	  Massachusetts).	  At	  the	  time,	  Mitt	  Romney’s	  sizable	  wealth	  (and	  his	  tax	  rate	  and	  where	  he	  kept	  his	  wealth)	  was	  in	  the	  news	  (all	  transcript	  quotes	  from	  CNN).	  BLITZER:	  .	  .	  .	  let	  me	  bring	  this	  to	  Speaker	  Gingrich.	  .	  .	  .	  are	  you	  satisfied	  right	  now	  with	  the	  level	  of	  transparency	  as	  far	  as	  [Governor	  Romney’s]	  personal	  finances?	  	  GINGRICH:	  Wolf,	  you	  and	  I	  have	  a	  great	  relationship,	  it	  goes	  back	  a	  long	  way.	  I'm	  with	  him.	  This	  is	  a	  nonsense	  question.	  (APPLAUSE)	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Note	  that	  at	  the	  time,	  Gingrich	  had	  been	  garnering	  a	  lot	  of	  popular	  conservative	  support	  (especially	  in	  South	  Carolina	  the	  previous	  week)	  for	  castigating	  mainstream	  media	  for	  their	  supposedly	  nonsensical	  or	  supposedly	  biased	  treatment	  of	  Republican	  Primary	  candidates.	  After	  receiving	  the	  applause	  from	  this	  Florida	  crowd,	  Gingrich	  attempts	  to	  change	  the	  telos	  of	  the	  debate	  away	  from	  an	  epideictic	  
telos	  toward	  a	  deliberative	  telos:	  GINGRICH:	  Look,	  how	  about	  if	  the	  four	  of	  us	  agree	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  evening,	  we'll	  actually	  talk	  about	  issues	  that	  relate	  to	  governing	  America?	  	  Notice	  that	  Gingrich	  does	  not	  assert	  any	  specific	  issues	  (i.e.	  statements	  of	  stasis);	  rather,	  he	  merely	  asserts	  that	  the	  very	  form	  of	  the	  discussion	  should	  be	  about	  (unidentified)	  issues	  that	  relate	  to	  governing	  America.	  It	  is	  in	  Gingrich’s	  interest	  to	  assert	  a	  shift	  in	  telos	  from	  praise	  and	  blame	  to	  deliberation;	  the	  week	  before,	  a	  different	  news	  agency	  broke	  a	  story	  alleging	  that	  Gingrich	  had	  requested	  an	  open	  marriage	  with	  a	  previous	  wife.	  But	  Blitzer	  does	  not	  back	  down	  from	  Gingrich’s	  attacks	  on	  the	  media	  (as	  moderator	  John	  King	  had	  the	  week	  before	  in	  a	  South	  Carolina	  debate).	  Instead,	  Blitzer	  doggedly	  justifies	  retaining	  an	  epideictic	  telos	  while	  Gingrich	  strives	  to	  establish	  a	  deliberative	  telos:	  BLITZER:	  But,	  Mr.	  Speaker,	  you	  made	  an	  issue	  of	  this,	  this	  week,	  when	  you	  said	  that,	  "He	  lives	  in	  a	  world	  of	  Swiss	  bank	  and	  Cayman	  Island	  bank	  accounts."	  I	  didn't	  say	  that.	  You	  did.	  	  GINGRICH:	  I	  did.	  And	  I'm	  perfectly	  happy	  to	  say	  that	  on	  an	  interview	  on	  some	  TV	  show.	  But	  this	  is	  a	  national	  debate,	  where	  you	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  get	  the	  four	  of	  us	  to	  talk	  about	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  issues.	  	  BLITZER:	  But	  if	  you	  make	  a	  serious	  accusation	  against	  Governor	  Romney	  like	  that,	  you	  need	  to	  explain	  that.	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  GINGRICH:	  I	  simply	  suggested	  -­‐-­‐	  (BOOING)	  	  You	  want	  to	  try	  again?	  I	  mean	  –	  	  At	  this	  point,	  Governor	  Romney	  interjects	  to	  keep	  the	  telos	  of	  the	  moment	  solidly	  in	  epideictic	  territory.	  ROMNEY:	  Wouldn't	  it	  be	  nice	  if	  people	  didn't	  make	  accusations	  somewhere	  else	  that	  they	  weren't	  willing	  to	  defend	  here?	  (APPLAUSE)	  	  At	  this	  point,	  Gingrich	  caves	  and	  finds	  he	  must	  complete	  the	  telos	  he	  helped	  fuel	  by	  explaining	  his	  own	  epideictic	  accusations	  of	  Governor	  Romney.	  Gingrich,	  Blitzer,	  and	  Romney	  all	  had	  individual	  purposes	  at	  stake	  and	  individual	  issues	  they	  wanted	  to	  discuss.	  But	  this	  exchange	  was	  less	  about	  specific	  issues	  and	  individual	  purposes	  and	  more	  about	  the	  sort	  of	  activity	  they	  wanted	  to	  engage	  in.	  A	  reappropriated	  notion	  of	  telos-­‐as-­‐completion	  helps	  clearly	  identify	  such	  rhetorical	  shifts.	  	  
Telos,	  Burke,	  and	  Nietzsche	  But	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  reappropriate	  solely	  from	  Aristotle	  for	  more	  current	  understandings	  of	  telos-­‐as-­‐completion.	  As	  indicated	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  chapter,	  Kenneth	  Burke	  advanced	  telos-­‐like	  concepts	  in	  his	  work.	  Specifically,	  Burke	  latches	  onto	  Aristotle’s	  neologism	  entelechy	  to	  describe	  the	  formal	  principle,	  “which	  describes	  a	  thing	  by	  conceiving	  of	  its	  kind	  according	  to	  the	  perfection	  (that	  is,	  finishedness)	  of	  which	  that	  kind	  is	  capable”	  (Rhetoric	  14).	  Aristotle	  derives	  entelechy	  or	  entelecheia	  from	  telos	  and	  tends	  to	  favor	  entelechy	  throughout	  his	  Metaphysics.	  Entelechy	  features	  so	  prominently	  in	  Aristotle	  that	  Heidegger	  asserts	  that	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entelecheia	  is	  “the	  fundamental	  concept	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  concept	  of	  being”	  (Basic	  
Concepts	  	  59).	  For	  his	  part,	  Burke	  describes,	  “the	  Aristotelian	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘entelechy’	  [as]	  the	  notion	  that	  each	  being	  aims	  at	  the	  perfection	  natural	  to	  its	  kind	  (or,	  etymologically,	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  ‘possession	  of	  telos	  within’)”	  (“Definition”	  507).	  Perfection	  in	  a	  telos	  sense	  does	  not	  mean	  “without	  error;”	  Burke	  uses	  perfection	  more	  in	  terms	  of	  completion	  or	  genuineness.	  As	  he	  explains	  in	  an	  interview	  later	  in	  life,	  “if	  you’re	  taking	  perfection	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  trying	  to	  be	  as	  good	  as	  you	  could,	  I	  think	  that	  it’s	  probably	  doubtful.	  But	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  way	  I	  use	  the	  term,	  a	  guy	  could	  be	  a	  perfect	  fool	  or	  a	  perfect	  bastard	  or	  something”	  (Chapin).	  Speaking	  specifically	  about	  this	  “entelechial”	  principle	  of	  perfection,	  Burke	  offers	  a	  key	  observation	  on	  the	  matter:	  “A	  given	  terminology	  contains	  various	  implications,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  corresponding	  ‘perfectionist’	  tendency	  for	  men	  to	  attempt	  carrying	  out	  those	  implications”	  (“Definition”	  510).	  A	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  motivational	  power	  of	  dehumanizing	  wartime	  rhetoric.	  If	  you	  can	  convince	  a	  population	  that	  its	  enemies	  are	  less	  than	  human,	  or	  animals,	  or	  better	  yet	  vermin,	  it	  becomes	  not	  just	  easier	  but	  obligatory	  to	  kill	  or	  exterminate	  those	  enemies.	  	  But	  what	  would	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  perfectionist	  tendencies	  of	  a	  telos	  terminology	  look	  like?	  Since	  telos	  is	  imbued	  with	  notions	  of	  rhetorical	  purpose,	  the	  guiding	  question	  in	  such	  an	  analysis	  would	  not	  be	  just,	  “What	  does	  rhetorical	  purpose	  mean?”	  but	  also,	  “What	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  rhetorical	  purpose?”	  Or	  in	  other	  words,	  “What	  is	  the	  particular	  telos	  of	  telos	  itself?”	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  employs	  Kenneth	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Burke’s	  entelechial	  notions	  of	  rhetorical	  perfection	  and	  purification	  to	  round	  out	  this	  reappropriated	  definition	  of	  telos.	  Since	  telos	  as	  the	  source	  of	  purpose-­‐making	  always	  and	  already	  involves	  ambiguous	  combinations	  of	  conflict	  and	  unity,	  the	  “completion”	  of	  telos	  involves	  understanding	  rhetorical	  conflict.	  	  As	  a	  study	  of	  rhetorical	  conflict,	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  essay	  “The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Hitler’s	  ‘Battle’”	  ends	  in	  a	  call	  to	  action.	  After	  analyzing	  Hitler’s	  various	  rhetorical	  moves	  in	  
Mein	  Kampf	  (which	  Burke	  translates	  as	  My	  Battle),	  Burke	  suggests	  that	  conscientious	  readers	  face	  an	  obligation	  to	  embrace	  a	  “battle”	  of	  their	  own.	  “Our	  job,	  then,	  our	  anti-­‐Hitler	  battle,”	  Burke	  claims,	  “is	  to	  find	  all	  available	  ways	  of	  making	  the	  Hitlerite	  distortions	  .	  .	  .	  apparent,	  in	  order	  that	  politicians	  of	  his	  kind	  in	  America	  be	  unable	  to	  perform	  a	  similar	  swindle”	  (Philosophy	  219).	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  counter	  Hitler’s	  insidiously	  destructive	  modes	  of	  conflict,	  Burke	  advocates	  not	  less	  conflict	  but	  more	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  conflict—a	  physically	  safe	  mode	  of	  conflict	  that	  rhetorically	  combats	  physically	  harmful	  conflict.	  This	  is	  more	  than	  just	  a	  capstone	  to	  his	  reading	  of	  Hitler’s	  “Battle.”	  Burke’s	  value	  of	  rhetorical	  conflict	  (as	  the	  best	  antidote	  to	  physical	  conflict)	  underscores	  most	  of	  his	  work	  throughout	  most	  of	  his	  career.	  	  Burke	  coined	  the	  phrase	  Ad	  Bellum	  Purificandum,	  or	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War,”	  to	  articulate	  this	  conflict-­‐valuing	  perspective.	  Even	  the	  most	  casual	  of	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  readers	  will	  recognize	  this	  phrase	  as	  the	  oddly	  hopeful	  motto	  of	  his	  1945	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book	  A	  Grammar	  of	  Motives	  (for	  an	  in-­‐book	  explanation	  of	  this	  motto,	  see	  Grammar	  317–20).	  Though	  articulated	  in	  the	  1940s,	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War”	  remained	  a	  guiding	  principle	  for	  Burke	  throughout	  his	  career	  up	  until	  his	  very	  last	  years	  (see	  Burks	  8).	  In	  a	  word,	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War”	  is	  Burke’s	  telos.	  For	  Burke,	  that	  motto	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  rhetorical	  situation	  we	  all	  ought	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  all	  the	  time.	  It’s	  also	  Burke’s	  attempt	  to	  encapsulate	  how	  embracing	  the	  symbolic	  qualities	  of	  war	  (i.e.	  divergence	  and	  disagreement)	  can	  serve	  to	  negate	  the	  physical	  qualities	  of	  war	  (i.e.	  the	  actual	  destruction	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  their	  property).	  In	  emphasizing	  the	  value	  of	  conflict,	  Burke	  acknowledges	  that	  he	  follows	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche’s	  lead	  in	  asserting	  that	  symbolic	  war	  can	  literally	  be	  a	  vigorous	  and	  healthy	  approach	  to	  life	  and	  living	  (for	  a	  late-­‐in-­‐life	  reference	  to	  Nietzsche	  in	  this	  regard,	  see	  Burke,	  “Communication”	  139–41;	  for	  significant	  early	  references,	  see	  Part	  II	  of	  Burke’s	  Permanence	  and	  Change).	  Thus,	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  eliminate	  war	  must	  not	  concern	  themselves	  with	  how	  to	  establish	  peace.	  Rather,	  eliminating	  actual	  physical	  conflict	  requires	  harnessing,	  refining,	  and	  completing	  conflict	  back	  to	  its	  symbolic	  roots—i.e.	  recognizing	  the	  telos	  qualities	  in	  conflict.	  	  Scholarship	  showing	  a	  philosophic	  genealogy	  from	  Nietzsche	  to	  Burke	  is	  not	  new	  (Burke	  himself	  was	  the	  first	  one	  to	  point	  it	  out	  in	  Permanence	  and	  Change;	  see	  also	  Hawhee	  129-­‐145).	  And,	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War”	  has	  received	  a	  lot	  of	  scholarly	  attention	  (see	  Bibliography	  for	  Blakesley;	  Weiser	  “Burke	  and	  War;”	  Zappen	  et	  al.;	  Weiser	  Burke,	  War,	  Words;	  and	  Wesier	  “As	  Usual”).	  And	  there	  is	  a	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significant	  Political	  Science	  discussion	  about	  Nietzsche	  and	  the	  social/political	  utility	  of	  conflict—specifically	  about	  agonism,	  agonistic	  pluralism,	  or	  agonistic	  democracy	  (for	  highlights,	  see	  Bibliography	  for	  Connolly;	  Hatab;	  and	  Mouffe).	  But	  what	  follows	  below	  is	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  emergent	  conditions	  and	  potential	  implications	  of	  rhetorical	  purpose	  writ	  large—of	  telos	  itself.	  The	  conditions	  and	  implications	  of	  rhetorical	  purpose	  are	  inseparable	  from	  conflict.	  Inasmuch	  as	  telos	  is	  the	  rhetorical	  source	  of	  purpose-­‐making,	  rhetorical	  telos	  always	  and	  already	  involves	  ambiguous	  combinations	  of	  conflict	  and	  unity	  among	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  Indeed,	  humans	  articulate	  telos	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  unity	  over	  the	  typically	  conflictual	  non-­‐purposeful	  state	  of	  nature	  they	  find	  themselves	  in.	  	  
War	  as	  Telos	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  hope	  to	  sidestep	  any	  possible	  trivialization	  of	  actual	  war	  by	  instead	  meditating	  on	  how	  war	  functions	  as	  an	  act	  of	  communication	  (something	  we	  talk	  with,	  like	  our	  fists—not	  something	  we	  talk	  about,	  like	  the	  weather).	  Viewing	  war	  as	  a	  telos	  of	  rhetoric—indeed,	  as	  a	  telos	  toward	  life	  in	  general—would	  nuance	  and	  broaden	  Carl	  von	  Clausewitz’s	  famous	  adage	  that	  “War	  is	  a	  mere	  continuation	  of	  policy	  by	  other	  means”	  (12).	  Instead	  of	  subordinating	  war	  to	  hegemonic	  state	  politics,	  viewing	  war	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  telos	  suggests	  that	  actual	  war	  is	  mass	  divergent	  communication	  manifested	  in	  physically	  violent	  ways.	  Actual	  war	  is	  horrific,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  actual	  war	  is	  also	  unavoidably	  and	  pervasively	  communicative.	  In	  microcosm,	  this	  is	  certainly	  true	  for	  armed	  individuals	  disputing	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the	  presence	  of	  other	  armed	  individuals	  near	  their	  homes.	  And	  in	  macrocosm,	  it	  is	  equally	  true	  for	  whole	  populations	  who	  pit	  human	  lives	  against	  more	  human	  lives	  over	  mass	  disagreements	  about	  trade,	  religion,	  race,	  property,	  or	  other	  ideologies.	  Viewing	  war	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  telos	  is	  also	  the	  most	  significant	  step	  toward	  understanding	  Burke’s	  motto	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War.”	  So	  it	  would	  be	  fruitful	  to	  first	  clearly	  explain	  Burke’s	  ambiguous	  use	  of	  war.	  	  Burke’s	  use	  of	  war	  is	  ambiguous	  in	  that	  Burke	  purposely	  and	  frequently	  slips	  from	  
war	  in	  an	  actual	  sense	  to	  war	  in	  a	  symbolic	  sense	  and	  back	  again.	  In	  the	  most	  basic	  sense,	  actual	  war	  is	  the	  concerted	  effort	  of	  people	  killing	  or	  harming	  each	  other,	  breaking	  each	  other’s	  things,	  and	  claiming	  each	  other’s	  property	  without	  agreement.	  Both	  and	  Nietzsche	  condemn	  this	  kind	  of	  war.	  With	  mournful	  disdain,	  Nietzsche	  figures	  that	  people	  who	  actually	  seek	  the	  real	  destruction	  of	  others	  already	  live	  self-­‐condemned	  lives	  (see	  Nietzsche,	  Twilight	  53–55).	  Nietzsche	  does	  offer	  a	  scathingly	  ironic	  call	  for	  the	  end	  of	  war:	  “If	  we	  could	  dispense	  with	  wars,	  so	  much	  the	  better.	  I	  can	  imagine	  more	  profitable	  uses	  for	  the	  twelve	  billion	  now	  paid	  annually	  for	  the	  armed	  peace	  we	  have	  in	  Europe;	  there	  are	  other	  means	  of	  winning	  respect	  for	  physiology	  than	  field	  hospitals”	  (Ecce	  344).	  Nietzsche	  speaks	  from	  experience.	  He	  served	  briefly	  as	  a	  medical	  orderly	  on	  the	  front	  in	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War	  of	  1870	  (Pletsch	  110-­‐12).	  Nietzsche	  further	  calls	  the	  kind	  of	  reason	  that	  seeks	  to	  violently	  remove	  all	  challenges	  to	  its	  authority	  “diseased	  reason”	  (Twilight	  56).	  Nietzsche	  clearly	  sees	  actual	  war	  as	  the	  perpetual	  lesser	  of	  any	  other	  options	  of	  behaving.	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Burke	  pursues	  a	  similar	  “diseased”	  path	  of	  analysis.	  “Outright	  war,”	  Burke	  asserts,	  “is	  to	  be	  viewed	  not	  as	  ‘essentially’	  a	  human	  motive,	  but	  rather	  secondarily	  as	  a	  
diseased	  form	  of	  cooperation”	  (“Communication”	  144,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  Actual	  war	  is	  cooperative	  in	  that	  the	  massively	  technological	  qualities	  of	  warfare	  require	  a	  mind-­‐boggling	  amount	  of	  cooperation	  among	  scientists,	  economists,	  politicians,	  media	  promoters,	  educators,	  and	  civic	  organizers	  (not	  to	  mention	  the	  correlative	  efforts	  of	  the	  militarists	  themselves).	  But	  actual	  war	  is	  also	  diseased	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  most	  noxious	  symptom	  of	  a	  larger	  societal	  illness	  that	  Burke	  calls	  “the	  cult	  of	  empire”	  which	  consists	  of	  the	  dual	  human	  impulses	  toward	  dissipation	  (grabbing	  whatever	  you	  can	  with	  whatever	  resources	  you	  can	  control)	  and	  fanaticism	  (blissfully	  imposing	  your	  subjective	  perspective	  over	  all	  other	  perspectives)	  (Grammar	  317–18).	  Actual	  war	  is	  fostered	  by	  (or	  festers	  in)	  diseased	  cultures	  of	  empire—cultures	  of	  unchecked	  ambition	  and	  unquestioned	  loyalty	  (culture	  in	  this	  sense	  carries	  all	  its	  Petri	  dish	  connotations	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  society).	  	  In	  brief,	  actual	  war	  is	  cooperative	  in	  that	  it	  pulls	  together	  efforts	  from	  almost	  all	  occupations	  of	  society	  (to	  form	  and	  coordinate	  the	  use	  of	  something	  as	  complex	  as,	  say,	  a	  firearm).	  Actual	  war	  is	  diseased	  in	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  impose	  on	  other	  perspectives	  a	  subjective	  perspective	  (as	  delivered	  through	  the	  barrel	  of	  the	  firearm).	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And	  certainly,	  the	  most	  diseased	  of	  all	  cooperative	  moments	  occurs	  when	  groups	  of	  people	  convince	  each	  other	  of	  this	  telos:	  that	  they	  must	  destroy	  each	  other.	  This	  is	  actual	  war.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Burke	  and	  Nietzsche	  use	  war	  in	  a	  distinctly	  symbolic	  sense.	  Both	  thinkers	  recognize	  aggression	  as	  a	  basic	  human	  motivation.	  Aggression	  is	  the	  primordial	  cultural	  soup	  from	  which	  telos	  transforms	  strife	  into	  striving.	  To	  begin	  with,	  Burke	  observes	  that	  all	  “organisms	  live	  by	  killing”	  and	  that	  there	  is	  “no	  construction	  without	  destruction”	  (“Communication”	  136–37).	  This	  involves	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  activities	  from	  consuming	  other	  living	  matter	  for	  survival	  to	  destroying	  tracts	  of	  forests	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  commodious	  living.	  Human	  perspectives	  also	  develop	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  As	  a	  certain	  thesis	  encounters	  divergent	  antitheses,	  the	  thesis	  is	  partially	  destroyed	  by	  (and	  reconstructed	  in	  at	  least	  the	  partial	  image	  of)	  each	  sound	  antithesis	  it	  encounters.	  	  Burke	  explicitly	  connects	  his	  use	  of	  “strife”	  in	  this	  primitive	  telos	  sense	  with	  Nietzsche’s	  use	  of	  “war.”	  In	  the	  1930s,	  while	  writing	  Permanence	  and	  Change,	  Burke	  saw	  issues	  of	  the	  state	  “discussed	  with	  an	  almost	  ferocious	  pugnacity”	  (Permanence139).	  In	  such	  a	  volatile	  (yet	  unavoidably	  democratic)	  environment,	  Burke	  “began	  to	  look	  upon	  the	  language	  of	  morals	  as	  simply	  the	  theoretic	  analogue	  of	  the	  hand,	  clenched	  into	  a	  fist”	  (“Communication”	  139).	  Further	  on,	  Burke	  connects	  this	  fist	  metaphor	  and	  other	  ideas	  to	  Nietzsche,	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Thoughts	  of	  that	  [fist	  metaphor]	  were	  in	  the	  back	  of	  my	  mind—but	  the	  trend	  they	  took	  was	  most	  definitely	  influenced	  by	  Nietzsche.	  .	  .	  .	  Nietzsche’s	  own	  combativeness	  was	  in	  itself	  enough	  to	  make	  him	  realize	  the	  value	  of	  combat	  so	  far	  as	  he	  was	  concerned.	  (“Communication”	  141)	  	  In	  recognizing	  his	  critical	  indebtedness	  to	  Nietzsche,	  Burke	  specifically	  references	  Nietzsche’s	  The	  Birth	  of	  Tragedy	  and	  The	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals	  as	  being	  particularly	  influential	  on	  Burke’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  dialectical	  nature	  of	  strife	  and	  war	  (“Communication”	  141).	  	  However,	  Nietzsche’s	  clearest	  explanations	  of	  his	  own	  symbolic	  use	  of	  war	  are	  found	  in	  his	  later	  works	  The	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols	  and	  Ecce	  Homo.	  For	  instance,	  in	  
Ecce	  Homo,	  Nietzsche	  fondly	  describes	  Heraclitus	  as	  the	  one	  ancient	  Greek	  philosopher,	   in	  whose	  proximity	  I	  feel	  altogether	  warmer	  and	  better	  than	  anywhere	  else.	  The	  affirmation	  of	  passing	  away	  and	  destroying,	  .	  .	  .	  saying	  Yes	  to	  opposition	  and	  war,	  becoming,	  along	  with	  a	  radical	  repudiation	  of	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  being—all	  this	  is	  clearly	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  me	  than	  anything	  else	  thought	  to	  date.	  (Ecce	  273,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original)	  	  In	  this	  passage,	  Nietzsche	  apparently	  references	  the	  well-­‐known	  Heraclitus	  fragment,	  πάντα	  κατ’	  ἔριν	  γίνεσθαι,	  the	  translations	  of	  which	  range	  from	  Nietzsche’s	  own	  suggestion	  above	  (i.e.	  things	  become	  through	  “opposition	  and	  war”)	  to	  Burke’s	  translation	  in	  which	  “war”	  is	  reconceived	  as	  “strife”.	  Though	  telos	  is	  absent	  from	  most	  pre-­‐Socratic	  texts,	  this	  Heraclitus	  fragment	  asserts	  a	  sort	  of	  proto-­‐
telos,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  all	  the	  subsequent	  iterations	  of	  telos	  in	  Homer	  that	  key	  off	  of	  combat,	  war,	  conflict,	  and	  death.	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Burke	  explains	  his	  own	  translation	  of	  the	  Heraclitus	  fragment	  like	  this:	  “I’d	  want	  to	  understand	  Heraclitus	  as	  saying	  that	  all	  things	  become	  through	  strife.	  I’d	  want	  to	  guard	  against	  the	  tendency	  to	  confuse	  such	  concepts	  as	  ‘strife’	  or	  ‘conflict’	  with	  ‘war,’	  a	  distinction	  which	  my	  early	  reading	  of	  Nietzsche	  did	  not	  always	  make”	  (“Communication”	  144,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  In	  other	  words,	  later	  in	  his	  career	  Burke	  would	  articulate	  a	  more	  distinct	  vocabulary	  difference	  between	  strife	  and	  
war,	  but	  when	  he	  formulated	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War”	  in	  the	  1930s,	  Burke	  had	  Nietzsche	  and	  Nietzsche’s	  value	  of	  strife	  in	  mind.	  And	  strife	  is	  key	  to	  rhetorical	  
telos	  in	  humans.	  “The	  very	  powers	  developed	  by	  us	  and	  grounded	  ultimately	  in	  the	  primal	  naturalistic	  necessities	  of	  strife	  or	  strain,”	  says	  Burke,	  “are	  the	  same	  resources	  by	  which	  we	  perfected	  our	  modes	  of	  cooperation”	  (“Communication”	  144).	  Strife	  perfected	  or	  completed	  in	  this	  way	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  “any	  conflict	  of	  
powers	  [to]	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  ‘balance	  of	  powers’”	  (“Communication”	  144,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  	  
Nietzsche	  and	  Enemies	  Burke’s	  vision	  of	  a	  kinder,	  gentler	  symbolic	  strife	  or	  war	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  later	  works	  which	  deal	  with	  the	  life-­‐affirming	  advantages	  of	  fostering	  a	  perspective	  of	  war.	  In	  these	  works,	  Nietzsche	  uses	  der	  Krieg	  (war,	  warfare)	  instead	  of	  der	  Kampf	  (fight,	  struggle,	  match,	  bout,	  battle,	  fray)	  or	  der	  Unfriede	  (strife,	  discord).	  From	  his	  forward	  to	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols,	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  “War”	  in	  a	  symbolic	  sense	  “has	  always	  been	  the	  grand	  sagacity	  of	  every	  spirit	  which	  has	  grown	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too	  inward	  and	  too	  profound;	  its	  curative	  power	  lies	  even	  in	  the	  wounds	  one	  receives”	  (Twilight	  31).	  He	  explains	  this	  conception	  of	  symbolic	  war	  more	  clearly	  in	  the	  “Morality	  as	  Anti-­‐Nature”	  section	  of	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols,	  The	  spiritualization	  of	  sensuality	  is	  called	  love:	  it	  is	  a	  great	  triumph	  .	  .	  .	  .	  A	  further	  triumph	  is	  our	  spiritualization	  of	  enmity.	  It	  consists	  in	  profoundly	  grasping	  the	  value	  of	  having	  enemies	  .	  .	  .	  enmity	  has	  now	  become	  more	  spiritual—much	  more	  prudent,	  much	  more	  thoughtful,	  much	  more	  forbearing	  .	  .	  .	  .	  We	  adopt	  the	  same	  attitude	  towards	  the	  ‘enemy	  within’:	  there	  too	  we	  have	  spiritualized	  enmity;	  there	  too	  we	  have	  grasped	  its	  value.	  .	  .	  .	  One	  has	  renounced	  the	  grand	  life	  when	  one	  renounces	  war.	  (Twilight	  53–54,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original)	  	  Nietzsche’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  war	  (der	  Krieg)	  instead	  of	  struggle	  or	  battle	  (der	  Kampf,	  	  as	  Hitler	  later	  uses)	  is	  significant.	  Der	  Krieg	  connotes	  prolonged	  effort	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  effort,	  a	  campaign	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  fight,	  a	  way	  of	  life	  rather	  than	  an	  anomaly	  within	  a	  life,	  an	  overall	  telos	  rather	  than	  an	  individual	  purpose.	  	  This	  is	  best	  indicated	  by	  Nietzsche’s	  use	  (in	  German)	  of	  the	  word	  Kriegs-­‐Praxis	  to	  describe	  his	  “practice	  of	  war”	  (Götzen	  246–47	  and	  Ecce	  232-­‐33).	  Praxis	  has	  mach	  the	  same	  connotation	  in	  German	  as	  it	  does	  in	  English	  and	  implies	  more	  of	  a	  daily-­‐living	  experience	  than	  a	  routine	  or	  training.	  Further,	  war	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  obviously	  not	  actual	  outright	  war.	  This	  symbolic	  war	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  destroy;	  rather,	  it	  seeks	  to	  find	  advantage	  in	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  opposition.	  Nietzsche	  explains	  his	  “practice	  of	  war”	  /	  “Kriegs-­‐Praxis”	  in	  Ecce	  Homo:	  I	  only	  attack	  causes	  that	  are	  victorious;	  I	  may	  even	  wait	  until	  they	  become	  victorious.	  Second:	  I	  only	  attack	  causes	  against	  which	  I	  would	  not	  find	  allies,	  so	  that	  I	  stand	  alone—so	  that	  I	  compromise	  myself	  alone	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Third:	  I	  never	  attack	  persons;	  I	  merely	  avail	  myself	  of	  the	  person	  as	  of	  a	  strong	  magnifying	  glass	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  make	  visible	  
	  	  
59	  
a	  general	  but	  creeping	  and	  elusive	  calamity.	  .	  .	  .	  Fourth:	  I	  only	  attack	  things	  when	  every	  personal	  quarrel	  is	  excluded,	  when	  any	  background	  of	  bad	  experiences	  is	  lacking.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  attack	  is	  in	  my	  case	  a	  proof	  of	  good	  will,	  sometimes	  even	  of	  gratitude.	  (Ecce	  232–33)	  	  Nietzsche’s	  philosophic	  and	  more	  polite	  sense	  of	  war	  depends	  on	  the	  person	  waging	  it	  to	  seek	  out	  worthy	  equals.	  A	  fight	  (even	  a	  philosophic	  fight)	  with	  an	  opponent	  of	  lesser	  means	  is	  no	  fight	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  a	  perspectively-­‐threatening	  position	  that	  people	  waging	  this	  sort	  of	  war	  really	  achieve	  and	  develop	  all	  they	  can.	  “Where	  one	  feels	  contempt,”	  Nietzsche	  claims,	  “one	  cannot	  wage	  war;	  where	  one	  commands,	  where	  one	  sees	  something	  beneath	  oneself,	  one	  has	  no	  business	  waging	  war”	  (Ecce	  232,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  Thus,	  Nietzsche’s	  symbolic	  war	  embraces	  the	  necessity	  of	  equals	  engaging	  each	  other	  with	  conflicting	  paradigms	  and	  perspectives	  in	  non-­‐destructive	  manners.	  	  In	  Nietzsche’s	  critique	  of	  traditional	  Christianity	  in	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols,	  he	  particularly	  revels	  in	  his	  opposition	  to	  the	  traditional	  Christian	  Church	  even	  though	  he’s	  sure	  the	  Church	  would	  love	  to	  see	  him	  (and	  those	  like	  him)	  disappear:	  “The	  Church	  has	  at	  all	  times	  desired	  the	  destruction	  of	  its	  enemies;	  we,	  we	  immoralists	  and	  anti-­‐Christians,	  see	  that	  it	  is	  to	  our	  advantage	  that	  the	  Church	  exist”	  (Twilight	  53).	  But	  while	  the	  traditional	  Christian	  Church	  may	  have	  desired	  the	  destruction	  of	  its	  enemies,	  Nietzsche	  readily	  acknowledges	  that,	  “the	  most	  serious	  Christians	  have	  always	  been	  well	  disposed	  toward	  me”	  (Ecce	  233).	  Nietzsche’s	  affinity	  toward	  “serious	  Christians”	  probably	  stems	  from	  Jesus’	  teachings	  regarding	  enemies:	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You	  have	  heard	  that	  it	  was	  said,	  “You	  shall	  love	  your	  neighbor	  and	  hate	  your	  enemy.”	  But	  I	  say	  to	  you,	  Love	  your	  enemies	  and	  pray	  for	  those	  who	  persecute	  you,	  .	  .	  .	  For	  if	  you	  love	  those	  who	  love	  you,	  what	  reward	  do	  you	  have?	  .	  .	  .	  And	  if	  you	  greet	  only	  your	  brothers	  and	  sisters,	  what	  more	  are	  you	  doing	  than	  others?	  .	  .	  .	  Be	  perfect,	  therefore.	  (Matthew	  5.43-­‐48	  NRSV)	  	  In	  the	  original	  Greek,	  Jesus	  enjoins	  those	  listening	  not	  to	  be	  “perfect”	  as	  in	  flawless	  but	  to	  be	  “perfect”	  as	  in	  telios,	  i.e.	  complete	  (telios	  is	  a	  variation	  of	  telos	  that	  Heidegger	  translates	  as,	  “something	  that	  is	  completed,”	  see	  Heidegger,	  Basic	  
Concepts	  55-­‐58).	  Nietzsche	  pokes	  at	  traditional	  Christianity	  for	  forgetting	  this	  part	  of	  its	  roots—that	  valuing	  enemies	  is	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  becoming	  a	  complete	  being.	  	  So	  for	  Nietzsche	  (as	  well	  as	  for	  “the	  most	  serious	  Christians”	  presumably),	  preserving	  the	  life	  of	  an	  enemy	  is	  just	  as	  vital	  as	  preserving	  his	  own.	  Thus	  he	  and	  others	  like	  him,	  he	  asserts,	  have	  “opened	  wide	  our	  hearts	  to	  every	  kind	  of	  understanding,	  comprehension,	  and	  approval.	  We	  do	  not	  readily	  deny,	  we	  seek	  our	  honor	  in	  affirming”	  (Twilight	  56,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  So	  while	  Nietzsche	  may	  condemn	  as	  unhealthy	  certain	  perspectives	  that	  seek	  to	  remove	  opposition,	  he	  still	  finds	  oppositional	  value	  in	  those	  unhealthy	  perspectives.	  Even	  these	  unhealthy	  perspectives	  should	  be	  encountered,	  for	  they	  provide	  people	  opportunities	  to	  be	  healthy	  (and	  to	  develop	  healthfully)	  in	  opposition.	  	  Though	  Nietzsche	  might	  disagree,	  this	  opponent-­‐equalizing,	  life-­‐affirming,	  opposition-­‐seeking,	  and	  ultimately	  philosophic	  war	  is	  at	  heart	  dialectical,	  at	  least	  in	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  sense.	  “Allow	  full	  scope	  of	  the	  dialectical	  process,”	  Burke	  suggests,	  
	  	  
61	  
“and	  you	  establish	  a	  scene	  in	  which	  the	  protagonist	  of	  a	  thesis	  has	  maximum	  opportunity	  to	  modify	  his	  thesis,	  and	  so	  mature	  it,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  antagonist’s	  rejoinders”	  (Philosophy	  444).	  The	  steadied	  ethos	  of	  engagement	  found	  in	  Burke’s	  
dialectic	  has	  definite	  echoes	  of	  Nietzsche.	  In	  his	  “Four	  Master	  Tropes”	  essay,	  Burke	  also	  closely	  identifies	  dialectic	  with	  the	  classical	  trope	  of	  irony.	  He	  does	  this	  because	  both	  dialectic	  and	  irony	  are	  “developments”	  resulting	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  divergent	  terms	  and	  terminologies	  (Grammar	  512).	  Even	  though	  irony	  is	  a	  frequent	  device	  used	  in	  sarcasm	  or	  derisive	  humor,	  Burke	  suggests	  that,	  “True	  irony,	  humble	  irony,	  is	  based	  upon	  a	  sense	  of	  fundamental	  kinship	  with	  the	  enemy,	  as	  one	  needs	  him,	  is	  indebted	  to	  him,	  is	  not	  merely	  outside	  him	  as	  an	  observer	  but	  contains	  him	  
within,	  being	  consubstantial	  with	  him”	  (Grammar	  514,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  	  All	  of	  this	  points	  to	  this	  observation:	  Burke	  employs	  Nietzsche’s	  symbolic	  use	  of	  “war”	  to	  represent	  the	  conflictual	  telos	  that	  humans	  use	  to	  both	  survive	  and	  communicate.	  Burke	  never	  thinks	  of	  “communication	  without	  thinking	  of	  its	  ultimate	  perfection	  [i.e.	  telos],	  named	  in	  such	  words	  as	  ‘community’	  and	  ‘communion’”	  (“Communication”	  144).	  Burke	  continues,	  “though	  such	  terms	  do	  also	  imply	  a	  competitive	  element,	  as	  does	  indeed	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  ‘persuasion,’	  which	  in	  most	  cases	  is	  to	  be	  classed	  as	  the	  very	  antithesis	  of	  war”	  (“Communication”	  144).	  This	  is	  perhaps	  as	  good	  as	  any	  aphoristic	  summary	  of	  this	  particular	  telos:	  the	  purification	  of	  war	  is	  communion	  through	  competition.	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Toward	  Purification	  While	  Burke’s	  notion	  of	  war	  provides	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  conflictual	  basis	  of	  
telos,	  it	  is	  the	  purification	  component	  of	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War”	  that	  cements	  conflict	  and	  telos	  together.	  The	  ambiguity	  of	  purification	  in	  “Toward	  the	  Purification	  of	  War”	  stems	  from	  what	  Burke	  calls	  the	  “paradox	  of	  purity”	  or	  the	  “paradox	  of	  the	  absolute”	  (Grammar	  35).	  In	  short,	  the	  paradox	  of	  purity	  occurs	  whenever	  “actual”	  occurrences	  of	  a	  concept	  are	  juxtaposed	  with	  the	  “pure”	  concept	  itself	  and	  when	  actuality	  is	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  generality.	  Specifically,	  for	  any	  given	  action,	  a	  pure	  action	  cannot	  in	  actuality	  be	  the	  action	  because	  every	  actual	  instance	  of	  an	  action	  is	  unavoidably	  singular	  while	  a	  pure	  action	  would	  be	  the	  action	  in	  its	  
general	  sense.	  Actual	  actions	  will	  always	  be	  distinct	  from	  other	  instances	  of	  actual	  actions	  while	  a	  pure	  action	  will	  always	  be	  the	  same	  and	  thus	  only	  treatable	  in	  non-­‐
actual	  ways.	  In	  this	  way	  a	  pure	  act	  is	  always	  symbolic.	  	  In	  applying	  this	  to	  war,	  pure	  war	  is	  the	  non-­‐actual,	  symbolic,	  general	  form	  of	  actual	  war.	  Again,	  actual	  war	  is	  any	  occurrence	  in	  which	  groups	  of	  people	  organize	  themselves	  in	  concerted	  movements	  to	  kill	  or	  harm	  each	  other	  in	  mass-­‐efforts	  to	  assert	  divergent	  perspectives	  (see	  Burke,	  “Communication”	  144–45).	  From	  the	  symbolic	  origins	  of	  actual	  war	  (i.e.	  divergent	  perspectives)	  to	  actual	  war’s	  symbolic	  ends	  (e.g.	  ownership,	  supremacy,	  agreement,	  treaty,	  etc.),	  actual	  war	  emerges	  as	  physical	  strife	  toward	  symbolic	  ends.	  In	  other	  words,	  actual	  war	  is	  symbolic	  strife	  about	  which	  its	  participants	  forget	  that	  it	  is	  symbolic	  strife.	  (I	  am,	  of	  course,	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misappropriating	  Nietzsche’s	  sentiment,	  “Truths	  are	  illusions	  about	  which	  it	  has	  been	  forgotten	  that	  they	  are	  illusions”	  from	  Nietzsche,	  “On	  Truth”	  250).	  In	  a	  word,	  symbolic	  strife	  is	  actual	  war’s	  telos.	  	  In	  contrast	  with	  actual	  war,	  pure	  war	  is	  already	  symbolic	  in	  that	  pure	  war	  is	  only	  treatable	  in	  non-­‐actual	  terms.	  In	  this	  way,	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  pure	  war	  never	  “forget”	  (in	  Nietzsche’s	  sense)	  that	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  symbolic	  war;	  pure	  war	  can	  thus	  serve	  as	  a	  preemption	  of	  actual	  war.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  instances	  of	  symbolic	  war	  are	  necessarily	  pure	  war;	  indeed,	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  (whether	  symbolic	  or	  not)	  implies	  a	  specific	  and	  not	  a	  general	  character	  (much	  like	  a	  computer	  game	  simulating	  a	  WWII	  battlefield	  is	  a	  symbolic	  war	  but	  is	  obviously	  not	  pure	  war	  or	  war-­‐in-­‐general).	  Rather,	  pure	  war	  as	  telos	  completes	  the	  concept	  of	  war	  back	  to	  its	  symbolic	  roots.	  Pure	  war	  is	  symbolic	  conflict	  that	  literally	  asserts	  its	  symbolic	  nature	  but	  never	  literalizes	  its	  symbolic	  assertions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  pure	  war	  reverses	  the	  relationship	  found	  in	  actual	  war	  and	  seeks	  to	  transform	  “war”	  so	  that	  the	  
symbolic	  nature	  of	  war	  (i.e.	  asserting	  divergent	  perspectives)	  becomes	  its	  actual	  use.	  	  Inasmuch	  as	  actual	  war	  is	  “diseased”	  cooperation	  (see	  Burke	  “Communication”	  144),	  pure	  war	  would	  be	  the	  cure.	  But	  also	  inasmuch	  as	  actual	  war	  and	  pure	  war	  are	  dialectic	  in	  their	  telos	  relationship,	  with	  Burke,	  “we	  should	  ‘ironically’	  note	  the	  function	  of	  the	  disease	  in	  ‘perfecting’	  the	  cure,	  or	  the	  function	  of	  the	  cure	  in	  ‘perpetuating’	  the	  disease”	  (Grammar	  512).	  In	  particular,	  the	  attitudinal	  telos	  of	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actual	  war—the	  assertion	  of	  divergent	  perspectives—will	  always	  be	  a	  guide	  for	  pure	  war.	  As	  a	  telos,	  war	  is	  a	  means	  towards	  its	  own	  purification.	  Consider	  this	  explanation	  from	  Burke’s	  A	  Grammar	  of	  Motives:	  All	  means	  are	  necessarily	  “impure.”	  For	  besides	  the	  properties	  in	  them	  that	  fit	  them	  for	  the	  particular	  use	  to	  which	  they	  are	  put,	  they	  have	  other	  properties	  (properties	  that	  would	  fit	  them	  for	  other	  possible	  uses,	  including	  hostile	  ones).	  .	  .	  .	  That	  is,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  end	  exclusively	  implicit	  in	  them.	  And	  thus,	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  any	  given	  end,	  they	  are	  “impure.”	  And	  we	  act	  by	  a	  progressive	  purification	  of	  them.	  (Grammar	  309–10)	  	  Burke’s	  assertion	  is	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  Aldous	  Huxley’s	  claim	  that	  pure	  ends	  can	  only	  result	  from	  pure	  means.	  The	  error	  in	  Huxley’s	  claim	  lies	  in	  the	  dogged	  view	  that	  ends	  and	  means	  enjoy	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship—that	  ends	  necessarily	  follow	  means—when	  of	  course	  means	  are	  means	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  ends	  to	  which	  they	  aim.	  That	  is,	  means	  depend	  on	  a	  telos.	  Whatever	  the	  sought-­‐for	  telos,	  means	  must	  adapt	  themselves	  to	  those	  ends.	  In	  this	  sense,	  a	  telos	  actually	  produces	  its	  means	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  Means	  fulfill	  each	  respective	  telos	  insofar	  as	  means	  complete	  their	  progression	  back	  to	  their	  ends.	  Means	  are,	  in	  a	  word,	  impure	  formulations	  of	  each	  respective	  telos.	  	  Using	  the	  conflictual	  nature	  of	  war	  as	  a	  means	  to	  mitigating	  conflict	  may	  seem	  paradoxical	  at	  first.	  Indeed,	  Burke	  points	  out,	  “if	  we	  could	  get	  peace	  by	  peaceful	  means	  we’d	  have	  peace	  already;	  and	  if	  we	  couldn’t	  get	  it	  by	  means	  somewhat	  short	  of	  peace,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  no	  use	  in	  our	  attempting	  to	  get	  it	  at	  all”	  (Grammar	  309).	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  peace	  can	  only	  result	  from	  actions	  that	  are	  decidedly	  not	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peaceful,	  what	  use	  pursuing	  peace	  if	  the	  effort	  to	  attain	  it	  and	  keep	  it	  only	  perpetuates	  the	  lack	  of	  it?	  Pure	  war	  as	  telos	  solves	  this	  paradox	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  elimination	  of	  actual	  outright	  war	  will	  never	  come	  about	  by	  purely	  peaceful	  means.	  	  As	  noted,	  pure	  war	  as	  telos	  places	  as	  foremost	  war’s	  symbolic	  purpose—i.e.,	  the	  assertion	  of	  divergent	  perspectives.	  The	  assertion	  of	  divergent	  perspectives	  is	  a	  necessarily	  dialectical	  activity.	  Burke	  suggests	  that	  dialectical	  thinking	  “arises	  when	  one	  tries,	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	  terms	  upon	  one	  another,	  to	  produce	  a	  development	  which	  uses	  all	  the	  terms”	  (Grammar	  512,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  From	  this	  “perspective	  of	  perspectives,”	  Burke	  suggests,	  “none	  of	  the	  participating	  ‘sub-­‐perspectives’	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  either	  precisely	  right	  or	  precisely	  wrong.	  They	  are	  all	  voices,	  or	  personalities,	  or	  positions,	  integrally	  affecting	  one	  another”	  (Grammar	  512).	  As	  divergent	  “terms	  are	  thus	  encouraged	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  orderly	  parliamentary	  development,	  the	  dialectic	  of	  this	  participation	  produces	  .	  .	  .	  a	  ‘resultant	  certainty’	  .	  .	  .	  that	  all	  the	  sub-­‐certainties	  be	  considered	  as	  neither	  true	  nor	  false,	  but	  contributory”	  (Grammar	  513,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  Quoting	  Kenneth	  Benne’s	  critique	  of	  A	  Grammar	  of	  Motives,	  Burke	  summarizes	  the	  dialectical	  purpose	  of	  his	  Motives	  project:	  “Reaffirming	  ‘the	  parliamentary	  process,’	  [Burke’s	  project]	  is	  motivated	  by	  a	  ‘humanitarian	  concern	  to	  see	  how	  far	  war	  may	  be	  translated	  practically	  into	  linguistic	  struggle	  and	  how	  such	  verbal	  struggle	  may	  be	  made	  to	  eventuate	  in	  a	  common	  enactment	  short	  of	  physical	  combat’”	  (“Linguistic”	  268).	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In	  practice,	  such	  dialectic	  will	  always	  be	  (at	  the	  very	  least)	  verbally	  messy	  if	  only	  because	  divergence	  implies	  a	  lack	  of	  accounting	  for	  that	  which	  is	  divergent.	  The	  challenge	  facing	  conscientious	  rhetors	  is	  to	  keep	  such	  messes	  verbally	  contained—avoiding	  the	  spilling	  over	  of	  verbal	  divergence	  (face-­‐to-­‐face	  pure	  war)	  into	  physical	  divergence	  (fist-­‐to-­‐face	  actual	  war).	  The	  trick	  is	  harnessing	  the	  strife	  found	  in	  humans’	  natural	  condition	  and	  employing	  it	  to	  cooperative	  ends	  or	  telos.	  Burke	  suggests	  the	  general	  shape	  such	  a	  trick	  might	  take:	  With	  a	  few	  more	  terms	  in	  his	  vocabulary	  of	  motives,	  for	  instance,	  the	  rabid	  advocate	  of	  racial	  intolerance	  could	  become	  a	  mild	  one;	  and	  the	  mild	  one	  would	  not	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  be	  thus	  intolerant	  at	  all.	  And	  so	  human	  thought	  may	  be	  directed	  towards	  “the	  purification	  of	  war,”	  not	  perhaps	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  war	  can	  be	  eliminated	  from	  any	  organism	  that,	  like	  man,	  has	  the	  motives	  of	  combat	  in	  his	  very	  essence,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  war	  can	  be	  refined	  to	  the	  point	  where	  it	  would	  be	  much	  more	  peaceful	  than	  the	  conditions	  we	  would	  now	  call	  peace.	  (Grammar	  305)	  	  Such	  a	  telos	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Burke’s	  “anti-­‐Hitler	  battle”	  mentioned	  in	  “The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Hitler’s	  ‘Battle’.”	  Indeed,	  such	  a	  telos	  is	  the	  hinge	  upon	  which	  Burke’s	  entire	  philosophy	  of	  symbols	  swings.	  Such	  a	  telos	  is,	  in	  a	  word,	  the	  motive	  of	  Burke’s	  entire	  
Motives	  project.	  But	  it’s	  not	  just	  Burke’s	  project,	  it	  belongs	  to	  anyone	  who	  is	  genuinely	  interested	  in	  seeing	  the	  human	  race	  survive	  and	  thrive.	  	  
A	  Teleological	  Account	  of	  Telos	  Thus,	  here	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  dissertation	  chapter	  about	  telos,	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  make	  a	  single	  teleological	  observation	  of	  my	  own.	  Yet,	  to	  posit	  the	  enduring	  significance	  of	  
telos	  for	  rhetoric	  and,	  indeed,	  the	  survivability	  of	  the	  human	  species,	  I	  find	  a	  certain	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teleological	  account	  most	  convincing.	  It	  deals	  with	  Burke’s	  well-­‐known	  definition	  of	  humans	  as	  symbol-­‐using	  animals,	  which	  is	  related	  to	  Heidegger’s	  similar	  definition	  of	  humans:	  “When	  the	  Greeks	  say	  that	  the	  human	  being	  is	  a	  living	  thing	  that	  speaks,	  they	  do	  not	  mean,	  in	  a	  physiological	  sense,	  that	  he	  utters	  definite	  sounds.	  Rather,	  the	  human	  being	  is	  a	  living	  thing	  that	  has	  its	  genuine	  being-­‐there	  in	  conversation	  and	  in	  
discourse”	  (Basic	  Concepts	  74,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  I	  would	  nuance	  Heidegger’s	  definition	  and	  say	  that	  the	  Greeks	  meant	  “not	  just	  in	  a	  physiological	  sense”	  if	  only	  because	  our	  unique	  physiological	  ability	  to	  vocally	  articulate	  is	  itself	  a	  profound	  quality	  among	  all	  other	  fauna	  on	  this	  planet.	  The	  human	  throat	  physiologically	  favors	  speaking	  more	  than	  swallowing.	  Biologists	  have	  known	  this	  for	  years.	  One	  such	  researcher	  observes,	  Man	  is	  the	  only	  mammal	  in	  which	  “communication”	  has	  become	  a	  dominant	  oropharyngeal	  activity.	  .	  .	  .	  “speech”	  involves	  the	  exactly	  patterned	  modulation	  of	  the	  basic	  note	  emitted	  from	  the	  larynx.	  That	  patterning	  is	  produced	  by	  a	  change	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  air	  space	  in	  the	  oral	  cavity	  and	  by	  use	  of	  a	  series	  of	  “stops”	  which	  involve	  the	  tongue,	  teeth,	  and	  lips.	  [This	  suggests]	  a	  much	  more	  fundamental	  and	  wide-­‐ranging	  question—the	  relationship	  between	  the	  evolution	  of	  speech	  and	  the	  changes	  in	  both	  the	  anatomy	  and	  functional	  relationships	  of	  the	  structures	  developed	  to	  process	  food.	  (Hiiemae	  278)	  	  While	  we	  cannot	  know	  the	  exact	  evolutionary	  nuances	  of	  such	  changes,	  the	  fact	  that	  human	  throats	  are	  the	  general	  shape	  and	  form	  they	  are	  indicates	  that	  verbal	  communication	  evidently	  allowed	  our	  proto-­‐human	  ancestors	  to	  survive	  and	  thrive	  more	  completely	  than	  their	  other	  not-­‐as-­‐vocally	  articulate	  proto-­‐primate	  cousins.	  In	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other	  words,	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  humans,	  vocal	  articulation	  helped	  generations	  survive	  better	  than	  mere	  swallowing	  did.	  	  	  However,	  we	  should	  also	  recognize	  that	  mere	  vocal	  articulation	  is	  but	  a	  symptom	  of	  a	  larger	  evolutionary	  development	  in	  humans.	  The	  recent	  work	  by	  Stanley	  Greenspan	  and	  Stuart	  Shanker	  on	  affect-­‐based	  language	  development	  suggests	  that	  language	  acquisition	  emerges	  from	  a	  panoply	  of	  affective	  behaviors.	  For	  a	  full	  treatment,	  see	  their	  2004	  book	  The	  First	  Idea:	  How	  Symbols,	  Language,	  and	  
Intelligence	  Evolved	  from	  Our	  Primate	  Ancestors.	  In	  a	  2005	  follow-­‐up	  article	  on	  “The	  Role	  of	  Affect	  in	  Language	  Development,”	  Greenspan	  and	  Shanker	  explain	  their	  empirical	  findings	  this	  way,	  Language	  does	  not	  suddenly	  appear	  at	  some	  pre-­‐determined	  age	  in	  some	  pre-­‐determined	  fashion	  but	  rather,	  emerges	  after	  the	  ape	  or	  child	  has	  begun	  to	  engage	  with	  his	  or	  her	  caregivers	  in	  such	  co-­‐regulated	  activities	  as	  sharing,	  requesting,	  imitating,	  playing,	  naming,	  describing,	  apologizing,	  etc.	  The	  ape	  or	  child	  is	  increasingly	  motivated	  to	  use	  and	  develop	  these	  communicational	  tools	  so	  that	  he	  or	  she	  may	  achieve	  context-­‐dependent,	  interactional	  goals:	  goals	  which	  themselves	  develop	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  ape	  or	  child’s	  developing	  communicational	  environment	  and	  his	  or	  her	  growing	  abilities	  and	  increasingly	  differentiated	  affects.	  (330)	  	  Such	  findings	  reject	  traditional	  Cartesian	  views	  of	  language-­‐acquisition	  with	  the	  attendant	  bogus	  traditional	  assumptions	  of	  “language-­‐acquisition	  as	  an	  internal	  mental	  process	  and	  language	  itself	  as	  a	  code	  for	  transmitting	  one’s	  thoughts”	  (329).	  	  In	  a	  1978	  conference	  paper,	  Kenneth	  Burke	  anticipated	  this	  community-­‐centric	  sort	  of	  scientific	  finding	  about	  language	  acquisition.	  In	  it,	  Burke	  admits	  his	  indebtedness	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to	  anthropologist	  Bronislaw	  Malinowski	  for	  partly	  inspiring	  Burke’s	  famous	  formulation	  of	  humans	  as	  symbol-­‐using	  animals:	  “it's	  helpful	  to	  recall	  Malinowski's	  prime	  representative	  anecdote	  for	  the	  study	  of	  symbolic	  action:	  a	  group	  of	  illiterate	  savages	  using	  language	  as	  a	  tool	  in	  the	  cooperative	  act	  of	  catching	  fish”	  (“Questions”	  333).	  Remembering	  this	  is	  vital	  to	  understanding	  the	  need	  that	  humans	  have	  for	  
telos.	  Humans	  are	  animals	  whose	  communal	  instincts	  directed	  the	  evolution	  of	  communication	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  survival.	  	  	  We	  should	  also	  recognize	  that	  such	  cooperation	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  human	  animals	  nor	  is	  cooperation	  merely	  a	  sign	  of	  non-­‐natural	  altruism.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  traditional	  view	  of	  natural	  selection	  holds	  that	  species	  evolve	  by	  surviving	  their	  environments	  largely	  in	  competition	  with	  other	  species	  and	  in	  competition	  with	  members	  of	  their	  own	  species.	  Until	  recently,	  evolutionary	  biologists	  had	  assumed	  that	  cooperation	  was	  merely	  “a	  peripheral	  feature	  of	  the	  history	  of	  life—[a]	  behavior	  found	  in	  just	  a	  few	  species	  of	  social	  animals”	  (Sterelny	  et	  al.	  5).	  Instead,	  there	  has	  been	  mounting	  biological	  evidence	  in	  recent	  years	  that	  suggests	  that	  cooperation	  is	  mostly	  ubiquitous	  in	  the	  natural	  world.	  Just	  last	  year,	  MIT	  press	  published	  a	  tome	  of	  studies	  titled	  Cooperation	  and	  Its	  Evolution,	  which	  contains	  the	  work	  of	  an	  array	  of	  evolutionary	  biologists	  and	  other	  scientists	  whose	  collected	  research	  reveals	  pervasive	  cooperative	  aspects	  in	  all	  realms	  of	  life.	  The	  book’s	  introduction	  summarizes	  these	  findings	  in	  this	  way:	  One	  overarching	  trend	  in	  the	  history	  of	  life	  has	  been	  an	  increase	  in	  complexity	  [which]	  depended	  on	  a	  series	  of	  revolutions	  in	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cooperation,	  as	  more	  complex	  evolutionary	  agents	  (metazoans,	  eusocial	  insect	  colonies)	  emerged	  out	  of	  cooperatively	  interacting	  simpler	  ones.	  Groups	  become	  individuals	  as	  the	  members	  of	  those	  groups	  go	  through	  an	  evolutionary	  transition	  from	  independence	  through	  contingent	  cooperation	  to	  mandatory	  cooperation.	  (Sterelny	  et	  al.	  5)	  	  So	  while	  cooperation	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  evolutionary	  patterns	  of	  most	  biological	  life,	  in	  humans	  the	  evolutionary	  role	  of	  complex	  symbolic	  cooperation	  is	  more	  pronounced	  than	  in	  other	  symbol-­‐using	  species—of	  which	  there	  are	  many,	  of	  course.	  Thus,	  when	  Burke	  refers	  to	  humans	  as	  the	  symbol-­‐using	  animal,	  he	  is	  not	  asserting	  that	  humans	  are	  the	  only	  species	  who	  use	  symbols.	  Rather,	  humans	  are	  those	  animals	  whose	  symbol-­‐use	  has	  come	  to	  circumscribe	  their	  existence	  in	  more	  profound	  and	  pervasive	  ways	  than	  any	  other	  animal	  species.	  Recent	  biological	  findings	  seem	  to	  support	  Burke	  in	  his	  use	  of	  Malinowski’s	  representative	  anecdote	  of	  humans	  developing	  language	  to	  better	  help	  each	  other	  catch	  fish.	  	  	  Thus	  I	  arrive	  at	  a	  teleological	  account	  for	  telos	  itself:	  if	  communication	  evolved	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  help	  humans	  better	  catch	  fish	  together,	  telos	  is	  the	  engine	  of	  that	  mechanism.	  Without	  the	  shared	  purpose	  of	  catching	  fish,	  our	  proto-­‐human	  ancestors	  would	  never	  have	  evolved	  the	  now-­‐millennia-­‐old	  complex	  sets	  of	  linguistic	  symbols	  evident	  in	  the	  words	  “catching	  fish.”	  In	  other	  words,	  just	  as	  we	  have	  rhetoric	  because	  we	  persuade	  (and	  not	  vice	  versa),	  we	  communicate	  because	  we	  have	  telos	  (and	  not	  vice	  versa).	  Humans	  have	  become	  the	  dominant	  species	  on	  this	  planet	  precisely	  because	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  complete	  their	  shared	  purposes	  in	  ways	  that	  other	  animals	  cannot.	  The	  biggest	  danger	  for	  humans	  occurs	  when	  we	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forget	  that	  communication	  and	  rhetoric	  have	  always	  been	  about	  the	  thriving	  survival	  of	  the	  species.	  When	  we	  forget	  that	  basic	  (however	  constructed)	  teleological	  truth,	  humans	  inevitably	  end	  up	  hurting	  other	  humans	  (anywhere	  on	  the	  scale	  from	  individuals	  to	  entire	  peoples).	  	  Concerns	  of	  telos	  are	  suddenly	  accompanied	  by	  stark	  ethical	  responsibilities.	  Foremost	  among	  these	  responsibilities	  is	  committing	  our	  selves,	  our	  arts,	  and	  our	  lives	  to	  answering	  these	  questions:	  how	  do	  we	  bring	  pure	  war	  to	  those	  who	  already	  use	  actual	  war?	  How	  do	  we	  dialectically	  engage	  divergent	  perspectives	  that	  have	  abandoned	  dialectic	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  assert	  themselves?	  How	  do	  we	  promote	  perpetual	  arguing-­‐without-­‐fighting	  among	  those	  who	  are	  already	  fighting?	  These	  questions	  will	  not	  go	  away	  any	  time	  soon.	  But	  as	  conscientious	  rhetoricians	  and	  critics,	  we	  can	  commit	  ourselves	  to	  see	  in	  all	  such	  conflicts	  “the	  characteristic	  invitation	  to	  rhetoric”	  (Burke,	  Rhetoric	  25).	  We	  can	  do	  this	  by	  recognizing	  along	  with	  Burke	  that,	  “We	  need	  never	  deny	  the	  presence	  of	  strife,	  enmity,	  faction	  as	  a	  characteristic	  motive	  of	  rhetorical	  expression.	  We	  need	  not	  close	  our	  eyes	  to	  their	  almost	  tyrannous	  ubiquity	  in	  human	  relations”	  (Rhetoric	  20).	  Far	  from	  being	  discouraged	  by	  humanity’s	  ubiquitous	  penchant	  for	  conflict,	  instead,	  “we	  can	  be	  on	  the	  alert	  always	  to	  see	  how	  such	  temptations	  to	  strife	  are	  implicit	  in	  the	  institutions	  that	  condition	  human	  relationships;	  yet	  we	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  always	  look	  beyond	  this	  order”	  (Rhetoric	  20).	  We	  can	  do	  this	  by	  following	  paths	  of	  strife	  back	  to	  their	  rhetorical	  roots—by	  using	  conflict	  as	  the	  very	  telos	  to	  see	  conflict’s	  end.	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  CHAPTER	  3.	  THE	  END	  OF	  DIVERGENCE:	  SYMBOULEUTIKON	  AND	  THE	  RHETORICAL	  IMPERATIVE	  	  “Rhetorical	  power	  and	  excellence	  of	  speech	  belong	  to	  fine	  art;	  but	  oratory	  (ars	  oratoria),	  the	  art	  of	  using	  people’s	  weaknesses	  for	  one’s	  own	  aims	  (no	  matter	  how	  good	  these	  may	  be	  in	  intention	  or	  even	  in	  fact),	  is	  unworthy	  of	  any	  respect	  whatsoever.”	  —Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Judgment	  	  	  
Toward	  an	  Actual	  Ethics	  of	  Rhetoric	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  explored	  a	  philology	  of	  telos	  that	  followed	  telos	  specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  completing	  conflict	  back	  to	  its	  linguistic	  or	  rhetorical	  roots.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  symbouleutikon,	  a	  venue	  and	  practice	  with	  its	  own	  sort	  of	  telos	  or	  completion.	  I	  do	  this	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  my	  claim	  in	  the	  introduction—that	  rhetoric	  is	  pervasively	  ethical.	  The	  concept	  of	  symbouleutikon	  provides	  a	  setting	  in	  which	  rhetoric’s	  ethics	  clearly	  emerges.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  explore	  Aristotle’s	  specific	  telos	  for	  symbouleutikon,	  which	  is	  
sympheron.	  The	  commonsense	  view	  has	  been	  that	  deliberation	  (symbouleutikon)	  has	  a	  specific	  purpose	  (telos),	  which	  is	  traditionally	  called	  expediency	  (sympheron).	  But	  I	  write	  this	  chapter	  with	  the	  guiding	  question	  of	  what	  we	  might	  discover	  if	  we	  reversed	  the	  typical	  order	  and	  instead	  posit	  that	  telos	  (completion,	  perfection,	  purification)	  has	  a	  specific	  symbouleutikon	  (way	  of	  bringing	  wills	  together).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  could	  the	  human	  impulse	  toward	  completion	  have	  its	  own	  distinctive	  “deliberative”	  activity	  and	  content	  (scare	  quotes	  intended)?	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Symbouleutikon	  is	  the	  term	  that	  Aristotle	  uses	  to	  name	  what	  later	  theorists	  called	  deliberation	  or	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  Throughout	  other	  parts	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  use	  the	  terms	  symbouleutikon	  and	  deliberation	  largely	  interchangeably.	  But	  in	  this	  chapter,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity	  and	  nuance,	  I	  prefer	  to	  use	  the	  term	  symbouleutikon	  whenever	  possible	  to	  describe	  a	  mode	  of	  rhetoric	  that	  is	  more	  of	  a	  state	  of	  being-­‐together-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world—a	  pervasive	  condition	  in	  which	  humans’	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  speaking,	  and	  moralizing	  are	  infused	  with	  an	  inescapable	  togetherness.	  
Symbouleutikon	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  a	  close	  cousin	  of	  what	  traditionally	  gets	  called	  deliberation.	  Also	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  I	  do	  not	  use	  the	  term	  symbouleutikon	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  that	  Aristotle	  uses	  it.	  Jeffrey	  Walker	  notes	  that,	  “Aristotle’s	  rhetorical	  ideal	  is	  evident	  in	  his	  .	  .	  .	  preference	  for	  the	  term	  symbouleutikon,”	  or	  συμβουλής,	  as	  a	  name	  for	  deliberative	  discourse	  (Walker	  38).	  Walker	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  “Symbouleutikon	  suggests	  primarily	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  boulê	  [or	  βουλή],	  the	  ‘senate’	  or	  council,	  which	  deliberated	  and	  prepared	  proposals	  before	  they	  were	  heard	  in	  the	  .	  .	  .	  popular	  assembly”	  (Walker	  38).	  I	  do	  not	  use	  symbouleutikon	  in	  this	  narrow	  sense	  of	  the	  pre-­‐assembly	  council	  from	  ancient	  Athens.	  Instead,	  I	  prefer	  to	  use	  symbouleutikon	  to	  connote	  something	  similar	  but	  with	  broader	  implications—implications	  which	  Aristotle	  may	  very	  well	  have	  been	  alluding	  to	  when	  he	  chose	  the	  
boulê	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  boulê	  did	  refer	  to	  the	  Greek	  senate,	  but	  “senate”	  is	  a	  secondary	  or	  even	  tertiary	  meaning	  of	  boulê.	  More	  basically,	  boulê	  means	  “will”	  or	  “decision.”	  The	  first	  part	  of	  
symbouleutikon,	  syn/sym	  or	  σύν,	  is	  a	  preposition	  that	  means	  “together.”	  So	  as	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Aristotle	  names	  it,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  symbouleutikon	  is	  literally	  the	  discourse	  in	  which	  wills	  or	  decisions	  get	  together.	  I	  use	  symbouleutikon	  in	  this	  broader	  sense.	  (This	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  reappropriation	  I	  advocated	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  dissertation:	  I	  take	  up	  Aristotle’s	  artful	  chisel	  of	  symbouleutikon	  to	  see	  how	  it	  works	  as	  a	  hammer,	  and	  lo,	  the	  world	  is	  suddenly	  full	  of	  nails.)	  	  Also,	  notice	  the	  striking	  phonetic	  similarities	  between	  symbouleutikon	  and	  symbolon,	  the	  Greek	  word	  for	  symbol,	  which	  literally	  means	  “casting	  together.”	  The	  middle	  components	  of	  both	  words,	  boulê	  and	  bólos,	  are	  quasi-­‐cognates	  of	  each	  other	  and	  mean	  “will”	  and	  “throw	  or	  cast”	  respectively.	  The	  language	  for	  “casting	  a	  vote”	  was	  used	  in	  ancient	  Athens	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  discuss	  “casting	  votes”	  today—namely,	  participants	  cast	  votes	  after	  deliberative	  discussion	  as	  symbols	  of	  their	  wills	  or	  decisions	  on	  a	  matter.	  When	  Aristotle	  named	  what	  has	  since	  been	  called	  deliberation,	  i.e.	  symbouleutikon,	  he	  drew	  on	  language	  that	  refers	  to	  two	  inevitable	  qualities	  of	  rhetoric—its	  symbolic	  nature	  and	  how	  it	  draws	  participants	  together.	  The	  symbolic	  and	  togetherness	  qualities	  of	  symbouleutikon	  form	  the	  soil	  from	  which	  rhetoric’s	  ethics	  emerge.	  	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  having	  a	  clear	  telos	  in	  mind—a	  clear	  path	  through	  which	  rhetoric’s	  ethics	  finds	  its	  completion—I	  need	  to	  nuance	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  “rhetoric’s	  ethics”	  and	  “an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.”	  These	  two	  terms	  mean	  the	  same	  thing	  to	  me,	  but	  they	  are	  very	  different	  than	  describing	  rhetoric	  that	  accords	  to	  ethics	  or	  an	  ethics	  that	  is	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informed	  by	  rhetoric.	  The	  problem	  of	  articulating	  an	  actual	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  that	  an	  ethics	  is	  not	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  if	  it	  is	  merely	  appended	  to	  or	  added	  to	  rhetoric.	  Rather,	  an	  ethics	  is	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  if	  it	  is	  articulated	  by	  and	  through	  rhetoric.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  an	  ethics	  is	  an	  emergent	  quality	  of	  rhetorical	  behavior	  and	  action	  then	  that	  ethics	  is	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  If	  by	  virtue	  of	  behaving	  rhetorically	  you	  also	  behave	  ethically	  then	  you	  have	  uncovered	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  And	  further,	  as	  I’ll	  argue	  below,	  you	  will	  have	  also	  discovered	  how	  ethics	  completes	  rhetoric,	  i.e.	  how	  ethics	  is	  a	  rhetorical	  telos.	  Articulating	  that	  is	  the	  challenge	  facing	  any	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  not	  new.	  Perhaps	  the	  best-­‐known	  treatment	  is	  Richard	  Weaver’s	  1953	  book	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Rhetoric.	  Weaver’s	  most	  significant	  observations	  about	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics	  were	  his	  thoughts	  on	  what	  he	  called	  “ultimate	  terms.”	  An	  ultimate	  term	  is	  a	  term	  “about	  which	  all	  other	  [related]	  related	  expressions	  are	  ranked	  as	  subordinate	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Its	  force	  imparts	  to	  the	  others	  their	  lesser	  degree	  of	  force.	  .	  .	  .	  [It	  is]	  the	  ultimate	  generator	  of	  force	  flowing	  down	  through	  many	  links	  of	  ancillary	  terms”	  (212).	  Weaver	  explores	  the	  term	  progress	  as	  one	  such	  term	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  an	  ultimate	  term	  in	  American	  society	  at	  the	  time	  he	  wrote	  his	  book.	  As	  a	  symptom	  of	  high	  modernism,	  Weaver	  explains,	  the	  term	  
progressive	  “will	  validate	  almost	  anything”	  in	  the	  public	  consciousness.	  Weaver	  goes	  on	  to	  conclude,	  however,	  “An	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  requires	  that	  ultimate	  terms	  be	  ultimate	  in	  some	  rational	  sense.	  The	  only	  way	  to	  achieve	  that	  objective	  is	  through	  an	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ordering	  of	  our	  own	  minds	  and	  our	  own	  passions”	  (232).	  In	  other	  words,	  Weaver	  asserts	  that	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  requires	  external,	  or	  non-­‐rhetorical,	  hierarchies	  of	  thoughts	  and	  motives	  in	  order	  to	  be	  efficacious	  as	  an	  ethics.	  Thus	  in	  the	  end,	  Weaver’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  still	  merely	  an	  ethics	  applied	  to	  rhetoric,	  not	  an	  ethics	  which	  emerges	  from	  rhetoric.	  	  But	  it	  turns	  out	  for	  other	  reasons	  that	  Weaver	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  place	  to	  start	  when	  considering	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  Though	  an	  accomplished	  theorist	  in	  his	  own	  right,	  Weaver’s	  Ethics	  of	  Rhetoric	  is	  full	  of	  unacknowledged	  references	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Kenneth	  Burke.	  As	  Richard	  Johannesen	  has	  researched,	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  books	  A	  
Grammar	  of	  Motives	  and	  A	  Rhetoric	  of	  Motives	  were	  the	  focus	  for	  study	  by	  Weaver	  and	  the	  other	  faculty	  participants	  in	  the	  quarter-­‐long	  seminar	  taught	  by	  Burke	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1949.	  Only	  after	  Weaver’s	  personal	  and	  intensive	  exposure	  to	  Burke	  and	  his	  “rhetorics”	  do	  we	  find	  the	  development	  of	  several	  rhetorical	  insights	  that	  are	  significant	  in	  Weaver’s	  view	  of	  rhetoric	  [including]	  the	  cultural	  potency	  of	  values	  in	  the	  form	  of	  “ultimate	  terms.”	  (328)	  	  The	  subject	  of	  ultimate	  terms	  occupies	  much	  of	  the	  third	  section	  of	  Burke’s	  Rhetoric	  
of	  Motives.	  But	  unlike	  Weaver’s	  appropriation	  of	  Burke,	  Burke	  remains	  suspicious	  of	  ultimate	  terms	  that	  reify	  non-­‐dialectical	  hierarchies.	  	  Instead,	  Burke	  prefers	  his	  own	  articulation	  of	  dialectical	  discourse	  guided	  by	  ultimate	  terms	  that	  serve	  specifically	  dialectical	  hierarchies	  (which	  look	  less	  and	  less	  hierarchical	  the	  more	  they	  accord	  to	  dialectic).	  Mere	  dialectic,	  Burke	  explains	  in	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his	  Rhetoric,	  “would	  leave	  the	  competing	  voices	  in	  a	  jangling	  relation	  to	  each	  other	  (a	  conflict	  solved	  faute	  de	  mieux	  by	  ‘horse-­‐trading’);	  but	  the	  ‘ultimate’	  order	  would	  place	  these	  competing	  voices	  themselves	  in	  a	  hierarchy,	  or	  sequence,	  or	  evaluative	  
series	  .	  .	  .	  being	  arranged	  developmentally	  with	  relation	  to	  one	  another”	  (Rhetoric	  187,	  italics	  in	  original).	  Burke	  further	  explains	  that,	  “In	  an	  ultimate	  dialectic,	  the	  terms	  so	  lead	  into	  one	  another	  that	  the	  completion	  of	  each	  order	  leads	  to	  the	  next.	  Thus,	  a	  body	  of	  positive	  terms	  must	  be	  brought	  to	  a	  head	  in	  a	  titular	  term	  which	  represents	  the	  principle	  or	  idea	  behind	  the	  positive	  terminology	  as	  a	  whole”	  (Rhetoric	  189).	  Symbouleutikon	  is	  one	  such	  titular	  term.	  Democracy	  is	  another,	  so	  also	  we	  might	  dub	  the	  terms	  family,	  university,	  game,	  religion,	  and	  others.	  Burke	  is	  saying	  that	  when	  dialectic	  is	  practiced	  in	  a	  venue	  under	  such	  a	  titular	  term,	  all	  discourse	  that	  proceeds	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  that	  term	  leads	  and	  proceeds	  eventually	  back	  to	  that	  term.	  	  Consider	  the	  clash	  between	  early	  American	  pro-­‐independence	  Northern	  delegates	  and	  crown-­‐supporting	  Southern	  delegates.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  after	  Thomas	  Jefferson’s	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  Declaration	  was	  put	  to	  committee	  revision	  that	  the	  crown-­‐supporting	  factions	  found	  themselves	  inclined	  to	  support	  independence.	  The	  pro-­‐independence	  faction	  invited	  the	  crown-­‐supporting	  faction’s	  feedback	  on	  a	  possible	  statement	  of	  declaration	  and	  thus	  set	  “independence”	  as	  an	  ultimate	  term	  that	  guided	  dialectical	  discourse	  toward	  eventual	  independence.	  In	  a	  smaller	  more	  intimate	  venue,	  a	  disgruntled	  teenager	  may	  express	  a	  desire	  to	  leave	  home	  but	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suddenly	  find	  herself	  involved	  in	  a	  “family”	  discussion	  about	  her	  frustration;	  thus,	  the	  jangle	  of	  voices	  and	  dialectical	  discord	  between	  parent	  and	  child	  still	  happen	  within	  and	  support	  her	  “family.”	  Also	  consider	  that	  any	  time	  a	  baseball	  coach	  argues	  with	  an	  umpire	  about	  a	  bad	  call,	  their	  dialectical	  clash	  still	  proceeds	  toward	  the	  ultimate	  term	  of	  “game”	  with	  all	  its	  attendant	  rules	  and	  expectations.	  	  Such	  ultimate	  terms,	  Burke	  explains,	  are	  “in	  a	  different	  order	  of	  vocabulary,”	  and	  inasmuch	  as	  these	  terms	  are	  in	  dialogue	  with	  other	  similarly	  ultimate	  terms,	  “there	  must	  be	  a	  principle	  of	  principles	  involved	  in	  such	  a	  design—and	  the	  step	  from	  principles	  to	  a	  principle	  of	  a	  principle	  is	  likewise	  both	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  previous	  order	  and	  the	  transcending	  of	  it”	  (Rhetoric	  189).	  As	  Burke	  develops	  elsewhere,	  and	  as	  I	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  principle	  of	  principles	  he	  alludes	  to	  is	  telos	  in	  general,	  or	  that	  which	  guides	  a	  concept	  to	  its	  completion	  or	  perfection.	  An	  ultimate	  term	  is	  already	  complete	  or	  perfect	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  other	  terms	  within	  an	  ultimate	  term’s	  dialectic	  find	  their	  completion	  or	  perfection	  in	  the	  ultimate	  term.	  Thus	  ultimate	  terms	  as	  a	  distinct	  order	  of	  vocabulary	  find	  their	  completion	  in	  telos.	  Their	  specific	  genus,	  as	  it	  were,	  is	  telos.	  	  And	  inasmuch	  as	  each	  ultimate	  term	  has	  a	  corresponding	  ultimate	  activity—play	  for	  
game;	  worship	  for	  religion;	  learn	  for	  university;	  debate	  for	  delegation—the	  corresponding	  activity	  for	  telos	  is	  symbouleutikon.	  By	  this	  I	  mean,	  that	  inasmuch	  as	  
telos	  is	  the	  distinctly	  human	  drive	  to	  conceptually	  complete	  and	  perfect	  all	  other	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concepts,	  symbouleutikon—the	  bringing	  together	  of	  wills—is	  the	  vehicle	  humans	  use	  to	  go	  about	  their	  efforts	  of	  completing	  and	  perfecting	  their	  terms	  and	  concepts.	  I	  should	  rather	  say,	  symbouleutikon	  is	  that	  which	  humans	  cannot	  escape	  as	  they	  go	  about	  their	  perfecting	  efforts.	  We	  are	  trapped	  in	  symbouleutikon,	  for	  we	  are	  linguistically	  bound—or	  bound	  to	  the	  symbols	  we	  share.	  	  In	  his	  essay	  “A	  Dramatistic	  View	  of	  the	  Origins	  of	  Language”	  (reprinted	  in	  Language	  
as	  Symbolic	  Action),	  Burke	  addresses	  our	  linguistically	  circumscribed	  reality	  this	  way,	  “Since	  language	  has	  its	  own	  peculiar	  motives,	  a	  language-­‐using	  species	  could	  not	  be	  motivated	  solely	  by	  nonlinguistic	  motives.	  [And]	  by	  its	  very	  nature,	  language	  also	  drives	  toward	  the	  ‘ultimate’	  of	  itself.	  And	  the	  ultimate	  is	  ‘Justice,’	  a	  kind	  of	  
completion	  whereby	  laws	  are	  so	  universalized	  that	  they	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  lawgiver”	  (Language	  440).	  In	  other	  words,	  Burke	  suggests	  that	  the	  particular	  telos	  of	  language	  is	  justice.	  Burke’s	  assertion	  proceeds	  from	  three	  inevitable	  qualities	  of	  language-­‐as-­‐symbol-­‐system.	  	  First,	  language-­‐as-­‐symbol-­‐system	  is	  unavoidably	  a	  shared	  communal	  public	  thing,	  which	  is	  infused	  with	  rules	  that	  are	  equally	  shared,	  communal,	  and	  public.	  	  The	  second	  quality,	  which	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  first,	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  
meaning	  is	  thus	  bound	  to	  the	  realm	  between	  and	  among	  beings	  instead	  of	  locked	  in	  mere	  subjectivity.	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And	  third,	  language’s	  public	  meanings	  and	  rules	  proceed	  toward	  their	  universal	  application	  to	  all	  language-­‐users,	  i.e.	  rules	  for	  one	  are	  rules	  for	  all	  because	  the	  rules	  themselves	  are	  public	  property.	  This	  is	  a	  definition	  of	  justice.	  	  Understanding	  each	  of	  these	  three	  qualities	  of	  language	  reveals	  how	  an	  actual	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  emerges	  from	  rhetoric.	  To	  explain	  the	  first	  quality,	  I	  briefly	  explore	  Charles	  Pierce’s	  semiotic	  theory	  of	  interpretants,	  which	  establishes	  that	  all	  our	  signs	  are	  unavoidably	  shared	  things.	  I	  also	  briefly	  explore	  Saul	  Kripke’s	  use	  of	  Wittgenstein	  to	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  language	  can	  never	  be	  private	  and	  how	  language’s	  rule-­‐based.	  To	  explain	  the	  second—that	  meaning	  itself	  exists	  between	  beings	  and	  not	  in	  solitary	  minds—I	  draw	  on	  Heidegger’s	  notion	  of	  an	  enworlded	  ontology.	  And	  to	  explain	  the	  third	  quality—that	  language’s	  rules	  proceed	  toward	  their	  universal	  application	  to	  all	  language-­‐users—I	  engage	  specific	  problems	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  Kantian	  ethics	  to	  account	  rationally	  and	  positively	  for	  divergent	  ethical	  perspectives.	  This	  last	  task	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  ultimate	  ethical	  project	  of	  symbouleutikon.	  	  
Language,	  Public,	  Rules	  In	  his	  2004	  article	  “Abduction	  is	  Never	  Alone,”	  Floyd	  Merrell	  concludes	  with	  this	  hope:	  “Perhaps,	  then,	  we	  may	  eventually	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  body,	  mind,	  signs,	  and	  abductive	  acts,	  are	  never	  alone,	  within	  the	  interconnected	  participatory	  whole”	  (273).	  What	  follows	  in	  this	  section	  is	  a	  step	  toward	  that	  hope.	  Specifically,	  by	  viewing	  Charles	  Peirce’s	  semiotics	  in	  terms	  of	  rhetorical	  tropes	  (instead	  of	  vice	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versa),	  we	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  Charles	  Peirce’s	  interpretants	  like	  abductive	  acts	  are	  also	  never	  alone	  (nor	  final).	  Another	  way	  of	  saying	  interpretants	  are	  never	  alone	  is	  saying	  that	  symbols	  are	  always	  shared	  phenomena.	  Simply	  put,	  an	  interpretant	  is	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  sign	  has	  on	  someone	  who	  perceives	  a	  sign.	  Interpretants	  are	  key	  to	  how	  Pierce	  explains	  semiosis,	  or	  the	  theory	  of	  signs.	  	  Pierce	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  actually	  three	  fundamentally	  different	  kinds	  of	  interpretant	  into	  which	  interpretant	  itself	  can	  be	  divided,	  namely	  dynamic	  interpretant,	  immediate	  interpretant,	  and	  final	  interpretant.	  Late	  in	  life,	  Charles	  Perce	  struggled	  to	  really	  articulate	  what	  the	  final	  interpretant	  really	  was.	  In	  one	  letter	  to	  an	  associate,	  he	  wrote,	  “I	  confess	  that	  my	  own	  conception	  of	  this	  third	  interpretant	  is	  not	  yet	  quite	  free	  from	  mist”	  (Pierce,	  Collected	  4.536).	  In	  a	  different	  letter,	  he	  continued	  to	  struggle	  with	  articulating	  the	  final	  interpretant:	  “it	  is	  quite	  hazy	  and	  needs	  a	  vast	  deal	  of	  study	  before	  it	  is	  rendered	  perfect”	  (Pierce,	  Collected	  8.314).	  The	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  final	  interpretant	  leads	  to	  a	  significant	  sense	  in	  which	  interpretants	  are	  never	  alone	  nor	  final.	  	  Interpretants	  are	  never	  alone	  simply	  because	  they	  are	  (or	  are	  components	  of,	  or	  representations	  of)	  mental	  states.	  Further,	  inasmuch	  as	  a	  sign	  is	  communicable,	  there	  must	  exist	  some	  sort	  of	  corresponding	  community	  through	  which	  the	  sign	  receives	  its	  “final”	  signification.	  For	  this	  same	  reason,	  the	  “final”	  interpretant	  as	  Pierce	  describes	  it	  can	  never	  be	  actually	  final,	  for	  community	  (itself	  as	  well	  as	  each	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individual	  community)	  is	  constantly	  evolving/devolving	  or	  at	  least	  in	  a	  continual	  state	  of	  flux.	  As	  such,	  interpretants	  will	  continue	  to	  multiply	  as	  community	  itself	  continues	  to	  alter	  the	  meaning	  and	  media	  of	  signs.	  	  This	  phenomenon	  makes	  sense	  in	  light	  of	  Pierce’s	  explanation	  of	  all	  three	  interpretants.	  The	  first	  interpretant	  Pierce	  describes	  as	  the	  “dynamic	  interpretant”	  which	  is	  the	  “effect	  actually	  produced	  on	  the	  mind”	  (Peirce,	  Essential	  482).	  This	  sort	  of	  interpretant	  occurs	  at	  the	  very	  initial	  stages	  of	  cognition	  all	  through	  the	  most	  complex	  stages	  of	  cognition.	  The	  dynamic	  interpretant	  engages	  a	  sign	  whenever	  and	  in	  whatever	  conditions	  a	  perceiver	  perceives	  (whether	  spatially,	  temporally,	  mentally,	  culturally,	  spiritually,	  intellectually,	  emotionally,	  etc.).	  	  From	  this	  first	  interpretant,	  Pierce	  suggests	  a	  second	  interpretant—a	  sort	  of	  intermediate	  interpretant,	  which	  he	  dubs	  the	  immediate	  interpretant.	  This	  interpretant	  engages	  with	  a	  sign	  whenever	  there	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  secondary	  image	  used	  to	  denote	  the	  sign.	  This	  sign-­‐of-­‐a-­‐sign	  can	  be	  as	  simple	  as	  recognizing	  the	  image	  of	  a	  sign	  in	  one’s	  mind,	  or	  the	  familiar	  notion	  of	  a	  physical	  object	  (like	  a	  tree).	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  humans.	  “Nature	  creates	  similarities,”	  notes	  Walter	  Benjamin,	  “One	  need	  only	  think	  of	  mimicry”	  (333).	  Mimicry	  in	  non-­‐humans	  reinforces	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  even	  neuronal	  impulses	  are	  metaphoric	  in	  nature.	  Consider	  natural	  camouflage	  in	  the	  world	  of	  non-­‐human	  animals.	  Natural	  selection	  tends	  to	  favor	  animals	  with	  natural,	  but	  we	  can’t	  really	  say	  whether	  camouflaged	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animals	  process	  camouflage	  functions	  on	  a	  symbolic	  level.	  But	  what	  of	  the	  predators	  against	  which	  this	  camouflaging	  function	  offers	  protection?	  For	  the	  camouflage	  to	  work	  as	  a	  protectant,	  a	  predator	  must	  see	  the	  camouflage	  as	  if	  it	  were	  part	  of	  the	  non-­‐food	  surrounding	  scenery.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  predator	  sees	  the	  camouflage	  animal	  in	  terms	  of	  anything	  in	  particular.	  But	  it	  does	  suggest	  that	  some	  animals	  see	  a	  thing	  as	  if	  it	  were	  not-­‐the-­‐thing,	  which	  is	  a	  fundamentally	  symbolic	  process.	  	  For	  his	  part,	  Charles	  Pierce	  describes	  the	  immediate	  interpretant	  as	  “the	  schema	  in	  [our]	  imagination,	  i.e.	  the	  vague	  Image	  of	  what	  there	  is	  in	  common	  to	  the	  different	  images	  of	  a	  [tree]”	  (Pierce,	  Collected	  8.314).	  Whatever	  the	  other	  notions	  of	  such	  an	  interpretant,	  this	  is	  certainly	  an	  “overlaying”	  sort	  of	  process.	  	  Finally,	  Pierce	  describes	  the	  final	  interpretant	  as	  “that	  which	  would	  finally	  be	  decided	  to	  be	  the	  true	  interpretation	  if	  consideration	  of	  the	  matter	  were	  carried	  so	  far	  that	  an	  ultimate	  opinion	  were	  reached”	  (Peirce,	  Essential	  496).	  Elsewhere,	  Pierce	  describes	  this	  last	  interpretant	  this	  way:	  My	  Final	  Interpretant	  is	  .	  .	  .	  the	  effect	  the	  Sign	  would	  produce	  upon	  any	  mind	  upon	  which	  the	  circumstances	  should	  permit	  it	  to	  work	  out	  its	  full	  effect.	  .	  .	  .	  the	  Final	  Interpretant	  is	  the	  one	  Interpretative	  result	  to	  which	  every	  Interpreter	  is	  destined	  to	  come	  if	  the	  Sign	  is	  sufficiently	  considered.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  Final	  Interpretant	  is	  that	  toward	  which	  the	  actual	  tends.	  (Hardwick	  and	  Cook	  110)	  	  It	  is	  probably	  because	  of	  these	  descriptions	  that	  subsequent	  secondary	  literature	  on	  Pierce	  has	  interpreted	  the	  final	  interpretant	  to	  be	  some	  sort	  of	  “arriving”	  at	  the	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summit	  of	  the	  sign—as	  if	  some	  sort	  of	  process	  really	  has	  some	  sort	  of	  end.	  But	  what	  I	  see	  from	  his	  descriptions	  above	  indicates	  that	  this	  is	  a	  never-­‐ending	  process.	  Perhaps	  the	  confusion	  here	  is	  one	  of	  movement.	  Pierce	  describes	  the	  “actual”	  as	  tending	  toward	  the	  final	  interpretant.	  This	  is	  not	  saying	  that	  our	  mental	  states	  more	  and	  more	  closely	  resemble	  realty—quite	  the	  contrary.	  The	  final	  interpretant	  is	  that	  fuzzy	  situation	  in	  which	  our	  realty	  more	  closely	  resembles	  our	  signs.	  	  Kenneth	  Burke	  explores	  a	  similar	  notion	  in	  an	  earlier	  essay	  in	  Language	  as	  Symbolic	  
Action,	  in	  which	  he	  reverses	  the	  traditional	  notion	  that	  “words	  are	  the	  signs	  of	  things”	  and	  instead	  asks	  “what	  might	  be	  discovered	  if	  we	  tried	  inverting	  such	  a	  view,	  and	  upholding	  instead	  the	  proposition	  that	  ‘things	  are	  the	  signs	  of	  words’”	  (Language	  360-­‐61).	  What	  we	  discover	  begins	  innocently	  enough.	  The	  first	  time	  a	  child	  is	  told	  by	  someone	  that	  a	  particular	  object	  is	  called	  “tree,”	  that	  object	  is	  not	  a	  tree	  to	  that	  child,	  it	  is	  the	  tree,	  for	  no	  other	  object	  in	  the	  world	  is	  called	  “tree.”	  In	  this	  moment,	  and	  this	  moment	  only,	  does	  an	  individual	  thing	  precede	  an	  individual	  sign.	  Every	  moment	  thereafter,	  that	  individual	  sign	  precedes	  the	  countless	  individual	  things	  that	  represent	  the	  individual	  sign.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  calling	  a	  thing	  “tree”	  does	  not	  overlay	  the	  thing	  with	  the	  symbol	  “tree”	  as	  much	  as	  it	  overlays	  the	  term/symbol	  for	  “tree”	  with	  countless	  analogous	  (yet	  singularly	  different)	  individual	  things.	  Think	  of	  a	  toddler’s	  excitement	  when	  a	  parent	  points	  to	  an	  object	  and	  asks	  the	  child,	  “What	  is	  that?”	  and	  the	  child,	  gleeful	  at	  understanding	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  recognizes	  the	  object	  for	  what	  it	  is:	  a	  sign	  for	  the	  word	  that	  the	  child	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learned	  from	  the	  parent.	  And	  so,	  the	  child	  calls	  out	  “tree!”	  and	  waits	  for	  another	  thing	  to	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  represents	  the	  word.	  	  Thus	  in	  a	  very	  rudimentary	  form	  in	  Pierce’s	  final	  interpretant,	  we	  have	  here	  a	  formulation	  of	  symbouleutikon—a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  child’s	  will	  is	  brought	  together	  with	  a	  parent’s	  will	  through	  the	  symbol	  game	  of	  naming	  a	  tree.	  	  Pierce’s	  notions	  of	  the	  final	  interpretant	  suggest	  some	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  ways	  we	  understand	  symbols.	  First,	  “symbol”	  itself	  implies	  at	  least	  two	  perspectives,	  for	  a	  single	  symbol	  that	  does	  not	  symbolize	  something	  else	  would	  not	  be	  a	  symbol.	  There	  is	  no	  symbol	  (singular)	  without	  symbols	  (plural).	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  a	  symbol	  is	  a	  symbol	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  dialectical	  relationship	  with	  other	  symbols;	  a	  symbol	  can	  never	  be	  understood	  by	  itself—only	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  symbols.	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  a	  single	  word	  in	  a	  linguistic	  vacuum	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  its	  interactions	  with	  other	  words;	  by	  this	  I	  mean	  language	  itself	  is	  necessarily	  dialectical.	  Likewise,	  a	  single	  “thought”	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  its	  interactions	  with	  other	  thoughts;	  so	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  all	  thought	  is	  also	  dialectical.	  In	  other	  words,	  thinking	  does	  not	  begin	  with	  a	  symbol	  (singular);	  thinking	  begins	  with	  the	  interrelated	  interaction	  of	  many	  symbols.	  This	  means	  that	  perceiving	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  interacting	  and	  interrelated	  symbol-­‐use	  is	  not	  just	  one	  way	  of	  many	  of	  perceiving	  thinking	  (which	  would	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  symbolic	  conversation).	  Instead,	  this	  means	  that	  thinking	  itself	  is	  literally	  interactive	  symbol-­‐
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use	  in	  nature.	  In	  an	  early	  essay,	  Nietzsche	  asks,	  “Is	  language	  the	  adequate	  expression	  of	  all	  realities?”	  Charles	  Pierce’s	  notion	  of	  interpretants	  suggests	  that	  the	  interacting	  and	  interrelated	  symbols	  we	  call	  language	  is	  the	  only	  reality	  we	  can	  express.	  	  Language	  may	  be	  the	  only	  reality	  we	  can	  express,	  but	  our	  individual	  subjective	  perspectives	  of	  reality	  are	  still	  incommensurable	  with	  one	  another.	  Despite	  our	  vast	  metaphoric	  vocabulary	  that	  encourages	  us	  to	  speak	  otherwise,	  I	  will	  never	  see	  things	  from	  your	  perspective	  nor	  you	  from	  mine.	  We	  do	  not	  share	  each	  other’s	  physical	  eyes	  or	  other	  sense	  organs,	  and	  we	  do	  not	  share	  each	  other’s	  physical	  brains	  with	  their	  attendant	  neuronal	  functions	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  each	  of	  our	  individual	  physical	  selves	  and	  to	  no	  other	  creature.	  	  Yet	  there	  is	  still	  a	  linguistic	  and	  symbolic	  bridge	  between	  the	  incommensurability	  of	  subjective	  sensation	  and	  the	  unavoidable	  language-­‐based	  reality	  we	  all	  share.	  This	  bridge	  is	  probably	  best	  understood	  by	  explaining	  the	  Wittgensteinian	  foundation	  of	  Saul	  Kripke’s	  language	  theories.	  One	  way	  of	  viewing	  language-­‐making	  is	  rule-­‐following	  in	  visual/audible/verbal	  form.	  But	  the	  problem	  with	  rules	  is	  that,	  “It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  obey	  a	  rule	  'privately':	  otherwise	  thinking	  one	  was	  obeying	  a	  rule	  would	  be	  the	  same	  things	  as	  obeying	  it”	  (Wittgenstein	  69).	  If	  this	  is	  true	  then	  all	  language	  must	  not	  only	  be	  publicly	  shared	  but	  must	  also	  depend	  on	  being	  able	  to	  be	  publicly	  shared.	  There	  cannot	  be	  any	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  private	  language.	  And	  by	  private	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language,	  Wittgenstein	  means	  this:	  “The	  words	  of	  [a	  private]	  language	  are	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  can	  be	  known	  only	  to	  the	  speaker;	  to	  his	  immediate,	  private,	  sensations.	  So	  another	  cannot	  understand	  the	  language”	  (Wittgenstein	  75).	  This	  is	  either	  impossible	  or	  nonsensical	  because	  once	  a	  word	  or	  symbol	  is	  articulated	  it	  is	  able	  to	  be	  articulated	  to	  any	  other	  creature	  with	  the	  same	  cognitive	  symbolic	  apparatus.	  In	  describing	  a	  private	  language,	  Wittgenstein	  is	  not	  merely	  taking	  about	  some	  sort	  of	  situation	  like	  the	  Robinson	  Crusoe	  or	  the	  film	  Cast	  Away.	  Those	  characters	  were	  entirely	  alone	  and	  created	  symbols	  all	  of	  their	  own	  making;	  however,	  those	  symbols	  could	  be	  taught	  and	  transferred	  to	  other	  people.	  Their	  individually	  made	  symbols	  were	  in	  public	  domain	  (so	  to	  speak)	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  were	  cognized.	  After	  all,	  Wittgenstein	  explains,	  “If	  language	  is	  to	  be	  a	  means	  of	  communication	  there	  must	  be	  agreement	  not	  only	  in	  definitions	  but	  also	  .	  .	  .	  in	  judgments”	  (Wittgenstein	  75).	  	  Consider,	  for	  instance,	  Saul	  Kripke’s	  Causal	  Picture	  or	  causal	  theory	  of	  naming.	  Although	  Kripke	  never	  advocated	  his	  Causal	  Picture	  as	  a	  fully	  developed	  theory,	  it	  is	  still	  instructive	  toward	  understanding	  the	  public	  rules	  that	  guide	  symbol-­‐use	  and	  language-­‐use.	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  a	  powerful	  historicist	  community	  component	  to	  naming:	  “In	  general	  our	  reference	  depends	  not	  just	  on	  what	  we	  think	  ourselves,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  people	  in	  the	  community,	  the	  history	  of	  how	  the	  name	  reached	  one,	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  It	  is	  by	  following	  such	  a	  history	  that	  one	  gets	  to	  the	  reference”	  (Kripke	  96).	  Drawing	  on	  traditional	  Christian	  ceremonial	  imagery,	  Kripke	  suggest	  that	  naming	  occurs	  when,	  “An	  initial	  ‘baptism’	  takes	  place.	  Here	  the	  object	  may	  be	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named	  by	  ostension,	  or	  the	  reference	  of	  the	  name	  may	  be	  fixed	  by	  a	  description.	  When	  the	  name	  is	  ‘passed	  from	  link	  to	  link,’	  the	  receiver	  of	  the	  name	  must,	  I	  think,	  intend	  when	  he	  learns	  it	  to	  use	  it	  with	  the	  same	  reference	  as	  the	  man	  from	  whom	  he	  heard	  it”	  (Kripke	  96).	  Via	  shared	  rules	  of	  language,	  the	  causal	  link	  connecting	  names	  to	  the	  objects	  they	  name	  thus	  changes	  our	  realty	  in	  relation	  to	  those	  things.	  The	  baptism	  of	  a	  thing	  gives	  it	  new	  life,	  so	  to	  speak.	  This	  phenomenon	  varies	  in	  detail	  but	  remains	  largely	  the	  same	  from	  culture	  to	  culture	  and	  from	  language	  to	  language.	  	  
A	  Philological	  Meaning	  of	  Meaning	  The	  arguments	  supporting	  the	  public	  nature	  of	  symbols	  and	  language	  are	  important	  because	  traditional	  (especially	  Cartesian)	  epistemology	  relies	  in	  part	  on	  the	  tacit	  idea	  that	  meaning	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  private	  event	  that	  individual	  subjective	  beings	  experience	  on	  their	  own.	  At	  the	  risk	  of	  asserting	  an	  argument	  ad	  consequentiam,	  the	  traditional	  sort	  of	  private	  meaning-­‐creating	  epistemology	  also	  supports	  an	  individualist	  approach	  to	  rhetoric	  that	  ultimately	  underpins	  the	  damaging	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  I	  reviewed	  in	  the	  introduction.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  non-­‐private	  epistemology	  through	  the	  media	  of	  non-­‐private	  symbols	  and	  non-­‐private	  language	  supports	  a	  togetherness-­‐oriented	  symbouleutikon.	  	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  more	  public	  notions	  of	  meaning	  may	  help	  clarify	  this	  distinction.	  “The	  world	  is	  not	  the	  mere	  collection	  of	  the	  countable	  or	  uncountable,	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  things	  that	  are	  at	  hand”	  Heidegger	  reminds	  us,	  “But	  neither	  is	  it	  a	  merely	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imagined	  framework	  added	  by	  our	  representation	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  such	  given	  things.	  The	  world	  worlds”	  (Basic	  Writings	  170).	  By	  verbing	  “world”	  into	  “worlds,”	  Heidegger	  makes	  a	  strong	  claim	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  meaning	  itself.	  The	  concept	  of	  meaning,	  according	  to	  Heidegger,	  is	  not	  something	  a	  priori	  “countable”	  in	  the	  universe,	  neither	  is	  meaning	  an	  “imagined”	  framework	  overlaid	  on	  the	  universe	  by	  clever	  language-­‐using	  animals.	  Rather,	  meaning	  is	  always	  and	  already	  a	  quality	  of	  the	  particular	  being	  of	  the	  world.	  But	  of	  what	  sort	  of	  meaning	  is	  this	  meaning?	  Or	  in	  a	  word,	  what	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  meaning?	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  a	  brief	  philological	  analysis	  of	  the	  term	  meaning	  reveals	  some	  striking	  and	  quasi-­‐forgotten	  aspects	  of	  
meaning.	  	  As	  the	  OED	  relates,	  meaning	  stems	  from	  the	  Old	  Frisian	  mene,	  which	  can	  be	  literally	  translated	  as	  assembly	  but	  which	  also	  has	  its	  earliest	  cognate	  in	  the	  Old	  English	  
gemǣne,	  which	  connotes	  fellowship	  or	  intercourse,	  specifically	  sexual	  intercourse.	  Hence,	  from	  its	  earliest	  uses,	  meaning	  was	  something	  that	  happened	  when	  people	  got	  together	  in	  overtly	  discursive	  ways	  (as	  in	  an	  assembly)	  but	  also	  in	  much	  more	  intimately	  communicative	  ways	  (as	  with	  sex).	  Meaning	  thus	  began	  as	  a	  performative	  act	  that	  only	  existed	  in	  the	  interchange	  between	  actors.	  	  The	  between	  quality	  of	  meaning	  is	  especially	  evident	  in	  the	  mathematic	  branch	  of	  
mean—as	  in	  the	  arithmetic	  mean.	  The	  arithmetic	  mean	  is	  what	  results	  from	  adding	  numbers	  together	  and	  dividing	  the	  sum	  by	  the	  number	  of	  numbers	  added.	  In	  this	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sense,	  an	  arithmetic	  mean	  will	  always	  be	  a	  number	  somewhere	  between	  the	  lowest	  and	  highest	  numbers	  added	  together.	  In	  a	  word,	  an	  arithmetic	  mean	  is	  
intermediary—that	  which	  is	  in	  the	  middle.	  	  Another	  branch	  of	  mean	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  “middle”	  traces	  a	  path	  of	  associated	  definitions	  beginning	  with	  “middle”	  proceeding	  to	  “held	  in	  common”	  then	  reducing	  to	  merely	  “common”	  then	  slipping	  into	  a	  definite	  classist	  connotation	  in	  the	  definition	  “low	  and	  vulgar,”	  which	  then	  proceeds	  into	  “cruel.”	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  miss	  the	  parallel	  in	  Heidegger.	  As	  Lynn	  Worsham	  points	  out,	  “Essential	  to	  American-­‐ism,”	  according	  to	  Heidegger,	  “is	  an	  assumption	  that	  human	  subjectivity	  is	  .	  .	  .	  the	  ground	  for	  truth	  and	  Being.	  .	  .	  .	  This	  form	  of	  subjectivity	  .	  .	  .	  seeks	  to	  systematize	  every	  private,	  social,	  and	  political	  phenomenon	  and	  thereby	  seeks	  to	  render	  everything	  available	  for	  use	  in	  the	  drive	  for	  knowledge	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Hence,	  Americanism	  [is]	  a	  totalizing	  and	  totalitarian	  regime”	  (216).	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  actually	  review	  some	  of	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  prescient	  observations	  of	  American	  democracy,	  which	  explore	  how	  the	  equality	  of	  social	  conditions	  can	  lead	  from	  a	  state	  of	  holding	  qualities	  in	  common	  to	  a	  state	  of	  system-­‐perfecting	  conformity.	  But	  not	  all	  senses	  of	  mean	  need	  be	  this	  cruel.	  	  We	  use	  mean	  in	  another	  intermediary	  sense	  when	  discussing	  a	  middle	  time	  between	  now	  and	  later.	  Now,	  I	  am	  sitting	  at	  a	  desk.	  Later,	  I’ll	  go	  eat	  dinner.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  I	  will	  work	  on	  my	  dissertation.	  
	  	  
91	  
But	  intermediary	  itself	  is	  a	  slippery	  concept.	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  latch	  onto	  mean	  as	  intermediary	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  moderation	  and	  balance	  (i.e.	  the	  Golden	  Mean).	  But	  
intermediary	  is	  also	  that	  which	  mediates.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  usage	  of	  intermediary	  that	  
mean	  acquires	  its	  particular	  flavor	  of	  instrumentality	  and	  agency.	  This	  dissertation	  is	  a	  means	  toward	  or	  for	  some	  end,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  this	  dissertation	  is	  also	  a	  means	  of	  communication	  and	  inquiry.	  Means	  in	  this	  sense	  applies	  to	  not	  just	  written	  communication	  or	  inanimate	  instrumentalities	  only.	  We	  often	  find	  that	  people	  and	  other	  beings	  are	  themselves	  means	  to	  ends	  or	  of	  purposes.	  And	  even	  ends	  and	  purposes	  can	  be	  means	  to	  yet	  other	  ends	  and	  purposes.	  Means	  that	  mediate	  are	  not	  only	  agencies	  but	  also	  the	  agents	  themselves	  and	  other	  components	  of	  the	  worlded	  world.	  	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  then	  that	  mean-­‐as-­‐mediation	  leads	  (inexorably?)	  to	  sign-­‐making	  and	  intention.	  The	  questions,	  “what	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  this?”	  or,	  “what	  do	  you	  mean?”	  reveal	  the	  in-­‐between	  character	  of	  meaning.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  answers,	  “This	  
means.	  .	  .,”	  or,	  “I	  mean.	  .	  .,”	  always	  and	  already	  rely	  on	  qualities	  of	  subject	  and	  object	  that	  are	  between	  at	  least	  two	  beings—shared—held	  in	  common—enworlded—of	  or	  pertaining	  to	  symbouleutikon.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  meaning	  relates	  to	  symbouleutikon	  because	  meaning	  is	  not	  something	  merely	  decoded	  from	  preexisting	  qualities	  of	  the	  world;	  nor	  is	  meaning	  merely	  overlaid	  on	  the	  world	  by	  conscious	  intention.	  Rather,	  meaning	  relates	  to	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symbouleutikon	  because	  meaning	  always	  and	  already	  emerges	  in	  between	  beings	  in	  the	  world.	  Meaning	  is	  an	  activity,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  act	  of	  discovery	  nor	  is	  it	  the	  act	  of	  covering	  what	  is	  already	  there.	  Meaning	  is	  the	  act	  of	  uncovering	  the	  particular	  situation	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  Lynn	  Worsham	  points	  to	  Heidegger’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  interpretation:	  “Our	  understanding	  gets	  interpreted,	  in	  other	  words,	  but	  the	  interpretation	  discloses	  not	  the	  speaking	  subject	  but	  the	  world.	  Language	  is	  a	  situation,	  a	  world,	  brought	  forth	  and	  disclosed	  in	  words”	  (Worsham	  226).	  This	  is	  exactly	  why	  human	  Being	  is	  a	  hermeneutic	  ontology	  for	  Heidegger.	  We	  interpret	  the	  world	  as	  an	  intricate	  component	  of	  the	  world	  and	  we	  do	  so	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  beings	  we	  interact	  with.	  	  Consider	  again	  Heidegger’s	  seeming	  tautology,	  “the	  world	  worlds.”	  Even	  though	  Heidegger’s	  verbing	  of	  “world”	  describes	  what	  the	  world	  does,	  his	  statement	  is	  only	  meaningful	  via	  roundabout	  understanding	  that	  re-­‐approaches	  “world”	  by	  way	  of	  “terms	  of	  other	  things”	  (see	  the	  whole	  middle	  paragraph	  in	  Heidegger,	  Basic	  
Writings	  170).	  This	  is	  also	  the	  paradox	  of	  meaning	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  same	  paradox	  of	  Wittgensteinian	  non-­‐private	  symbols	  and	  language	  described	  above).	  We	  can	  say	  that	  meaning	  means,	  and	  initially	  sound	  silly.	  But	  we	  must	  understand	  that	  to	  mean	  is	  to	  uncover	  the	  prior	  in-­‐between	  character	  of	  beings	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  their	  world.	  Such	  understanding	  immediately	  reveals	  that	  discussing	  meaning	  “in	  terms	  of	  other	  things”	  (or	  other	  beings	  or	  world)	  really	  leads	  back	  to	  recognizing	  that	  meaning	  does	  only	  what	  it	  can	  do:	  it	  means.	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When	  we	  engage	  in	  (and	  of)	  meaning,	  we	  articulate	  signs	  and	  intentions,	  which	  are	  intermediary	  markers	  between	  subjects,	  objects,	  and	  the	  world.	  These	  are	  what	  Charles	  Pierce	  calls	  interpretants.	  As	  such,	  words	  are	  the	  signs	  of	  things	  and	  things	  are	  the	  signs	  of	  words,	  for	  words/signs/languages	  are	  the	  intermediaries	  between	  the	  beings-­‐that-­‐articulates	  and	  the	  world.	  And,	  we	  should	  also	  remember	  that	  
meaning	  is	  neither	  in-­‐the-­‐thing	  nor	  in-­‐the-­‐being-­‐that-­‐articulates;	  rather,	  meaning	  occurs	  in	  the	  world	  between	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  themselves	  and	  between	  those	  beings	  and	  beings-­‐with-­‐things.	  	  All	  this	  talk	  of	  between,	  with	  its	  attendant	  notions	  of	  one-­‐two,	  may	  lead	  some	  readers	  to	  suspect	  a	  lurking	  binary—that	  these	  notions	  of	  meaning	  are	  yet	  another	  way	  of	  
thirding	  in	  Victor	  Vitanza’s	  sense.	  Vitanza	  asserts,	  “there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  identification.	  The	  one	  that	  I’m	  against	  is	  by	  way	  of	  the	  negative.	  You	  see,	  I,	  instead,	  identify	  with	  the	  third	  man/woman,	  or	  the	  excluded	  middles”	  (21).	  By	  the	  “third	  man/woman,”	  Vitanza	  refers	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  Michel	  Serres,	  which	  Vitanza	  quotes	  at	  length,	  “To	  hold	  a	  dialogue	  is	  to	  suppose	  a	  third	  man	  and	  to	  seek	  to	  exclude	  him;	  a	  successful	  communication	  is	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  third	  man.	  The	  most	  profound	  dialectical	  problem	  is	  not	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Other,	  who	  is	  actually	  a	  variety	  .	  .	  .	  of	  the	  Same;	  it	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  third	  man”	  (qtd.	  in	  Vitanza	  21).	  In	  this	  sense,	  Serres	  critiques	  dialectic	  as	  the	  process	  whereby	  two	  individuals	  go	  about	  identifying	  a	  mutually	  shared	  reality	  by	  virtue	  of	  excluding	  the	  realities	  of	  those	  not	  directly	  involved	  in	  their	  binary	  dialectic.	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Yet,	  the	  between	  qualities	  of	  meaning	  do	  not	  signify	  a	  binary;	  rather,	  between	  merely	  signifies	  that	  which	  is	  intermediary—in-­‐the-­‐middle.	  In	  this	  sense,	  among	  may	  be	  a	  more	  appropriate	  non-­‐binary	  term	  than	  between	  when	  considering	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  but	  among	  is	  also	  a	  quasi-­‐step	  away	  from	  the	  qualities	  of	  middle,	  which	  are	  core	  to	  (in	  the	  middle	  of)	  concepts	  of	  meaning.	  There	  are	  no	  binaries	  or	  others	  in	  this	  between	  sense	  of	  meaning;	  nor	  are	  there	  thirds	  in	  Vitanza’s	  sense.	  And	  it	  would	  be	  unnecessarily	  complex	  to	  suggest	  that	  meaning	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  fourth	  space	  if	  only	  because	  meaning	  is	  all	  space	  between	  (or	  among,	  if	  you	  like)	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  	  All	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  beings	  will	  not	  or	  do	  not	  disagree	  as	  to	  what	  different	  words/signs/languages	  mean.	  Indeed,	  most	  such	  disagreements	  tend	  to	  happen	  when	  beings	  desperately	  strive	  to	  agree.	  This	  is	  because	  agreement	  is	  the	  surrender	  (or	  the	  causing-­‐to-­‐surrender)	  of	  one	  meaning	  in	  deference	  to	  all	  others:	  beings	  agree	  by	  proceeding	  from	  pluralities	  of	  non-­‐agreement.	  The	  activity	  of	  meaning	  thus	  occupies	  minds-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  during	  every	  moment	  of	  perception.	  This	  means	  that	  
meaning	  is	  an	  ontological	  activity	  of	  interpretation	  and	  not	  just	  interpretation	  as	  a	  rational	  activity.	  Meaning-­‐as-­‐interpretation	  is	  ontological	  in	  that	  the	  world	  in	  which	  beings—you,	  me,	  your	  grandmother—find	  themselves	  is	  a	  world	  that	  always	  and	  already	  contains	  meaning	  because	  beings	  were	  in	  the	  world	  long	  before	  you,	  me,	  or	  your	  grandmother	  arrived	  on	  the	  scene.	  So,	  meaning	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  understood	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  something	  that	  is	  experienced	  as	  part	  of	  being-­‐
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(together)-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  Thus,	  the	  world	  in	  this	  sense	  exists	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  beings.	  But,	  to	  clarify,	  beings	  do	  not	  create	  the	  world;	  rather,	  the	  world	  is	  the	  unique	  situation	  that	  exists	  whenever	  beings	  exist.	  From	  this	  genesis,	  meaning	  is	  an	  emergent	  quality	  of	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  (much	  like	  liquidity	  is	  an	  emergent	  quality	  of	  water).	  	  These	  Heideggerian	  notions	  of	  meaning	  suggest	  that	  the	  bringing	  together	  of	  wills—
symbouleutikon—is	  not	  something	  that	  beings	  pursue	  like	  traditional	  notions	  of	  deliberation.	  Instead,	  symbouleutikon	  is	  something	  that	  beings	  inexorably	  experience	  by	  virtue	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  That	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  such	  an	  inevitable	  togetherness	  with	  all	  beings	  provides	  a	  pragmatist	  context	  for	  linguistic	  and	  symbolic	  universals.	  And	  the	  possibility	  of	  linguistic	  universals	  is	  what	  makes	  possible	  ethical	  universals	  as	  we	  shall	  presently	  explore	  in	  Kant’s	  moral	  philosophy.	  
	  
The	  Question	  of	  Divergence	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics	  In	  an	  essay	  reprinted	  in	  Language	  as	  Symbolic	  Action,	  Kenneth	  Burke	  asserts,	  “Of	  Kant’s	  three	  great	  Critiques	  (of	  Pure	  Reason,	  Practical	  Reason,	  and	  Judgment)	  the	  second	  leans	  most	  toward	  the	  Dramatistic.	  .	  .	  since	  it	  concerns	  ethics;	  and	  by	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  case,	  ethics	  builds	  its	  terminology	  around	  the	  problem	  of	  action”	  (436).	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  post-­‐classical	  thinker	  who	  has	  had	  more	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Western	  ethical	  philosophy	  than	  Kant.	  As	  noted	  earlier	  in	  this	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chapter,	  Burke’s	  notion	  of	  justice	  as	  language’s	  telos	  has	  its	  specific	  formulation	  in	  reference	  to	  Kant’s	  categorical	  imperative.	  	  Even	  the	  most	  casual	  of	  Kant’s	  readers	  understand	  that	  his	  formulation	  of	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  relies	  on	  the	  related	  notion	  of	  universal	  law.	  The	  pragmatic	  difficulty	  with	  both	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  and	  universal	  law	  is	  that	  no	  human	  actually	  lives	  according	  to	  either.	  Humans	  are	  an	  ethically	  divergent	  bunch,	  whose	  varied	  notions	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  frequently	  clash	  with	  one	  another.	  In	  contrast,	  Kant’s	  ethical	  project	  relies	  on	  universal	  concepts—non-­‐situational	  ideals	  that	  guide	  moral	  thinking.	  In	  light	  of	  Kant’s	  commitment	  to	  universal	  law,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  Kant	  could	  coherently	  account	  for	  (much	  less	  value)	  the	  social	  interchange	  that	  results	  from	  bringing	  together	  wills	  (symbouleutikon)	  of	  divergent	  ethical	  perspectives.	  Yet,	  as	  I	  explore	  below,	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  linguistic	  foundation	  necessary	  for	  Kant	  to	  be	  able	  to	  formulate	  universal	  law	  and	  the	  categorical	  imperative.	  Indeed,	  I	  suggest	  that	  symbouleutikon	  pursued	  to	  its	  rhetorical	  end—its	  
telos—makes	  possible	  the	  formulation	  of	  Kantian	  universal	  law.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  that	  Kant	  refers	  to	  most	  often	  only	  as	  moral	  agents.	  The	  term	  
rhetorical/moral	  agent	  may	  be	  clunky	  (not	  to	  mention	  potentially	  problematic	  since	  it	  appears	  to	  postulate	  an	  ideal—and	  therefore	  nonexistent	  and	  othered/othering—human	  actor).	  However,	  as	  should	  become	  evident	  in	  what	  follows,	  rhetorical/moral	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agents	  more	  accurately	  describes	  the	  pluralistic	  and	  endlessly	  diverse	  motley	  assortment	  of	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  who	  are	  inevitably	  both	  rhetorically	  and	  ethically	  infused.	  	  To	  proceed,	  I	  posit	  a	  straightforward	  question:	  do	  Kantian	  ethics	  account	  for	  ethical	  divergence,	  or	  do	  Kantian	  ethics	  at	  least	  provide	  a	  guide	  for	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  as	  to	  how	  to	  act	  when	  encountering	  divergent	  ethical	  views?	  The	  answer	  to	  both	  of	  these	  questions	  is	  an	  obvious	  “yes.”	  But	  do	  Kantian	  ethics	  account	  for	  ethical	  divergence	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  grants	  any	  sort	  of	  positive	  value	  to	  such	  divergence?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  is	  perhaps	  less	  obvious	  but	  still	  “yes.”	  In	  claiming	  this,	  I	  quickly	  acknowledge	  that	  even	  though	  Kant	  may	  value	  the	  free	  interchange	  of	  ideas	  and	  even	  the	  learning	  process	  that	  emerges	  from	  considering	  bad	  ideas,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  suggesting	  that	  Kant	  believed	  it	  was	  a	  good	  thing	  that	  anyone	  should	  ever	  believe	  bad	  ideas.	  Rather,	  inasmuch	  as	  people	  do	  believe	  bad	  (or	  any	  other	  kinds	  of)	  ideas,	  it	  is	  ethically	  necessary	  for	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  to	  seek	  to	  understand	  those	  ideas	  and	  perspectives	  through	  social	  interaction.	  This	  is	  necessary	  because	  the	  act	  of	  seeking	  to	  understand	  divergent	  ideas	  in	  social	  interaction	  is	  what	  leads	  a	  Kantian	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  to	  discern	  between	  conviction	  based	  on	  universal	  truth	  and	  mere	  persuasion	  based	  on	  subjective	  assumptions.	  Further,	  the	  ethical	  necessity	  to	  consider	  divergent	  perspectives	  has	  a	  “universal”	  edge	  to	  it.	  So	  even	  if	  none	  of	  a	  rhetorical/moral	  agent’s	  friends	  believes	  any	  divergent	  ideas,	  that	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  still	  faces	  the	  ethical	  necessity	  to	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The	  Problem	  of	  Divergence	  within	  Kant’s	  Ethical	  Community	  There	  is	  evidently	  a	  problem	  of	  accounting	  for	  social	  divergence	  in	  the	  secondary	  literature	  on	  Kant	  (even	  though,	  I	  would	  argue,	  such	  a	  problem	  does	  not	  actually	  exist	  in	  Kant’s	  primary	  writings).	  The	  perceived	  problem	  of	  social	  divergence	  in	  Kant	  could	  be	  summarized	  this	  way:	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  in	  an	  ethical	  community	  are	  duty-­‐bound	  to	  the	  exact	  same	  behaviors	  toward	  each	  other	  according	  to	  universal	  law;	  therefore,	  any	  divergence	  among	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  will	  either	  expel	  some	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  from	  the	  ethical	  community	  or	  otherwise	  will	  not	  contribute	  meaningfully	  toward	  the	  distinctive	  identity	  of	  the	  ethical	  community.	  This	  would	  prima	  facie	  preempt	  any	  robust	  notion	  of	  
symbouleutikon	  in	  Kantian	  ethics.	  	  Jennifer	  Moore	  calls	  this	  sort	  of	  view	  a	  “‘retrenched’	  atomist	  reading	  of	  Kant”	  (Moore	  58).	  She	  quotes	  W.D.	  Gottshalk	  as	  representative	  of	  such	  a	  view.	  According	  to	  Gottshalk,	   The	  Kantian	  ethics	  of	  the	  moral	  law	  .	  .	  .	  directs	  [agents’]	  actions	  so	  that	  each	  agent	  repeats	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  and	  shares	  a	  formal	  identity	  with	  them.	  But	  it	  makes	  no	  provision	  for	  each	  agent	  to	  complement	  and	  enrich	  the	  others,	  and	  to	  share	  not	  only	  in	  a	  formal	  identity	  but	  also	  in	  a	  communal	  diversity.	  The	  Kantian	  ethics	  is	  the	  ethics	  of	  secluded	  universality.	  (qtd.	  in	  Moore	  58)	  	  Moore	  responds	  to	  such	  a	  view	  by	  theorizing	  that	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  “community”	  includes	  harmony	  as	  a	  key	  feature	  (other	  key	  features	  include	  unity,	  communal	  intention,	  internal	  bonds,	  reciprocity,	  and	  others,	  see	  Moore	  59).	  Kant	  describes	  the	  kingdom	  of	  ends	  as	  being	  a	  “whole	  of	  ends	  in	  systematic	  conjunction;”	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therefore,	  Moore	  argues,	  “Kant’s	  moral	  social	  order	  is	  a	  harmony.	  It	  is	  a	  society	  in	  which	  everyone	  acts	  in	  accordance	  with,	  and	  for	  the	  sake	  of,	  the	  moral	  law”	  (Moore	  60).	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  part	  of	  Moore’s	  argument,	  though,	  is	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  harmonious	  any	  given	  communities	  may	  be,	  many	  (if	  not	  most)	  communities	  also	  contain	  ingrained	  strife	  (across	  lines	  of	  wealth,	  gender,	  race,	  age,	  culture	  of	  origin,	  politics,	  religion,	  education	  level,	  and	  so	  forth).	  Moore	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  strife	  that	  is	  present	  in	  most	  communities.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  her	  article,	  despite	  her	  earnest	  claims	  to	  the	  contrary,	  readers	  are	  left	  to	  wonder	  if	  Kant’s	  moral	  social	  order	  (if	  it	  exists)	  can	  apply	  to	  only	  a	  narrow	  range	  of	  communities	  with	  no	  internal	  strife.	  	  The	  error	  here	  may	  be	  one	  of	  conflation:	  Moore	  does	  not	  articulate	  any	  explicit	  difference	  between	  Kant’s	  notions	  of	  “ethical	  community”	  and	  “juridical	  commonwealth,”	  for	  instance.	  To	  be	  sure,	  her	  essay	  does	  not	  mention	  “juridical”	  at	  all,	  but	  the	  trajectory	  of	  her	  argument	  seeks	  to	  locate	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community	  among	  actual	  communities	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Though	  he	  does	  not	  mention	  Moore’s	  article,	  Allen	  Wood	  apparently	  sees	  such	  a	  move	  as	  indicative	  of	  a	  misreading	  of	  Kant.	  Wood	  claims	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  an	  ethical	  community,	  “cannot	  be	  conceived	  on	  the	  model	  of	  a	  juridical	  commonwealth	  or	  political	  state,	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  right	  of	  human	  beings	  through	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coercion.	  .	  .	  .	  [Rather,]	  participation	  in	  an	  ethical	  community	  must	  always	  be	  entirely	  voluntary,	  never	  subject	  to	  external	  compulsion	  of	  any	  kind”	  (Wood,	  “Religion”	  505-­‐06).	  Indeed,	  Kant	  himself	  claims	  that,	  “an	  ethical	  community	  really	  has	  nothing	  in	  its	  principles	  that	  resembles	  a	  political	  constitution”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:102).	  	  However,	  Wood	  does	  suggest	  a	  quality	  of	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community	  that	  seems	  to	  nod	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  recognizing	  social	  divergence:	  since	  the	  aim	  of	  ethical	  community	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  all	  human	  beings	  into	  a	  single	  system	  or	  realm	  of	  ends,	  the	  ethical	  community	  cannot	  be	  subject	  to	  .	  .	  .	  restricting	  it	  to	  people	  who	  live	  in	  a	  certain	  geographical	  area	  or	  belong	  to	  a	  specific	  race	  or	  heredity.	  .	  .	  it	  may	  not	  bind	  itself	  to	  any	  specific	  practices	  or	  creeds	  that	  would	  exclude	  part	  of	  the	  human	  race	  from	  belonging	  to	  it.	  (Wood,	  “Religion”	  506)	  	  But,	  this	  recognition	  of	  divergence	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  leading	  back	  to	  Gottshalk’s	  critique	  of	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community.	  Kant’s	  table	  of	  categories	  describing	  an	  ethical	  community	  remove	  any	  doubt	  as	  to	  any	  supposed	  diversity	  within	  the	  ethical	  community.	  These	  four	  categories	  include,	  one,	  being	  “founded	  on	  principles	  that	  necessarily	  lead	  it	  to	  universal	  union;”	  two,	  being	  pure	  in	  quality,	  which	  means	  “union	  under	  no	  other	  incentives	  other	  than	  moral	  ones;”	  three,	  requiring	  freedom	  of	  relation	  so	  that	  “the	  internal	  relation	  of	  its	  members	  among	  themselves	  as	  well	  as	  the	  external	  relation”	  of	  the	  ethical	  community	  to	  the	  current	  political	  power	  are	  “both	  in	  a	  free	  state;”	  and	  four,	  having	  an	  unchangeable	  constitution	  yet	  changeable	  administration	  (see	  Kant,	  “Religion”	  6:101-­‐02).	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Jennifer	  Moore	  still	  tries	  to	  read	  diversity	  into	  such	  a	  community	  by	  suggesting	  that	  in	  an	  ethical	  community,	  members	  are,	  Free	  to	  pursue	  their	  ‘personal’	  ends.	  [But]	  each	  member	  is	  also	  an	  ‘end’	  for	  every	  other.	  .	  .	  .	  This	  means	  that	  the	  ends	  that	  members	  pursue	  will	  always	  be	  ends	  that	  are	  compatible	  with	  those	  of	  others.	  That	  is,	  they	  will	  be	  ends	  that	  are	  shared	  by	  others	  or	  ends	  that	  do	  not	  affect	  others	  at	  all,	  rather	  than	  ends	  that	  reduce	  other	  persons	  to	  the	  status	  of	  means	  [only]”	  (Moore	  60).	  	  In	  this	  view,	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community	  is	  itself	  a	  constantly	  dynamic	  display	  of	  diversity.	  But	  even	  Moore’s	  argument	  appears	  to	  fall	  short.	  First,	  she	  may	  conflate	  Kant’s	  sense	  of	  ethical	  community	  with	  its	  more	  juridical	  counterparts	  (see	  Wood,	  “Religion”	  505-­‐06	  and	  Kant,	  “Metaphysics”	  6:102).	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  pertinently,	  since	  inclusion	  in	  the	  ethical	  community	  is	  ideological	  only,	  Moore’s	  description	  of	  an	  ethical	  community	  implies	  this:	  if	  the	  “personal”	  ends	  that	  individual	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  pursue	  conflict	  with	  the	  moral	  order	  of	  the	  kingdom	  of	  ends,	  then	  those	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  are	  no	  longer	  (really)	  part	  of	  the	  ethical	  community.	  Conversely,	  if	  their	  personal	  ends	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  the	  moral	  order,	  then	  those	  personal	  ends	  (no	  matter	  their	  cultural,	  religious,	  or	  historical	  significance)	  do	  not	  fully	  matter	  in	  the	  distinctive	  identity	  of	  the	  ethical	  community	  as	  an	  ethical	  community.	  Individual	  members	  may	  help	  each	  other	  pursue	  these	  personal	  ends,	  but	  such	  ends	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  what	  makes	  an	  ethical	  community.	  In	  such	  a	  schema,	  the	  moment	  of	  disagreement	  is	  either	  the	  moment	  of	  excommunication	  or	  of	  irrelevance.	  Moore’s	  arguments	  thus	  lead	  us	  back	  to	  a	  community	  of	  “secluded	  universality,”	  which	  is	  not	  the	  robust	  symbouleutikon	  from	  whence	  Kant’s	  entire	  project	  springs.	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Engaging	  Divergence	  beyond	  Kant’s	  Ethical	  Community	  (or	  the	  Pluralistic	  Key	  
to	  the	  Whole	  Program	  of	  Rational	  Thought)	  A	  more	  straightforward	  way	  of	  arguing	  for	  Kant’s	  ability	  to	  account	  for	  ethical	  divergence	  needs	  to	  follow	  a	  different	  trajectory	  because	  ethical	  divergence	  is	  simply	  not	  found	  within	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community.	  Full	  stop.	  Only	  those	  agents	  who	  respect	  and	  strive	  to	  live	  according	  to	  universal	  law	  are	  members	  of	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community	  (regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  use	  those	  specific	  terms	  or	  even	  acknowledge	  that	  they	  are	  part	  of	  such	  a	  community).	  To	  try	  to	  rebuild	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community	  to	  somehow	  incorporate,	  allow,	  or	  even	  value	  internal	  ethical	  divergence	  is	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  different	  project	  than	  the	  one	  Kant	  is	  engaged	  in.	  	  Regardless	  of	  this	  internal	  exclusion	  of	  ethical	  divergence,	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  isolated	  one.	  Indeed,	  Kant	  frequently	  refers	  to	  the	  ethical	  community	  of	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  as	  inter-­‐socializing	  with	  other	  communities	  (as	  with	  a	  juridical	  commonwealth	  or	  any	  other	  socio-­‐political/cultural	  environment).	  The	  ethical	  community	  is	  but	  one	  sort	  of	  community	  within	  and	  among	  other	  inter-­‐related	  communities.	  So	  even	  if	  Kant’s	  ethical	  community	  has	  no	  place	  for	  ethical	  divergence	  within	  itself,	  the	  ethical	  community	  must	  unavoidably	  address	  ethical	  divergence	  around	  itself.	  The	  more	  helpful	  question	  thus	  becomes,	  how	  do	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  account	  for	  ethical	  divergence	  in	  their	  sociality	  beyond	  the	  ethical	  community?	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The	  pluralistic	  answer	  to	  that	  question,	  it	  turns	  out,	  is	  key	  to	  the	  whole	  program	  of	  rational	  thought	  itself.	  Citing	  passages	  from	  Kant’s	  Anthropology	  and	  Lectures	  on	  
Ethics,	  Allen	  Wood	  summarizes	  Kant’s	  position	  on	  the	  matter:	  “Kant	  holds	  that	  human	  beings	  can	  accomplish	  the	  tasks	  of	  reason	  only	  through	  interacting	  with	  one	  another.	  We	  can	  develop	  our	  reason	  only	  by	  communicating	  with	  others”	  (Wood,	  
Kant’s	  301).	  Further,	  quoting	  from	  Kant’s	  “What	  Does	  It	  Mean	  to	  Orient	  Oneself	  in	  Thinking,”	  Wood	  goes	  on	  to	  argue,	  “Our	  capacity	  to	  think	  at	  all,	  and	  especially	  to	  think	  accurately,	  depends	  on	  our	  thinking	  ‘in	  community	  with	  others	  to	  whom	  we	  
communicate	  our	  thoughts,	  and	  who	  communicate	  their	  thoughts	  to	  us’”	  (Wood,	  
Kant’s	  301).	  Indeed,	  to	  “think	  in	  the	  position	  of	  everyone	  else”	  is	  one	  of	  three	  of	  Kant’s	  “maxims	  of	  the	  common	  human	  understanding”	  (Critique	  174).	  	  Kant	  calls	  thinking	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  maxim	  “a	  broad-­‐minded	  way	  of	  thinking.”	  A	  person	  achieves	  this	  sort	  of	  broad-­‐minded	  thinking,	  “if	  he	  sets	  himself	  apart	  from	  the	  subjective	  private	  conditions	  of	  the	  judgment,	  within	  which	  so	  many	  others	  are	  as	  if	  bracketed,	  and	  reflects	  on	  his	  own	  judgment	  from	  a	  universal	  standpoint	  (which	  he	  can	  only	  determine	  by	  putting	  himself	  into	  the	  standpoint	  of	  others)”	  (Critique	  174).	  Not	  to	  put	  too	  fine	  a	  point	  on	  it,	  but	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  bringing-­‐together-­‐of-­‐wills	  conditions	  that	  comprise	  symbouleutikon.	  	  Elsewhere,	  Kant	  refers	  to	  the	  refusal	  to	  consider	  others’	  perspectives	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  egoism.	  More	  specifically,	  a	  “logical	  egoist	  considers	  it	  unnecessary	  to	  test	  his	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judgment	  also	  by	  the	  understanding	  of	  others;	  as	  if	  he	  had	  no	  need	  at	  all	  for	  this	  touchstone”	  (Anthropology	  17).	  In	  contrast	  to	  self-­‐centered	  egoism,	  Kant	  coins	  the	  term	  pluralism	  to	  mean,	  “the	  way	  of	  thinking	  in	  which	  one	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  oneself	  as	  the	  whole	  world,	  but	  rather	  regards	  and	  conducts	  oneself	  as	  a	  mere	  citizen	  of	  the	  world”	  (Anthropology	  18).	  This	  sort	  of	  pluralism,	  according	  to	  Allen	  Wood,	  is	  itself,	  “the	  standpoint	  of	  reason.	  Reasons,	  in	  other	  words,	  are	  essentially	  to	  be	  shared	  between	  people—they	  are	  never	  only	  the	  private	  possession	  of	  those	  for	  whom	  they	  are	  reasons”	  (Wood,	  Kantian	  19).	  Reasons	  in	  this	  Kantian	  sense	  exactly	  accord	  with	  the	  Heideggerian	  notions	  of	  meaning	  explored	  above.	  Either	  Kant	  anticipated	  Heidegger,	  or	  Heidegger	  is	  deeply	  Kantian,	  or	  both.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  all	  this	  value	  placed	  on	  understanding	  the	  perspectives	  of	  others,	  some	  may	  still	  contend	  that	  Kant’s	  pluralism	  does	  not	  actually	  account	  for	  perspectives	  that	  differ	  drastically	  from	  universal	  law.	  Attentive	  readers	  of	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  
Morals	  could	  point	  to	  selections	  that	  seem	  to	  encourage	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  to	  avoid	  the	  “scandal”	  of	  associating	  with	  “vicious”	  people;	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  “scandal”	  counterargument	  below.	  Other	  readers	  of	  Kant’s	  Lectures	  on	  Ethics	  could	  read	  passages	  that	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  comparison	  of	  divergent	  ideas	  can	  only	  really	  occur	  between	  friends	  who	  already	  share	  a	  mutual	  respect	  for	  universal	  law;	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  friend	  counterargument	  below.	  Yet	  others	  could	  point	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  softer	  divergence	  at	  play	  among	  rhetorical/moral	  agents,	  which	  I	  call	  the	  softer	  divergence	  counterargument.	  So,	  I’ll	  address	  each	  of	  these	  in	  turn—first,	  
	  	  
106	  
the	  scandal	  counterargument,	  second,	  the	  friend	  counterargument,	  and	  then	  the	  softer	  divergence	  counterargument.	  	  
The	  “Scandal”	  Counterargument	  The	  first	  counterargument	  extends	  from	  some	  odd	  statements	  Kant	  makes	  in	  relation	  to	  “vicious”	  people	  and	  scandals.	  Some	  may	  argue	  that	  Kant	  asserts	  that	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  ought	  not	  to	  associate	  with	  “vicious”	  people	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  any	  scandal	  that	  attends	  associating	  with	  such	  vicious	  people.	  I	  call	  this	  the	  “scandal”	  counterargument	  (with	  “scandal”	  purposely	  in	  quotes,	  for	  it	  refers	  to	  something	  other	  than	  we	  may	  think)	  because	  the	  misunderstanding	  in	  this	  counterargument	  centers	  on	  what	  exactly	  Kant	  means	  by	  “scandal.”	  As	  the	  scandal	  counterargument	  goes,	  since	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  must	  avoid	  scandalous	  associations	  with	  vicious	  people,	  Kant’s	  other	  injunctions	  to	  engage	  divergent	  perspectives	  really	  only	  refer	  to	  perspectives	  that	  differ	  in	  non-­‐serious	  manners	  (i.e.	  that	  do	  not	  disagree	  as	  to	  the	  basic	  nature	  of	  morality).	  	  On	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  rhetorical/moral	  agents,	  this	  question	  arises	  for	  Kant,	  “whether	  one	  may	  also	  administer	  to	  vice-­‐ridden	  people”	  (6:474,	  my	  translation1).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Cambridge edition Gregor translation actually says this: “whether one may also keep company with 
those who are vicious.” From English to German, this would read, “ob man auch unter Bösartigen gehen 
dürfe?” However, Kant’s original German reads, “ob man auch mit Lasterhaften Umgang pflegen dürfe?” 
So I offer the translation above (“whether one may also administer to vice-ridden people”) for a couple 
reasons. First, it is true that “mit . . .Umgang pflegen” means “to socialize with,” but its connotations from 
“pflegen” suggest a kind of socializing that fosters, cares for, or is otherwise nurturing toward others. 
Certainly, there are other ways of saying “socialize” that connote more of a “keeping company” idea such 
as “er geht unter Leute” or “sie kommt unter Leute.” But Kant does not use those. Also, “vice-ridden” or 
even “full of vice” or “detained in vice” (though perhaps odd-sounding in English) are closer in 
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Of	  particular	  concern	  for	  Kant	  is	  “if	  the	  vice	  is	  a	  scandal,	  that	  is,	  a	  publicly	  given	  example	  of	  contempt	  for	  the	  strict	  laws	  of	  duty,	  which	  therefore	  brings	  dishonor	  with	  it;”	  in	  such	  situations,	  Kant	  suggests	  that	  “one	  must	  break	  off	  the	  association	  that	  existed	  or	  avoid	  it	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  since	  continued	  association	  with	  such	  a	  person	  deprives	  virtue	  of	  its	  honor”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:474).	  This	  may	  seem	  an	  upfront	  denial	  of	  the	  value	  of	  associating	  with	  vice-­‐ridden	  people.	  And	  certainly,	  we	  could	  point	  to	  a	  personal	  experience	  of	  Kant’s	  that	  would	  support	  this	  interpretation.	  	  In	  1768-­‐9,	  a	  young	  female	  acquaintance	  of	  Kant’s,	  Maria	  Charlotta,	  created	  a	  spectacle	  in	  Königsberg	  when	  she	  divorced	  her	  husband	  (who	  was	  almost	  twice	  her	  age)	  to	  marry	  someone	  closer	  to	  her	  own	  age.	  Kant	  apparently,	  “took	  the	  side	  of	  the	  former	  husband,	  said	  bad	  things	  about	  [Charlotta],	  and	  then	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  visit	  her	  after	  the	  divorce	  and	  the	  new	  marriage.	  .	  .	  .	  [Kant]	  found	  the	  matter	  neither	  remarkable	  nor	  admirable	  .	  .	  .	  [and	  decided]	  to	  cut	  off	  contact	  with	  Maria	  Charlotta”	  (Kuehn	  168).	  But	  this	  whole	  affair	  was	  more	  emotionally	  awkward	  for	  Kant	  than	  an	  example	  of	  clear	  moral	  certitude.	  Later,	  “Kant	  himself	  recognized	  that	  he	  did	  not	  play	  an	  admirable	  role	  in	  the	  affair”	  because	  of	  his	  petty	  (almost	  comic	  by	  one	  account)	  refusal	  to	  speak	  to	  his	  erstwhile	  friend	  after	  her	  infidelity	  (Kuehn	  168).	  For	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
connotation to “Lasterhaften” than “vicious,” which aligns with more malicious terms like “bösartig” or 
even “teuflisch.” My difference in translation shifts Kant’s question away from a concern about hanging 
out with a sinister crowd to a concern over how proactive one should be in reaching out to those afflicted 
with vice in general. This brings the translation closer in line with the apparent intent of the subsequent 
passages from Kant mentioned in this chapter. 
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Kant	  to	  doubt	  his	  own	  behavior	  in	  such	  a	  “scandal”	  should	  cause	  us	  to	  rethink	  what	  he	  may	  have	  meant	  by	  “scandal”	  in	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals.	  	  Rather	  than	  the	  usually	  parochial	  sense	  of	  “scandal,”	  Kant	  uses	  “scandal”	  in	  the	  
Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  to	  mean,	  “disregarding	  respectability	  that	  might	  lead	  others	  to	  follow	  it”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:464).	  Further,	  “respectability”	  in	  this	  sense	  specifically	  refers	  to	  “showing	  respect	  for	  a	  human	  being	  as	  a	  moral	  being”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:464).	  This	  definition	  occurs	  just	  ten	  pages	  before	  his	  injunction	  to	  “break	  off	  the	  association”	  with	  vice-­‐ridden	  people	  whose	  vice	  is	  a	  “scandal.”	  Kant’s	  injunction	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  encouragement	  to	  break	  off	  public	  association	  with	  people	  whose	  particular	  vices	  “lead	  others	  to	  follow”	  in	  “disregarding”	  the	  necessary	  “respect	  for	  a	  human	  being	  as	  a	  moral	  being.”	  	  Like	  many	  other	  parts	  of	  Kant’s	  moral	  philosophy,	  this	  bears	  a	  striking	  resemblance	  to	  moral	  injunctions	  from	  the	  Greek	  Bible	  (New	  Testament).	  Specifically	  in	  1	  Corinthians	  8.9,	  Paul	  enjoins	  the	  Corinth	  believers	  to	  not	  eat	  the	  meat	  offered	  at	  the	  public	  sacrifices	  to	  pagan	  idols.	  It’s	  not	  that	  eating	  the	  pagan	  meat	  is	  bad	  in	  itself.	  But,	  if	  believers	  were	  to	  eat	  the	  pagan	  meat,	  it	  might	  lead	  “the	  weak”	  to	  believe	  that	  pagan	  sacrifices	  are	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  Christian	  believers	  to	  participate	  in.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Kant’s	  caution	  to	  avoid	  scandal	  seems	  to	  be	  about	  avoiding	  specific	  public	  associations	  that	  might	  lead	  others	  down	  paths	  of	  disrespectability.	  This	  is	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different	  than	  avoiding	  private	  associations	  with	  people	  with	  whom	  you	  merely	  morally	  disagree.	  As	  such,	  avoiding	  “scandal”	  is	  more	  a	  concern	  of	  particular	  public	  social	  contexts	  than	  it	  is	  about	  any	  particular	  private	  association.	  I	  suspect	  the	  difference	  may	  be	  akin	  to	  publically	  associating	  with	  Joseph	  Goebbels	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  privately	  associating	  with	  your	  Nazi	  neighbors	  on	  the	  other.	  Publically	  associating	  your	  respectability	  with	  Goebbels,	  because	  of	  Goebbels’s	  prominence	  in	  the	  Nazi	  cause,	  might	  lead	  those	  who	  admire	  your	  respectability	  down	  paths	  of	  Nazi	  disrespectability.	  This	  is	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  “scandal”	  in	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  sense.	  However,	  privately	  associating	  with	  your	  Nazi	  neighbors	  (even	  if	  that	  neighbor	  is	  Goebbels)	  is	  an	  ethical	  necessity	  for	  both	  your	  neighbors	  (to	  encourage	  in	  them	  respect	  for	  universal	  law)	  and	  for	  you	  (to	  exercise	  broad-­‐minded	  thinking).	  Interpreting	  “scandal”	  in	  this	  way	  reconciles	  any	  supposed	  conflicts	  between	  avoiding	  scandalous	  associations	  and	  Kant’s	  multiple	  other	  injunctions	  to	  socially	  engage	  with	  divergent	  perspectives.	  	  
The	  “Friend”	  Counterargument	  Some	  may	  further	  argue	  that	  Kant	  goes	  beyond	  merely	  asserting	  the	  negative	  claim	  that	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  ought	  not	  associate	  with	  scandalous	  people.	  In	  this	  further	  view,	  Kant	  makes	  an	  apparent	  positive	  claim	  that	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  ought	  only	  to	  engage	  the	  “divergent”	  perspectives	  of	  friends	  who	  already	  share	  the	  rhetorical/moral	  agents’	  moral	  beliefs	  (whose	  views	  are	  actually	  not	  divergent).	  I	  call	  this	  the	  “friend”	  counterargument—with	  “friend”	  purposely	  in	  quotes—because	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the	  key	  misunderstanding	  in	  this	  counterargument	  turns	  “friend”	  into	  an	  inaccurate	  synecdoche	  that	  is	  somehow	  supposed	  to	  refer	  to	  all	  of	  a	  rhetorical/moral	  agent’s	  associations.	  As	  with	  the	  scandal	  counterargument,	  the	  “friend”	  counterargument	  would	  likewise	  read	  Kant’s	  other	  injunctions	  to	  engage	  divergent	  perspectives	  as	  really	  only	  referring	  to	  perspectives	  that	  are	  already	  based	  on	  shared	  moral	  principles	  (and	  therefore	  only	  differ	  in	  non-­‐serious	  manners).	  	  The	  passages	  that	  seem	  most	  clearly	  to	  support	  this	  view	  come	  from	  Kant’s	  discussion	  of	  friends	  in	  his	  Lectures	  on	  Ethics.	  First,	  according	  to	  Kant,	  all	  of	  us	  have	  strong	  inclinations	  toward	  making	  relationships,	  so	  that	  we,	  have	  a	  strong	  impulse	  to	  unbosom	  ourselves	  and	  be	  wholly	  companionate.	  But	  this	  can	  be	  only	  in	  the	  company	  of	  one	  or	  two	  friends.	  People	  also	  have	  a	  need	  to	  confide,	  moreover,	  in	  that	  only	  so	  can	  their	  opinion	  be	  subject	  to	  reflection.	  If	  I	  possess	  such	  a	  friend,	  of	  whom	  I	  know	  that	  his	  disposition	  is	  upright	  and	  kindly,	  neither	  malicious	  nor	  false,	  he	  will	  already	  be	  helpful	  in	  rectifying	  my	  judgment,	  when	  I	  have	  gone	  astray.	  This	  is	  the	  whole	  purpose	  of	  man,	  which	  allows	  him	  to	  enjoy	  his	  existence.	  (Lectures	  27:428)	  	  This	  would	  appear	  to	  say	  a	  few	  significant	  claims:	  one,	  humans	  need	  to	  confide	  in	  friends	  so	  their	  own	  perspectives	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  reflection;	  and	  two,	  such	  reflection	  only	  occurs	  with	  friends	  that	  are	  upright	  and	  kindly;	  therefore,	  reflection	  (in	  the	  sense	  Kant	  values	  it)	  does	  not	  occur	  when	  engaging	  perspectives	  that	  are	  malicious	  or	  false.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  a	  much	  too	  narrow	  reading	  of	  the	  passage.	  The	  passage	  merely	  asserts	  that	  an	  “upright	  and	  kindly”	  friend	  who	  is	  “neither	  malicious	  nor	  false”	  will	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be	  “helpful	  in	  rectifying	  my	  judgment”	  (my	  emphasis).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  saying	  that	  only	  the	  perspectives	  of	  like-­‐minded	  friends	  can	  provide	  opportunity	  for	  reflection.	  Certainly,	  as	  I’ll	  argue	  further	  below,	  divergent	  perspectives	  of	  all	  stripes	  can	  provide	  opportunity	  for	  reflection.	  It’s	  just	  that	  a	  true	  friend	  will	  be	  “helpful	  in	  rectifying	  my	  judgment”	  whereas	  mere	  acquaintances	  may	  not	  be	  helpful	  and	  certainly	  enemies	  and	  villains	  may	  try	  to	  be	  decidedly	  unhelpful.	  When	  engaging	  perspectives	  that	  are	  not	  my	  friends’,	  I	  must	  think	  much	  more	  carefully	  and	  independently	  to	  discern	  my	  errors	  in	  judgment.	  	  But	  even	  when	  among	  friends,	  Kant	  suggests	  that,	  “identity	  of	  thought	  is	  not	  required	  for	  the	  purpose”	  of	  discerning	  errors	  in	  judgment,	  “on	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  difference,	  rather,	  which	  establishes	  friendship;	  for	  in	  that	  case	  the	  one	  supplies	  what	  the	  other	  lacks”	  (Lectures	  27:429).	  So	  far	  so	  good,	  but	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  say:	  but	  in	  one	  particular	  they	  must	  agree:	  they	  need	  to	  have	  the	  same	  principles	  of	  understanding	  and	  morality,	  and	  then	  they	  can	  fully	  understand	  each	  other;	  if	  they	  are	  not	  alike	  in	  that,	  they	  cannot	  get	  on	  at	  all	  together,	  since	  in	  judgment	  they	  are	  poles	  apart.	  (Lectures	  27:429)	  	  It	  may	  be	  tempting	  to	  employ	  this	  passage	  to	  defend	  the	  “friend”	  counterargument—particularly	  Kant’s	  assertion	  that	  moral	  unity	  is	  necessary	  to	  “fully	  understand	  each	  other”	  otherwise	  such	  agents	  “cannot	  get	  on	  at	  all	  together.”	  	  But	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  read	  this	  passage	  that	  way	  because	  this	  passage	  is	  about	  the	  association	  of	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  as	  friends	  and	  not	  about	  their	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relationship	  with	  other	  agents	  regardless	  of	  relationship.	  This	  is	  by	  itself	  perhaps	  an	  unremarkable	  observation	  since	  the	  passage	  appears	  in	  the	  middle	  a	  long	  section	  in	  the	  Lectures	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  friends	  and	  friendship.	  But	  notice	  how	  the	  passage	  clarifies	  itself	  if	  we	  simply	  add	  “as	  friends”	  to	  the	  end	  of	  most	  of	  its	  clauses.	  It	  may	  sound	  a	  bit	  redundant,	  so	  please	  bear	  with	  me,	  but	  the	  repetition	  emphasizes	  the	  crucial	  meaning	  of	  this	  passage:	  but	  in	  one	  particular	  they	  must	  agree	  [as	  friends]:	  they	  need	  to	  have	  the	  same	  principles	  of	  understanding	  and	  morality	  [as	  friends],	  and	  then	  they	  can	  fully	  understand	  each	  other	  [as	  friends];	  if	  they	  are	  not	  alike	  in	  that,	  they	  cannot	  get	  on	  at	  all	  together	  [as	  friends],	  since	  in	  judgment	  they	  are	  poles	  apart	  [as	  friends].	  (Lectures	  27:429)	  	  Read	  this	  way,	  this	  passage	  merely	  asserts	  that	  moral	  unity	  is	  necessary	  for	  friends	  to	  understand	  each	  other	  as	  friends	  otherwise	  such	  agents	  cannot	  get	  on	  at	  all	  together	  as	  friends.	  It	  is	  stretch	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  passage	  is	  actually	  about	  the	  association	  of	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  with	  other	  agents	  regardless	  of	  relationship.	  	  
The	  Softer	  Divergence	  Counterargument	  Even	  if	  I’m	  right	  about	  the	  scandal	  and	  friend	  counterarguments	  above	  (and	  I	  believe	  I	  am),	  none	  of	  what	  I’ve	  covered	  thus	  far	  has	  yet	  to	  definitively	  establish	  that	  Kantian	  ethics	  does	  in	  fact	  value	  engaging	  ethically	  divergent	  perspectives.	  All	  I’ve	  illustrated	  definitively	  so	  far	  is	  that,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  Kant	  believes	  that	  scandal	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  private	  associations	  and	  that	  friends	  cannot	  get	  on	  together	  as	  friends	  unless	  they	  share	  a	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  morality.	  But	  neither	  of	  these	  is	  the	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same	  as	  saying	  that	  Kant,	  in	  fact,	  values	  the	  seeking	  to	  understand	  divergent	  moral	  perspectives.	  	  Thus,	  the	  contrarian	  may	  ask,	  why	  couldn’t	  Kant	  be	  advocating	  for	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  to	  engage	  only	  with	  perspectives	  of	  other	  like-­‐minded	  rhetorical/moral	  agents?	  Could	  not	  there	  be	  enough	  of	  a	  softer	  kind	  of	  divergence	  among	  like-­‐minded	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  that	  helps	  them	  develop	  broad-­‐minded	  ways	  thinking?	  Could	  not	  this	  softer	  divergence	  accord	  to	  other	  significant	  criteria	  (such	  as	  culture,	  ethnicity,	  gender,	  religion,	  etc.)	  without	  implying	  that	  Kant	  values	  interactions	  with	  views	  he	  would	  otherwise	  call	  wicked	  or	  immoral?	  	  These	  questions	  get	  to	  the	  core	  of	  the	  problem:	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  accept	  that	  Kantian	  ethics	  would	  value	  respect	  for	  universal	  law	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  valuing	  the	  act	  of	  engaging	  perspectives	  that	  could	  directly	  conflict	  with	  universal	  law.	  It	  seems	  an	  uphill	  argument	  to	  try	  to	  try	  working	  around	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  formulations	  of	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative:	  “I	  ought	  never	  to	  act	  except	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  I	  could	  also	  
will	  that	  my	  maxim	  should	  become	  a	  universal	  law.	  Here	  mere	  conformity	  to	  law	  as	  such,	  without	  having	  as	  its	  basis	  some	  law	  determined	  for	  certain	  actions,	  is	  what	  serves	  the	  will	  as	  its	  principle,	  and	  must	  so	  serve	  it,	  if	  duty	  is	  not	  to	  be	  everywhere	  an	  empty	  delusion	  and	  a	  chimerical	  concept”	  (“Groundwork”	  4:402,	  italics	  in	  original).	  In	  other	  words,	  once	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  understand	  the	  value	  of	  the	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categorical	  imperative,	  there	  is	  no	  more	  substantial	  value	  in	  “figuring	  things	  out”	  in	  regards	  to	  other	  ethical	  perspectives.	  	  Allen	  Wood	  offers	  a	  kind	  of	  resolution	  to	  this	  problem	  in	  one	  of	  his	  discussions	  of	  Kantian	  pluralism.	  According	  to	  Wood’s	  interpretation	  of	  Kant,	  To	  act	  rationally	  is	  to	  act	  for	  [sic2]	  grounds	  that	  are	  essentially	  intersubjective—not	  merely	  comprehensible	  by	  others,	  but	  also	  in	  some	  sense	  shared	  by	  and	  valid	  for	  others	  as	  well	  as	  for	  oneself.	  What	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  me	  to	  do	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  what	  is	  rational	  for	  others	  to	  do	  because	  my	  situation	  may	  differ	  from	  theirs.	  But	  if	  I	  have	  a	  valid,	  rational	  ground	  for	  what	  I	  do,	  then	  that	  ground	  is	  also	  comprehensible	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  others.	  (Wood,	  Kantian	  18)	  	  But	  notice	  that	  for	  such	  “intersubjectivity”	  to	  function	  in	  moral	  terms,	  conversing	  agents	  would	  need	  to	  share	  an	  intersubjective	  moral	  ground.	  It	  seems	  that	  even	  in	  a	  Kantian	  pluralism,	  people	  can’t	  be	  that	  pluralistic.	  In	  order	  for	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  to	  exchange	  ideas	  at	  all	  with	  others,	  it	  seems	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  so	  pluralistic	  that	  they	  do	  not	  share	  the	  same	  (Kantian)	  moral	  ground	  with	  those	  they	  associate	  with.	  	  All	  that	  is	  left	  of	  the	  value	  of	  divergence	  in	  such	  a	  schema	  is	  to	  value	  the	  duties	  of	  “One’s	  own	  perfection	  as	  an	  end”	  and	  “The	  happiness	  of	  others	  as	  an	  end”	  which	  duties	  could	  conceivably	  include	  increasing	  all	  other	  uniquely	  human	  capacities	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  universal	  law.	  Universal	  law	  does	  not	  necessarily	  stipulate	  the	  cultural	  value	  of	  (e.g.)	  a	  certain	  holiday	  observance,	  but	  the	  duties	  to	  one’s	  own	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I assume Wood means “from” because everywhere else in Kant’s and Wood’s texts, grounds are always 
something that action extends from and not something that actions have as their object. 
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perfection	  and	  to	  the	  happiness	  of	  others	  may	  direct	  us	  to	  value	  such	  observances	  because	  they	  direct	  others	  toward	  perfecting	  their	  own	  capacities	  or	  happinesses	  (see	  “Metaphysics”	  6:392).	  	  But	  these	  same	  passages	  are	  equally	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  with	  Kant’s	  injunction	  to	  respect	  (while	  directly	  engaging)	  actual	  divergent	  perspectives	  that	  contain	  errors	  of	  moral	  judgment	  (i.e.	  perspectives	  that	  are	  morally	  wrong).	  Specifically,	  Kant’s	  injunction	  about	  human	  respect	  is	  that,	  “Every	  human	  being	  has	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  respect	  from	  his	  fellow	  human	  beings	  and	  is	  in	  turn	  bound	  to	  respect	  every	  other.	  Humanity	  itself	  is	  a	  dignity”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:462).	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  variation	  of	  Kant’s	  Formula	  of	  Humanity,	  which	  Kant	  immediately	  reiterates	  and	  then	  follows	  up	  with	  exactly	  how	  in	  this	  regard	  a	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  may	  appreciate	  other	  human	  beings	  as	  individual	  ends	  while	  at	  the	  same	  using	  those	  same	  human	  beings	  as	  means	  toward	  the	  ends	  which	  are	  themselves.	  The	  universal	  respect	  a	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  owes	  to	  all	  human	  beings	  including	  him/herself	  leads	  to	  a	  duty	  to	  respect	  a	  human	  being	  even	  in	  the	  logical	  use	  of	  his	  reason,	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  censure	  his	  errors	  by	  calling	  them	  absurdities,	  poor	  judgment	  and	  so	  forth,	  but	  rather	  to	  suppose	  that	  his	  judgment	  must	  yet	  contain	  some	  truth	  and	  to	  seek	  this	  out,	  uncovering,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  deceptive	  illusion	  (the	  subjective	  ground	  that	  determined	  his	  judgment	  which,	  by	  an	  oversight,	  he	  took	  for	  objective),	  and	  so,	  by	  explaining	  to	  him	  the	  possibility	  of	  his	  having	  erred,	  to	  preserve	  his	  respect	  for	  his	  own	  understanding.	  For	  if,	  by	  using	  such	  expressions,	  one	  denies	  any	  understanding	  to	  someone	  who	  opposes	  one	  in	  a	  certain	  judgment,	  how	  does	  one	  want	  to	  bring	  him	  to	  understand	  he	  has	  erred?	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:463)	  	  
	  	  
116	  
The	  duty	  toward	  mutual	  respect	  thus	  requires	  that	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  interact	  with	  divergent	  views	  in	  a	  way	  that	  best	  allows	  those	  divergent	  views	  to	  be	  thoroughly	  explained	  and	  explored.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  has	  a	  proselytizing	  edge	  to	  it,	  but	  the	  goal	  here	  (i.e.	  the	  end	  of	  this	  particular	  duty)	  is	  to	  preserve	  an	  opposing	  agent’s	  “respect	  for	  his	  own	  understanding”	  not	  necessarily	  to	  convert	  the	  wayward.	  Respecting	  (actively	  discerning,	  appreciating,	  uncovering)	  the	  truth	  in	  all	  ways	  of	  thinking	  is	  apparently	  vital	  to	  Kantian	  ethics,	  perhaps	  even	  especially	  in	  the	  thinking	  of	  that	  person	  who	  “opposes	  one	  in	  a	  certain	  judgment.”	  	  The	  most	  reasonable	  path	  of	  reconciliation	  seems	  to	  be	  along	  these	  lines:	  Kantian	  ethics	  apparently	  values	  both	  living	  according	  to	  universal	  law	  and	  the	  learning	  experience	  that	  emerges	  from	  engaging	  contrary	  perspectives.	  The	  act	  of	  engaging	  (i.e.	  addressing,	  understanding,	  trying	  to	  find	  the	  truth	  in	  something)	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  believing	  (i.e.	  accepting	  as	  true).	  Engaging	  specifically	  contrary	  moral	  perspectives	  is	  what	  makes	  a	  rational	  conception	  of	  universal	  law	  even	  possible.	  This	  is	  because	  any	  rational	  moral	  perspective	  “reflects	  on	  [its]	  own	  judgment	  from	  a	  universal	  [moral]	  standpoint”	  which	  a	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  “can	  only	  determine	  by	  putting	  himself	  into	  the	  [moral]	  standpoint	  of	  others”	  (Kant,	  Critique	  174).	  Even	  if	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  never	  meet	  anyone	  with	  immoral	  beliefs,	  such	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  could	  still	  use	  their	  rational	  faculties	  to	  articulate	  divergent	  ethical	  perspectives	  (without	  believing	  them)	  against	  which	  they	  can	  and	  should	  continually	  compare	  their	  own	  moral	  beliefs.	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Kantian	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  are,	  indeed,	  non-­‐isolated	  and	  sociable	  creatures:	  it’s	  their	  duty	  to	  be	  so.	  If	  nothing	  else,	  they	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  discover	  the	  truth	  of	  all	  things,	  and	  as	  Kant	  notes	  elsewhere,	  “Men	  who	  separate	  themselves	  from	  all	  human	  society	  necessarily	  find	  in	  the	  end,	  when	  they	  begin	  to	  investigate	  their	  condition	  .	  .	  .,	  that	  they	  do	  not	  themselves	  have	  enough	  means	  to	  distinguish	  the	  true	  from	  the	  false”	  (“Blomberg”	  150).	  Thus	  again	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  bringing	  wills	  together—of	  symbouleutikon—sociality	  itself	  provides	  the	  necessary	  tools	  for	  analytic	  critique.	  What	  those	  tools	  are	  exactly,	  and	  how	  exactly	  divergent	  sociality	  provides	  them,	  I	  will	  address	  presently.	  
	  
Toward	  the	  Rhetorical	  Imperative	  (or	  How	  to	  Use	  One’s	  Moral	  Perfections	  in	  
Social	  Intercourse)	  Though	  Kant	  is	  wary	  of	  possible	  dishonor	  arising	  from	  associating	  with	  certain	  vice-­‐ridden	  folk,	  he	  nevertheless	  admits	  that,	  “One	  cannot	  avoid	  meeting	  them,	  without	  leaving	  the	  world”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:474).	  Kant	  even	  goes	  beyond	  this.	  He	  suggests	  that,	  “It	  is	  a	  duty	  to	  oneself	  as	  well	  as	  to	  others	  not	  to	  isolate	  oneself	  .	  .	  .	  but	  to	  use	  one’s	  moral	  perfections	  in	  social	  intercourse”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:473).	  But,	  how	  exactly	  do	  Kantian	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  use	  their	  moral	  perfections	  in	  social	  intercourse?	  Another	  way	  of	  phrasing	  this	  question	  is,	  “How	  do	  ethics	  emerge	  from	  rhetoric?”	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Kant	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  starting	  point	  is	  always	  using	  good	  manners	  such	  as	  “affability,	  sociability,	  courtesy,	  hospitality,	  and	  gentleness	  (in	  disagreeing	  without	  quarrelling)”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:473).	  According	  to	  Kant,	  good	  manners	  like	  these	  are	  “by-­‐products”	  of	  a	  virtuous	  disposition.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  men	  good	  manners	  are	  necessarily	  appended	  to	  rhetorical	  situations.	  Instead,	  these	  qualities,	  “are	  merely	  the	  manners	  one	  is	  obliged	  to	  show	  in	  social	  intercourse”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:474).	  In	  other	  words,	  good	  manners	  emerge	  from	  social	  rhetorical	  situations.	  By	  accepting	  this	  rhetorical	  obligation	  for	  good	  manners,	  a	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  thereby	  “binds	  others	  too;	  and	  so	  they	  [manners]	  still	  promote	  a	  virtuous	  disposition	  by	  at	  least	  making	  virtue	  fashionable”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:474).	  Such	  positive	  social	  qualities	  are	  the	  ports	  of	  entry	  into	  actual	  engagement	  with	  divergent	  ethical	  perspectives.	  No	  matter	  what	  disagreements	  may	  follow,	  by	  adhering	  to	  rhetorical	  principles,	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  always	  come	  back	  to	  social	  qualities	  that	  continue	  to	  foster	  a	  virtuous	  disposition	  in	  them	  and	  in	  those	  with	  whom	  they	  disagree.	  	  Beyond	  politeness	  and	  non-­‐quarrelling	  agreeableness,	  though,	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  have	  still	  further	  obligations	  towards	  those	  with	  whom	  they	  have	  ethical	  disagreements.	  Remember	  Kant’s	  discussion	  of	  human	  respect	  from	  the	  Metaphysics	  
of	  Morals.	  When	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  engage	  the	  erroneous	  perspectives	  of	  others,	  they	  are	  obliged	  to	  seek	  out	  any	  element	  of	  truth	  they	  can	  in	  such	  perspectives,	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  uncovering	  the	  likely	  “deceptive	  illusion”	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  erroneous	  perspectives,	  which	  is	  “the	  subjective	  ground	  that	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determined	  [the]	  judgment	  which	  [the	  erring	  agent]	  took	  for	  objective”	  (“Metaphysics”	  6:463).	  These	  terms	  (illusion,	  subjective	  ground,	  and	  objective	  ground)	  refer	  to	  issues	  that	  Kant	  covered	  more	  in	  depth	  in	  his	  work	  in	  logic.	  Specifically,	  these	  terms	  refer	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  persuasion	  and	  conviction.	  In	  brief,	  Kant	  suggests	  that	  persuasion	  results	  from	  assumptions	  based	  on	  subjective	  grounds	  of	  reasoning	  only	  while	  conviction	  results	  from	  actual	  belief	  based	  on	  objective	  grounds	  of	  reasoning	  (see	  Kant,	  “Jäsche”	  73).	  Rhetorically	  speaking,	  we	  might	  describe	  Kant’s	  nuance	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  parallel	  to	  the	  nuanced	  deference’s	  between	  deliberation	  and	  symbouleutikon.	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  persuasion	  resembles	  the	  sort	  of	  expediency	  motives	  in	  traditional	  deliberation	  while	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  conviction	  more	  resembles	  the	  togetherness	  motives	  in	  symbouleutikon.	  	  Kant	  defines	  persuasion	  as	  holding	  something	  to	  be	  true	  “on	  account	  of	  the	  illusion	  of	  cognition.”	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  when	  someone	  is	  persuaded,	  “one	  accepts	  any	  degree	  of	  truth	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  approve	  a	  cognition,	  without	  investigating	  whether	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  opposite	  have	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  truth	  or	  not.”	  As	  such,	  “Persuasion	  is	  really	  a	  kind	  of	  delusion,	  for	  one	  always	  considers	  only	  the	  one	  side,	  without	  in	  the	  least	  reflecting	  on	  the	  opposite	  side”	  (“Blomberg”	  143).	  Persuasion	  in	  this	  sense	  directly	  smacks	  of	  expediency,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Roman	  Rhetorica	  
Ad	  Herennium,	  which	  suggests,	  “when	  we	  have	  submitted	  our	  arguments	  and	  destroyed	  those	  of	  the	  opposition,	  we	  have,	  of	  course,	  completely	  fulfilled	  the	  speaker’s	  function”	  (Caplan	  33).	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Conversely,	  Kant	  uses	  the	  term	  convinced	  in	  those	  situations,	  	  when	  the	  thing	  is	  so	  logically	  perfect	  that	  I	  can	  communicate	  it	  to	  someone	  else;	  when	  I	  represent	  to	  myself	  that	  I	  would	  hold	  the	  thing	  to	  be	  true	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  risks;	  if	  I	  were	  to	  waver,	  then	  I	  would	  not	  really	  be	  convinced.	  But	  if	  I	  believe	  I	  am	  not	  risking	  anything	  when	  I	  put	  up	  all	  my	  interests	  as	  security,	  then	  I	  am	  convinced.	  (“Vienna”	  854-­‐5)	  	  Notice	  the	  togetherness	  qualities	  of	  Kantian	  conviction	  (or	  being	  convinced	  in	  Kant’s	  sense).	  People	  are	  convinced	  (not	  merely	  persuaded)	  when	  they	  can	  share	  without	  any	  reservation	  those	  things	  they	  are	  convinced	  of	  with	  others.	  	  But	  notice	  that	  both	  persuasion	  and	  conviction	  are	  still	  personal	  states.	  Kant	  admits	  that	  the	  “distinction	  between	  persuasion	  and	  conviction	  is	  precarious”	  because	  someone	  could	  be	  persuaded	  by	  grounds	  of	  reasoning	  that	  might	  actually	  be	  objective	  but	  are	  only	  reasoned	  through	  subjectively	  (“Dohna-­‐Wundlacken”	  747).	  The	  danger	  in	  persuasion	  arises	  from,	  “Holding	  a	  proposition	  to	  be	  true,	  without	  being	  able	  to	  distinguish	  whether	  it	  occurs	  from	  subjective	  or	  objective	  grounds”	  (“Dohna-­‐Wundlacken”	  747).	  So	  how	  can	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  distinguish	  between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  grounds	  of	  reasoning?	  	  	  Kant	  acknowledges	  that,	  “we	  lack	  a	  universally	  sufficient	  mark,	  then,	  for	  correctly	  and	  infallibly	  distinguishing	  the	  subjective	  grounds	  of	  holding-­‐to-­‐be-­‐true	  from	  the	  objective	  ones,”	  i.e.	  between	  persuasion	  and	  conviction	  (“Blomberg”	  147).	  In	  such	  a	  perpetual	  state	  of	  uncertainty,	  Kant	  suggests	  two	  methods	  that	  make	  it	  possible	  for	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people	  to	  discern	  between	  truth	  and	  error.	  Both	  methods	  are	  fundamentally	  rhetorical	  and	  lead	  to	  ethical	  behavior.	  First,	  One	  must	  compare	  his	  cognition	  of	  this	  or	  that	  object	  with	  the	  cognitions	  of	  other	  people	  concerning	  one	  and	  the	  same	  object	  and	  carefully	  hold	  them	  against	  one	  another,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  supposed	  that	  every	  man	  should	  have	  one	  and	  the	  same	  grounds	  moving	  him	  to	  hold	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing	  to	  be	  true;	  instead	  there	  is	  the	  greatest	  probability	  that	  what	  one	  person	  considers	  from	  one	  side,	  someone	  else,	  who	  thinks	  something	  else	  and	  who	  conceives	  the	  whole	  thing	  differently,	  will	  be	  opposed	  from	  the	  other	  side.	  (“Blomberg”	  147)	  	  In	  other	  words,	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  need	  to	  compare	  their	  moral	  cognitions	  with	  the	  moral	  cognitions	  of	  others	  who	  may	  think	  things	  through	  with	  very	  different	  moral	  beliefs.	  Second,	  “One	  must	  accept	  and	  suppose	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  cognition	  that	  one	  has;	  one	  must	  place	  oneself,	  as	  it	  were,	  in	  the	  position	  of	  his	  opponent	  and	  of	  one	  who	  disputes	  the	  truth	  of	  my	  cognition,	  and	  then	  look	  to	  see	  whether	  it	  may	  be	  thought	  as	  true	  or	  at	  least	  probable”	  (“Blomberg”	  147).	  This	  method	  goes	  further	  by	  suggesting	  that	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  can	  value	  completely	  opposite	  moral	  views	  by	  always	  trying	  to	  find	  the	  truth	  in	  such	  opposing	  moral	  views.	  Through	  such	  a	  process,	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  will	  either	  discover	  errors	  in	  their	  own	  judgments	  or,	  sans	  any	  discovery	  of	  error,	  they	  will	  be	  reassured	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  own	  moral	  assertions	  (see	  “Blomberg”	  147).	  Whatever	  the	  case,	  considering	  and	  engaging	  divergent	  moral	  perspectives	  is	  at	  base	  a	  rhetorical	  activity	  from	  which	  emerges	  specific	  Kantian	  duties	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  bringing	  valuable	  side-­‐benefits	  regardless	  of	  the	  outcome.	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Just	  a	  few	  pages	  later	  in	  the	  same	  logic	  passage,	  Kant	  reiterates	  and	  summarizes	  these	  methods	  in	  a	  two-­‐fold	  filter	  for	  determining	  objective	  grounds	  of	  cognition:	  first,	  “The	  agreement	  of	  other	  men	  with	  our	  premises,	  and	  [second]	  the	  testing	  of	  our	  thought	  according	  to	  other	  men’s	  sentiments”	  (Blomberg	  150).	  Because	  all	  of	  this	  relies	  on	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  being	  able	  to	  communicate	  their	  perspectives,	  “The	  freedom	  to	  communicate	  one’s	  thoughts,	  judgments,	  and	  cognitions	  is	  certainly	  the	  only	  most	  certain	  means	  to	  test	  one’s	  cognitions	  properly,	  however,	  and	  to	  verify	  them”	  (Blomberg	  150).	  Elsewhere,	  Kant	  repeats	  this	  sentiment	  that	  the	  need	  to	  compare	  our	  perspectives	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  is	  vital:	  “this	  may	  be	  the	  most	  important	  reason	  why	  learned	  people	  cry	  out	  so	  urgently	  for	  freedom	  of	  the	  press.	  For	  if	  this	  freedom	  is	  denied,	  we	  are	  deprived	  at	  the	  same	  time	  of	  a	  great	  means	  of	  testing	  the	  correctness	  of	  our	  own	  judgments,	  and	  we	  are	  exposed	  to	  error”	  (Anthropology	  17).	  In	  other	  words,	  practices	  which	  serve	  to	  bring	  wills	  together—symbouleutikon—are	  necessary	  for	  any	  sort	  of	  robust	  judgment	  to	  happen	  about	  anything.	  	  
Conclusion:	  the	  Rhetorical	  Imperative	  and	  Its	  Perfection	  This	  then	  culminates	  rhetorical/morals	  agents’	  responsibilities	  in	  continually	  seeking	  out,	  understanding,	  and	  finding	  as	  much	  value	  as	  possible	  in	  all	  divergent	  perspectives.	  Kantian	  ethics	  commits	  none	  of	  the	  offenses	  Gottshalk	  alleges.	  Kant	  goes	  beyond	  making	  ample	  “provision	  for	  each	  agent	  to	  complement	  and	  enrich	  the	  others,	  and	  to	  share	  not	  only	  in	  a	  formal	  identity	  but	  also	  in	  a	  communal	  diversity”	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(qtd.	  in	  Moore	  58).	  When	  viewed	  in	  light	  of	  his	  work	  in	  logic	  especially,	  Kant’s	  ethics	  relies	  on	  each	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  complementing	  and	  enriching	  one	  another.	  	  Rhetorical/moral	  agents	  thus	  face	  what	  I	  call	  a	  rhetorical	  imperative	  that	  precedes	  and	  makes	  possible	  the	  formulation	  of	  universal	  law	  or	  Kant’s	  categorical	  imperative.	  Inasmuch	  as	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  natural	  plurality	  of	  divergent	  perspectives,	  the	  rhetorical	  imperative	  that	  rhetorical/moral	  agents	  face	  contains	  a	  four-­‐fold	  unending	  discursive	  responsibility:	  	  A	  rhetorical/moral	  agent	  completes	  (i.e.	  finds	  a	  telos	  in)	  rhetorical	  discourse	  by	  
1. engaging divergent (i.e. erroneous or immoral) perspectives, which fosters 
2. understanding any and all convincing elements in those divergent perspectives, 
which then contributes to 
3. encouraging self-respect in all diverging agents including oneself, which 
perpetuates 
4. engaging further divergent perspectives (see again “Metaphysics” 6:463) 	  Though	  not	  part	  of	  rhetorical/moral	  agents’	  responsibilities,	  this	  rhetorical	  imperative	  should	  also	  have	  the	  dual	  benefit	  of	  uncovering	  the	  specific	  errors	  that	  the	  erring	  agents	  were	  persuaded	  of	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  helping	  erring	  agents	  become	  convinced	  of	  universal	  law	  and	  universal	  terms.	  But	  these	  are	  benefits	  only.	  The	  real	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  imperative	  are	  those	  listed	  above.	  	  The	  discursive	  direction	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  imperative	  described	  above	  is	  what	  Kenneth	  Burke	  calls	  in	  many	  places	  a	  “rounding-­‐out	  of	  the	  terms,”	  or	  in	  relation	  to	  Kant’s	  ethical	  project	  specifically,	  “following-­‐through-­‐to-­‐the-­‐end-­‐of-­‐the-­‐line”	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(Language	  440).	  Burke	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  “orderly	  perfection	  of	  such	  thoroughness	  .	  .	  .	  brings	  up	  strains	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  medium”	  of	  language	  (Language	  440).	  As	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  these	  intrinsic	  qualities	  of	  language	  are	  
telos	  or	  entelechy.	  Burke	  goes	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  further	  moral	  entelechy	  in	  language	  “arises	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  embody	  in	  practice	  what	  we	  have	  conceived	  in	  principle”	  (Language	  440).	  In	  this	  way,	  Burke	  offers	  a	  useful	  summary	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  grounding	  of	  Kant’s	  ethical	  project,	  which	  accords	  closely	  to	  what	  I’ve	  explored	  above:	  “Such	  [moral]	  universalization	  comes	  easy	  to	  language.	  Merely	  round	  out	  a	  terminology,	  and	  “justice”	  is	  found	  to	  involve	  ‘self-­‐legislation’”	  (Language	  440).	  In	  a	  footnote,	  Burke	  qualifies	  this	  claim	  by	  grammatically	  unwrapping	  Kant’s	  notions	  of	  universal	  law	  and	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  like	  this:	  “Suppose	  that	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  purely	  selfish	  command	  .	  .	  .,	  ‘Thou	  shalt	  not	  kill	  me.’	  Next,	  I	  universalize	  the	  pronouns,	  so	  that	  everyone	  is	  a	  thou	  and	  everyone	  is	  a	  me”	  (Language	  440).	  By	  pursuing	  a	  purely	  discursive	  course	  of	  action,	  Burke	  observes	  that	  he	  ends	  up	  with	  a	  universal	  command	  that	  ends	  up	  “commanding	  myself	  not	  to	  kill	  others”	  (Language	  440).	  In	  making	  his	  own	  rhetorically	  based	  claims	  about	  Kantian	  ethics,	  Burke	  understand	  some	  rationalists	  may	  view	  his	  argument	  as	  shaky	  at	  best	  or	  dismissively	  subjective	  at	  worst.	  So	  Burke	  further	  explains,	  We	  do	  not	  thereby	  obligate	  ourselves	  to	  say	  that	  the	  grounding	  is	  “nothing	  but”	  language.	  We	  say	  merely	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  language	  (as	  distinct	  from	  “the	  senses”).	  And	  if	  one	  so	  desired,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  though	  these	  [rhetorical]	  sources	  of	  [ethical]	  “respect”	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  language	  as	  “lawgiver,”	  language	  itself	  is	  grounded	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  ultimate	  “language-­‐giver.”	  (Language	  440)	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Burke’s	  notion	  of	  an	  ultimate	  language-­‐giver	  suggests	  almost	  godly	  qualities	  for	  such	  a	  source.	  While	  Burke	  stops	  short	  of	  waxing	  religious	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  Kantian	  ethics	  (and	  while	  Burke	  was	  certainly	  not	  personally	  religious),	  he	  does	  explore	  the	  peculiarly	  theological	  implications	  of	  his	  linguistic	  philosophy	  in	  the	  essays	  collected	  in	  The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Religion.	  His	  observations	  are	  not	  theological	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  of	  seriously	  studying	  the	  nature	  of	  God	  as	  an	  actual	  being.	  Instead,	  Burke’s	  particular	  theological	  bent	  is	  concerned	  “not	  directly	  with	  religion,	  but	  rather	  with	  the	  terminology	  of	  religion;	  not	  directly	  with	  man’s	  relationship	  with	  God,	  but	  rather	  with	  his	  relationship	  to	  the	  word	  ‘God’”	  (Religion	  vi).	  	  Following	  Burke’s	  lead,	  and	  toward	  the	  perfecting	  (i.e.	  articulating	  a	  concise	  telos)	  of	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric,	  I	  would	  take	  the	  opening	  passage	  of	  the	  Gospel	  of	  St.	  John	  in	  the	  Greek	  Bible	  at	  face	  value:	  “In	  the	  beginning	  was	  the	  Word	  [logos],	  and	  the	  Word	  [logos]	  was	  with	  God,	  and	  the	  Word	  [logos]	  was	  God”	  (John	  1.1	  NSRV).	  In	  this	  sense,	  
Logos-­‐as-­‐God	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ultimate	  of	  ultimate	  terms,	  for	  there	  is	  no	  term	  beyond	  terminology	  itself.	  Further	  in	  this	  sense,	  we	  might	  appropriate	  an	  admonition	  of	  Jesus	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  perfection	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  imperative	  described	  above.	  When	  asked	  what	  the	  greatest	  commandment	  was,	  Jesus	  responded	  with	  two	  basic	  responsibilities:	  “love	  God	  with	  all	  your	  heart	  [and]	  love	  your	  neighbor	  as	  yourself”	  (Matthew	  22.37-­‐39	  NSRV).	  By	  way	  of	  appropriation,	  if	  we	  exchange	  Logos	  for	  God	  as	  John	  did,	  we	  get	  a	  causally	  connected	  great	  rhetorical	  imperative:	  “love	  
Logos	  with	  all	  your	  heart	  and	  thereby	  love	  your	  neighbor	  as	  yourself.”	  Upon	  this	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imperative	  hangs	  all	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics.	  For	  if	  we	  despise	  the	  universal	  discursive	  use	  of	  language,	  we	  abandon	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics	  in	  preference	  for	  other	  modes	  of	  persuasion,	  which	  only	  ends	  in	  violence	  (as	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  dissertation	  explores).	  	  In	  the	  end,	  instead	  of	  an	  “ethics	  of	  secluded	  universality,”	  Kantian	  ethics	  emerges	  from	  and	  thrives	  in	  an	  ever-­‐churning	  rhetorical	  environment	  of	  constantly	  engaging	  and	  reengaging	  rhetorical/moral	  agents.	  This	  is	  the	  very	  stuff	  of	  which	  
symbouleutikon	  in	  the	  broad	  sense	  is	  made.	  Without	  such	  rhetorical	  socialization	  there	  is	  nothing	  with	  which	  or	  about	  which	  to	  critique	  or	  moralize.	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  CHAPTER	  4.	  THE	  END	  OF	  DEMOCRACY:	  SYMPHERON	  AND	  THE	  EXPEDIENCY	  OF	  INEFFICIENCY	  	  “When	  social	  conditions	  are	  equal,	  each	  man	  readily	  lives	  a	  life	  independent	  of	  others	  and	  forgets	  the	  crowd.	  If	  legislators	  of	  democratic	  nations	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  correct	  this	  fatal	  tendency	  .	  .	  .	  a	  time	  might	  come	  when	  the	  disorderly	  passions	  of	  a	  few	  men,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  stupid	  selfishness	  and	  small-­‐mindedness	  of	  the	  majority,	  would	  ultimately	  force	  the	  main	  body	  of	  society	  to	  suffer	  strange	  social	  changes.”	  —Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville,	  Democracy	  in	  America	  	  “Hain't	  we	  got	  all	  the	  fools	  in	  town	  on	  our	  side?	  And	  ain’t	  that	  a	  big	  enough	  majority	  in	  any	  town?”	  —Mark	  Twain,	  The	  Adventures	  of	  Huckleberry	  Finn	  	  	  
Introduction	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  reversed	  the	  traditional	  order	  of	  telos	  and	  symbouleutikon	  in	  order	  to	  see	  what	  we	  might	  discover	  if	  we	  posited	  that	  telos	  (completion,	  perfection,	  purification)	  has	  a	  specific	  symbouleutikon	  (way	  of	  bringing	  wills	  together).	  Through	  pursuing	  that	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  I	  uncovered	  the	  rhetorical	  pluralism	  that	  makes	  possible	  Kantian	  universal	  law	  and	  the	  categorical	  imperative.	  The	  rhetorical	  imperative	  (a	  sort	  of	  pre-­‐universal	  law/imperative)	  emerged	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  an	  actual	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  The	  rhetorical	  imperative	  values	  engaging	  divergent	  perspectives	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  any	  subsequent	  critical	  activity.	  Other	  theorists	  have	  identified	  similar	  ethical	  phenomena	  in	  other	  rhetorical	  projects.	  For	  instance,	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  Chaim	  Perelman’s	  New	  Rhetoric,	  Mieczysław	  Maneli	  suggests	  “the	  only	  true	  moral	  and	  social	  virtue	  is	  our	  ability	  to	  reconsider,	  to	  reenter	  into	  dialogue,	  to	  keep	  an	  open	  mind,	  to	  be	  flexible,	  open	  to	  suggestions,	  and	  willing	  to	  follow	  new,	  reasonable	  advice.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  New	  Rhetoric	  may	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be	  the	  only	  philosophy	  that	  praises	  those	  who	  ruminate,	  hesitate,	  are	  reluctant,	  doubtful,	  but	  ultimately	  able	  to	  act	  prudently”	  (Maneli	  13,	  qtd.	  in	  Crosswhite,	  “Universalities”	  446).	  Far	  from	  being	  the	  only	  philosophy	  that	  values	  such	  activities,	  the	  work	  I’ve	  established	  thus	  far	  in	  this	  dissertation	  traces	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  such	  virtues	  in	  Aristotle,	  Kenneth	  Burke,	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Immanuel	  Kant	  and	  others.	  This	  chapter	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  those	  virtues.	  	  As	  I	  began	  the	  previous	  chapter	  with	  a	  conceptual	  reversal,	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  reverse	  that	  reversal	  and	  pursue	  the	  traditional	  line	  of	  deliberative	  reasoning	  to	  its	  completion.	  To	  wit,	  Aristotle	  claims	  that	  symbouleutikon	  has	  a	  specific	  telos,	  and	  that	  specific	  telos	  is	  summarized	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  sympheron.	  Like	  telos,	  the	  Greek	  term	  
sympheron	  is	  not	  included	  in	  Lanham’s	  Handlist	  of	  Rhetorical	  Terms.	  Sympheron	  also	  receives	  only	  passing	  mention	  in	  the	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Rhetoric	  (283),	  and	  has	  generally	  received	  little	  scholarly	  attention.	  In	  contemporary	  English	  translations	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric,	  the	  Greek	  term	  sympheron	  has	  been	  translated	  as	  “expedient”	  (Cooper	  29)	  or	  “utility”	  (Roberts	  2165)	  or	  “advantageous”	  (Kennedy	  61).	  These	  translations	  remind	  me	  of	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  critique	  of	  a	  common	  translation	  of	  
ethos;	  Heidegger’s	  critique	  can	  apply	  to	  each	  of	  each	  of	  the	  above	  translations	  of	  
sympheron:	  “This	  translation	  thinks	  in	  a	  modern	  way,	  not	  a	  Greek	  one”	  (Heidegger,	  
Basic	  Writings	  256).	  The	  word	  sympheron	  is	  formed	  from	  two	  other	  words—syn	  which	  means	  “together”	  and	  phero	  which	  means	  “to	  bear.”	  So	  when	  the	  Greeks	  used	  
sympheron,	  they	  drew	  on	  an	  etymology	  that	  means	  “bearing	  together.”	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More	  than	  just	  ancient	  vocabulary	  esoterica,	  sympheron	  is	  vital	  to	  contemporary	  conversations	  about	  the	  role	  expediency	  plays	  in	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  It’s	  abundantly	  clear	  that	  Aristotle	  uses	  sympheron	  to	  describe	  deliberative	  rhetoric’s	  main	  purpose	  or	  goal:	  “But	  since	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  deliberative	  speaker	  is	  [sympheron],	  .	  .	  .	  and	  since	  [sympheron]	  is	  a	  good,	  one	  should	  grasp	  the	  elements	  of	  good	  and	  [sympheron]	  in	  abstract”	  (Kennedy	  61,	  the	  original	  Greek	  term	  “sympheron”	  standing	  in	  for	  Kennedy’s	  translation	  “the	  advantageous”).	  Though	  Aristotle	  used	  sympheron	  with	  some	  connotations	  of	  expediency,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  some	  time	  before	  Cicero	  in	  the	  Roman	  Empire	  that	  expediency	  alone	  was	  theorized	  as	  the	  purpose	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  Since	  then,	  the	  place	  of	  expediency	  in	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  has	  gone	  on	  largely	  unchallenged.	  Indeed,	  the	  Encyclopedia	  of	  
Rhetoric’s	  entry	  on	  expediency	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  occupies	  six	  double-­‐columned	  pages	  (Wander	  283-­‐88).	  	  However,	  the	  purposes	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  shifts	  dramatically	  if	  sympheron	  instead	  means	  “bearing	  together.”	  Sympheron-­‐as-­‐expediency	  implies	  that	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  can	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  that	  which	  is	  expedient,	  beneficial,	  advantageous,	  etc.	  But,	  of	  course,	  using	  the	  Aristotelian	  tools	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  for	  these	  purposes	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  power-­‐plays	  over	  what	  decisions	  are	  expedient	  for	  which	  individuals.	  Conversely,	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐bearing-­‐together	  implies	  that	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  can	  be	  used	  to	  facilitate	  rhetors	  and	  audiences	  bearing	  each	  others’	  perspectives	  and	  beliefs.	  The	  incommensurability	  of	  diverse	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subjectivities	  is	  thus	  not	  a	  stalemate	  at	  the	  end	  of	  deliberation;	  rather,	  such	  incommensurability	  is	  the	  very	  exigency	  that	  initiates	  deliberation.	  	  Incommensurability	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  early	  formulations	  of	  sympheron	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Greek	  agonism	  (see	  philological	  notes	  below).	  Some	  sort	  of	  conflict	  is	  inevitable	  in	  most	  any	  human	  interaction	  if	  only	  because	  humans	  are	  still	  isolated	  by	  their	  individual	  perceptions	  even	  if	  their	  languages	  (used	  to	  describe	  their	  isolated	  perceptions)	  are	  shared	  and	  public	  and	  thus	  unavoidably	  unite	  them.	  As	  I	  explored	  more	  in	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  shows	  us	  that	  language	  is	  unavoidably	  public	  which	  suggests	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  private	  language	  is	  incoherent.	  This	  means	  the	  rules	  of	  any	  language	  (no	  matter	  how	  privately	  created)	  can	  always	  be	  taught	  to	  another.	  This	  clashes	  with	  the	  incommensurability	  of	  subjective	  experience.	  No	  matter	  how	  similar	  or	  adjacent	  people	  are	  to	  each	  other,	  nobody	  can	  perceive	  or	  experience	  the	  exact	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  another.	  Language	  emerges	  as	  the	  fluctuating	  sets	  of	  approximations	  that	  people	  use	  to	  perceive	  as	  other	  people	  perceive.	  Thus	  the	  processes	  of	  uniting	  (and	  keeping	  united)	  divergent	  perspectives	  involves	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  sustained	  bearing-­‐together.	  	  This	  is	  because	  even	  when	  people	  agree,	  they	  must	  sustain	  the	  burden	  of	  trusting	  each	  other’s	  perspectives,	  which	  they	  cannot	  see	  nor	  feel	  for	  themselves.	  So	  while	  there	  is	  a	  great	  identity	  among	  those	  who	  speak	  the	  same	  language	  and	  assert	  their	  agreement,	  they	  must	  still	  bear	  (and	  constantly	  make	  up	  the	  difference	  for)	  the	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incommensurable	  conflict	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  experience	  the	  perspectives	  of	  others.	  Understanding	  sympheron	  in	  terms	  of	  “bearing	  together”	  encourages	  using	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  in	  efforts	  to	  bridge	  incommensurable	  perspectives.	  But	  viewing	  sympheron	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  expediency,	  utility,	  or	  advantage	  obscures	  and	  confuses	  this	  function	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  and	  instead	  favors	  a	  destructive	  form	  of	  expedient	  individualism.	  	  The	  long-­‐standing	  incomplete	  understanding	  of	  sympheron	  has	  led	  to	  a	  throng	  of	  critiques	  that	  lump	  the	  moral	  incongruities	  of	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐expediency	  with	  Aristotle’s	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  As	  emblematic	  of	  such	  a	  throng,	  consider	  Steven	  Katz’s	  1992	  article,	  “The	  Ethic	  of	  Expediency”	  (which	  has	  been	  anthologized	  and	  steadily	  debated	  since—by	  way	  of	  example,	  see	  Bibliography	  for	  Moore	  in	  2004,	  Katz	  in	  2006,	  and	  Ward	  in	  2009).	  In	  his	  interpretation	  of	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐expediency,	  Katz	  vehemently	  argues	  that	  an	  ethic	  of	  expediency,	  based	  on	  Aristotelian	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  accompanies	  the	  contemporary	  practice	  and	  teaching	  of	  technical	  communication.	  As	  Katz	  explains	  it,	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  values	  means	  as	  means	  independent	  from	  their	  ends;	  it	  seeks	  to	  perfect	  processes	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  processes	  are.	  Katz	  draws	  on	  actual	  Nazi	  bureaucratic	  rhetoric	  to	  carefully	  illustrate	  how	  such	  an	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  helped	  justify	  and	  implement	  the	  Holocaust.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  article,	  Katz	  suggests	  a	  sobering	  thought,	  “when	  every	  field	  strives	  to	  be	  scientific	  and	  technical	  and	  decisions	  are	  made	  and	  consequences	  weighed	  and	  value	  argued	  on	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  only—the	  Holocaust	  may	  have	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something	  to	  teach	  those	  of	  us	  in	  technical	  communication,	  composition,	  and	  rhetoric”	  (273).	  	  Undeniably,	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  justification	  in	  any	  occupation	  presents	  a	  clear	  danger	  to	  the	  future	  safety	  and	  wellness	  of	  society.	  However,	  such	  an	  ethic	  does	  not	  have	  its	  genesis	  in	  Aristotle’s	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  Rather,	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  emerges	  from	  the	  particular	  social	  conditions	  that	  provide	  exigency	  for	  deliberation—i.e.	  democracy.	  Thus,	  those	  who	  want	  to	  critique	  expediency	  will	  not	  find	  solutions	  in	  direct	  critiques	  of	  deliberation.	  Indeed,	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  (as	  we’ve	  inherited	  it	  from	  the	  classical	  Roman	  tradition)	  is	  somewhat	  of	  a	  smokescreen	  because	  of	  key	  terms	  that	  changed	  sometime	  between	  Aristotle	  and	  Cicero.	  Instead,	  as	  I’ll	  show	  below,	  solutions	  to	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  share	  much	  with	  other	  peaceable	  solutions	  to	  the	  other	  problems	  of	  democracy.	  	  To	  show	  this,	  I	  first	  include	  a	  brief	  philological	  look	  at	  sympheron.	  After	  this	  philological	  glimpse	  at	  sympheron,	  I	  dive	  headlong	  into	  the	  political/rhetorical	  theories	  of	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  and	  Kenneth	  Burke.	  Both	  of	  these	  theorists	  provide	  helpful	  critiques	  of	  democracy	  that	  show	  how	  an	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  can	  emerge	  from	  democratic	  conditions.	  Their	  critiques	  also	  indicate	  how	  it	  is	  that	  sympheron	  can	  slip	  from	  a	  damaging	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  toward	  a	  corrective	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together.	  In	  short,	  conscientious	  democratic	  living	  encourages	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  that	  helps	  keep	  the	  excesses	  of	  democracy	  in	  check.	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A	  Philology	  of	  Sympheron	  The	  confusion	  we’ve	  inherited	  about	  sympheron	  comes	  from	  two	  main	  sources—different	  ancient	  Greek	  usages	  of	  sympheron	  and	  the	  ancient	  Roman	  obscuring	  of	  
togetherness	  in	  their	  theories	  about	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  that	  they	  inherited	  from	  Aristotle.	  	  First,	  ancient	  Greeks	  simply	  used	  sympheron	  in	  different	  but	  adjacent	  ways.	  The	  earliest	  recorded	  uses	  of	  sympheron	  are	  in	  Homer’s	  Iliad	  where	  sympheron	  is	  used	  in	  specifically	  combative	  terms.	  In	  book	  8	  of	  the	  Iliad,	  the	  goddesses	  Hera	  and	  Athene	  prepare	  themselves	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  between	  the	  Greeks	  and	  Trojans	  even	  though	  Zeus	  had	  expressly	  forbidden	  such	  interloping	  by	  the	  gods.	  When	  father	  Zeus	  saw	  [Hera	  and	  Athene]	  from	  Ida	  he	  waxed	  wondrous	  wroth,	  and	  sent	  forth	  golden-­‐winged	  Iris	  to	  bear	  a	  message:	  ‘Up,	  go,	  swift	  Iris;	  turn	  them	  back	  and	  suffer	  them	  not	  to	  come	  face	  to	  face	  with	  me,	  seeing	  it	  will	  be	  in	  no	  happy	  wise	  that	  we	  shall	  join	  in	  combat.”	  (Iliad	  8:399-­‐400,	  emphasis	  added)	  	  The	  word	  join	  in	  this	  translation	  is	  sympheron.	  Understanding	  sympheron	  begins	  with	  understanding	  how	  combat	  (agon)	  is	  something	  that	  people	  bear	  together.	  I	  suspect	  that	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐combat	  draws	  on	  the	  shared	  burden	  of	  allies	  in	  uniting	  against	  a	  common	  foe.	  But	  I	  also	  suspect	  that	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐combat	  draws	  on	  the	  inevitable	  clash	  that	  erupts	  when	  enemies	  bring	  their	  divergent	  perspectives	  to	  bear	  on	  each	  other.	  Much	  like	  the	  conflict-­‐centered	  analysis	  of	  telos	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐combat	  suggests	  that	  political	  rhetoric	  is	  actually	  the	  continuation	  of	  war	  in	  a	  different	  medium.	  Or,	  in	  other	  words,	  rhetorical	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engagement	  is	  the	  symbolic	  implementation	  of	  combat	  while	  actual	  combat	  is	  the	  physical	  implementation	  of	  symbolic	  incommensurability.	  	  Additionally,	  notice	  that	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐combat	  still	  has	  specifically	  rhetorically	  discursive	  contexts.	  In	  the	  Zeus	  example	  mentioned	  above,	  Zeus	  referred	  to	  
sympheron	  while	  he	  “waxed	  wondrous	  wroth.”	  Elsewhere	  in	  the	  Iliad,	  sympheron	  is	  also	  used	  by	  the	  Greek’s	  resident	  eloquent	  rhetor,	  Nestor	  of	  Gerenia	  who’s	  described	  as	  “sweet	  of	  speech,	  the	  clear-­‐voiced	  orator	  of	  the	  Pylians,	  from	  whose	  tongue	  flowed	  speech	  sweeter	  than	  honey”	  (Iliad	  1:247-­‐49).	  In	  a	  motivational	  retelling	  of	  a	  previous	  battle,	  Nestor	  includes	  this	  statement,	  “for	  when	  the	  bright	  sun	  stood	  above	  the	  earth	  we	  made	  prayer	  to	  Zeus	  and	  Athene,	  and	  joined	  battle”	  (Iliad	  11.736,	  emphasis	  added).	  Again,	  “joined”	  in	  this	  selection	  is	  sympheron.	  In	  both	  the	  Zeus	  and	  Nestor	  examples,	  sympheron	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  bearing	  together	  of	  combat	  motivated	  by	  powerfully	  suasive	  communications.	  Also	  in	  these	  instances	  of	  
sympheron,	  notice	  the	  none-­‐too-­‐subtle	  ancient	  Greek	  machismo	  (for	  lack	  of	  a	  better	  word).	  Ancient	  Greek	  obsession	  with	  masculinity	  definitely	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  these	  early	  combative	  forms	  of	  sympheron.	  Further	  understanding	  sympheron	  in	  these	  contexts	  suggests	  the	  need	  future	  studies	  in	  early	  Greek	  gender	  roles	  and	  gender	  expectations.	  Hints	  and	  shades	  of	  expediency	  are	  evident	  in	  these	  early	  sympheron	  examples.	  If	  nothing	  else,	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  see	  that	  it	  is	  much	  more	  expedient	  for	  individual	  soldiers	  to	  join	  together	  (sympheron)	  when	  facing	  an	  enemy.	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Herodotus	  uses	  sympheron	  is	  a	  way	  that	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  togetherness/expediency	  uses	  of	  sympheron.	  Consider	  the	  pun	  Herodotus	  uses	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  tragic	  tale	  of	  Mardonius.	  Just	  before	  the	  Lacedaemonians	  capture	  Mardonius	  at	  his	  divinations	  and	  kill	  him,	  Herodotus	  tells	  this	  about	  Mardonius:	  “οὐ	  μέντοι	  ἔς	  γε	  τέλος	  οἱ	  συνήνεικε	  τὸ	  ἔχθος	  τὸ	  ἐς	  Λακεδαιμονίους	  συγκεκυρημένον”	  (Herodotus	  9:37).	  The	  pun	  appears	  in	  the	  two	  words	  that	  begin	  with	  συ-­‐.	  Both	  are	  variants	  of	  sympheron.	  David	  Grene’s	  translation	  of	  this	  selection	  goes	  like	  this:	  “But	  in	  the	  end	  this	  hatred	  of	  the	  Lacedaemonians,	  which	  had	  so	  much	  become	  part	  of	  all	  that	  happened	  to	  him,	  did	  not	  turn	  out	  well	  for	  him”	  (Herodotus	  9:37,	  Grene	  630).	  Grene’s	  translation	  clarifies	  distinctions	  between	  the	  two	  uses	  of	  
sympheron,	  but	  A.	  D.	  Godley’s	  translation	  gives	  a	  better	  hint	  of	  the	  pun:	  “Yet	  the	  enmity	  which	  he	  bore	  them	  brought	  him	  no	  good	  at	  the	  last”	  (Herodotus	  9:37,	  Godley).	  In	  this	  selection,	  sympheron	  is	  used	  to	  indicate	  the	  verb	  “bore”	  (as	  in	  “to	  bear”),	  and	  it	  also	  indicates	  “good”	  (or	  expediency,	  as	  in	  “that’s	  good	  for	  me”).	  An	  approximation	  of	  the	  pun	  in	  English	  might	  go	  something	  like	  this:	  Yet	  the	  hatred	  he	  
bore	  to	  the	  Lacedaemonians	  did	  not	  bear	  him	  anything	  in	  return.	  Herodotus’s	  pun	  indicates	  the	  area	  of	  slippage	  between	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐bearing-­‐together	  and	  
sympheron-­‐as-­‐expediency.	  But	  even	  in	  this	  slippage,	  both	  usages	  still	  retain	  their	  emphasis	  of	  togetherness.	  It	  was	  Mardonius’s	  hatred	  for	  the	  Lacedaemonians	  that	  brought	  him	  and	  them	  together	  –	  that	  wrapped	  up	  his	  actions	  with	  theirs.	  But,	  paradoxically,	  his	  hatred	  was	  also	  the	  factor	  that	  eventually	  brought	  him	  an	  utter	  lack	  of	  togetherness	  because	  the	  Lacedaemonians	  eventually	  killed	  him.	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Elsewhere	  in	  his	  History,	  Herodotus	  also	  uses	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  sympheron	  in	  a	  quasi-­‐aphorism:	  “if	  all	  mankind	  should	  assemble,	  for	  market,	  their	  own	  vicious	  deeds,	  wanting	  to	  barter	  them	  for	  those	  of	  their	  neighbors,	  on	  close	  inspection	  of	  those	  neighbors’	  ill	  acts	  they	  would	  be	  glad	  enough	  to	  take	  back	  home	  again	  their	  own,	  which	  they	  had	  brought	  with	  them”	  (7:152,	  Grene	  521).	  Again,	  David	  Grene’s	  translation	  provides	  clear	  distinction	  between	  like	  terms	  (e.g.	  “vicious	  deeds”	  as	  opposed	  to	  “ill	  acts”).	  But	  A.	  D.	  Godley’s	  translation	  gets	  more	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  Herodotus’s	  word-­‐play:	  “if	  all	  men	  should	  carry	  their	  own	  private	  troubles	  to	  market	  for	  barter	  with	  their	  neighbors,	  there	  would	  not	  be	  a	  single	  one	  who,	  when	  he	  had	  looked	  into	  the	  troubles	  of	  other	  men,	  would	  not	  be	  glad	  to	  carry	  home	  again	  what	  he	  had	  brought”	  (7:152,	  Godley).	  Both	  translators	  struggle	  with	  exactly	  how	  to	  convey	  sympheron	  in	  English.	  But	  their	  choices	  of	  words	  indicates	  that	  sympheron	  is	  somewhere	  between	  assembling	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  carrying	  on	  the	  other.	  In	  short,	  
sympheron	  is	  what	  people	  do	  when	  they	  bear	  burdens	  together	  (whether	  literally	  or	  metaphorically).	  	  The	  slippage	  between	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐bearing-­‐together	  and	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐expediency	  can	  also	  be	  illustrated	  in	  the	  analogous	  term	  convene.	  Convene	  comes	  to	  us	  from	  the	  Latin	  con	  (“together”)	  and	  vene	  (“come”)	  –	  literally	  “come	  together.”	  In	  one	  sense	  of	  convene,	  we	  might	  say,	  “The	  diplomats’	  meeting	  came	  together”	  –	  i.e.	  it	  
convened.	  Or	  we	  might	  also	  say,	  “Those	  questions	  really	  came	  together	  for	  me”	  –	  i.e.	  they	  were	  convenient.	  Though	  not	  exactly	  the	  same,	  the	  slippage	  between	  convene	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and	  convenient	  is	  at	  least	  analogous	  to	  the	  slippage	  between	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐bearing-­‐together	  and	  sympheron-­‐as-­‐expediency.	  The	  former	  emphasizes	  expedient	  togetherness;	  the	  latter	  emphasizes	  individual	  expediency.	  	  The	  historical	  transition	  in	  sympheron	  from	  expedient	  togetherness	  to	  individual	  expediency	  also	  manifests	  in	  the	  odd	  lexical	  gap	  in	  English	  words	  for	  rhetoric.	  The	  closest	  etymologically	  similar	  term	  to	  sympheron	  we	  have	  in	  English	  is	  conference.	  
Sympheron	  is	  Greek	  while	  conference	  is	  Latin.	  Their	  individual	  components	  are	  fairly	  commensurable:	  syn/sym	  and	  con	  both	  mean	  “together”	  in	  Greek	  and	  Latin	  respectively.	  The	  middle	  components	  –pher–	  and	  –fer–	  are	  etymologically	  identical;	  they	  both	  mean	  “to	  bear”	  (or	  “to	  bring”	  or	  “to	  carry”).	  So	  at	  their	  basics,	  both	  
sympheron	  and	  conference	  roughly	  mean	  “the	  bearing	  together	  [of	  something].”	  
Sympheron	  represents	  a	  lexical	  gap	  in	  English’s	  words	  for	  rhetoric	  because	  similar	  meanings	  for	  conference	  are	  now	  obsolete.	  According	  to	  the	  OED,	  the	  earliest	  English	  uses	  of	  conference	  did	  mean	  “the	  bearing	  together	  or	  bringing	  together	  [of	  something]”	  but	  such	  uses	  are	  now	  archaic.	  If	  such	  uses	  of	  conference	  were	  resurrected,	  English-­‐speakers	  might	  use	  conference	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  –fer–	  (to	  differentiate	  from	  other	  uses	  of	  conference).	  	  The	  lexical	  gap	  evident	  between	  sympheron	  and	  conference	  already	  existed	  by	  the	  time	  Cicero	  and	  the	  unknown	  author	  of	  Rhetoric	  Ad	  Herennium	  adapted	  Aristotle’s	  notions	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  to	  Roman	  discourse.	  For	  Aristotle,	  deliberative	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rhetoric	  had	  a	  definite	  togetherness	  quality	  about	  it.	  But	  by	  the	  time	  Cicero	  and	  Quintilian	  came	  along,	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  emphasized	  individual	  expediency.	  The	  Roman	  re-­‐conception	  of	  deliberation	  is	  especially	  evident	  in	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Aristotelian	  purpose	  of	  deliberation	  and	  the	  Ciceronian	  purpose	  of	  deliberation.	  For	  Aristotle,	  the	  purpose	  of	  deliberation	  was	  sympheron	  (“bearing	  together”	  or	  at	  most	  “expedient	  togetherness”),	  but	  for	  Cicero	  (and	  Quintilian	  afterwards),	  the	  purpose	  was	  utilitas,	  or	  “utility”	  /	  “expediency”	  /	  “advantage”	  with	  no	  emphasis	  on	  togetherness.	  	  This	  was	  so	  much	  the	  case	  that	  Cicero	  found	  it	  necessary	  to	  append	  ethical	  correctives	  to	  Aristotle’s	  rhetorical	  purposes.	  In	  Hubbell’s	  1949	  translation	  of	  De	  
Inventione,	  Cicero	  explains	  some	  of	  Aristotle’s	  rhetorical	  purposes	  this	  way,	  “it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  the	  end	  in	  the	  forensic	  type	  is	  equity,	  i.e.	  a	  subdivision	  of	  the	  larger	  topic	  of	  ‘honor.’	  In	  the	  deliberative	  type,	  however,	  Aristotle	  accepts	  advantage	  as	  the	  end,	  but	  I	  prefer	  both	  honor	  and	  advantage”	  (323-­‐25).	  In	  the	  original	  Latin,	  Cicero	  uses	  the	  term	  utilitas,	  which	  Hubbell	  translates	  as	  advantage.	  In	  other	  words,	  Cicero	  was	  taught	  that	  Aristotle	  accepts	  utilitas	  as	  the	  main	  motive	  for	  deliberation.	  This	  is	  especially	  odd	  because	  Cicero’s	  Latin	  lexicon	  had	  confero,	  which	  is	  a	  direct	  translation	  of	  sympheron,	  and	  Cicero	  used	  confero	  in	  other	  senses	  in	  De	  Iventione	  and	  in	  his	  other	  works.	  In	  other	  words,	  confero	  was	  a	  common	  enough	  term	  for	  Cicero	  and	  was	  a	  direct	  translation	  of	  sympheron,	  so	  why	  use	  a	  completely	  different	  term	  like	  utilitas	  instead	  of	  confero?	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	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of	  this	  dissertation.	  It	  may	  be	  possible	  that	  Cicero	  did	  not	  know	  of	  the	  original	  Greek	  term	  sympheron.	  Or	  maybe	  Cicero	  did	  know	  the	  term	  and	  its	  etymological	  affinity	  to	  






Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville,	  Kenneth	  Burke,	  and	  the	  Expediency	  of	  Democratic	  
Inefficiency	  Part	  of	  a	  deliberative	  rhetor’s	  burden	  as	  Aristotle	  saw	  it	  probably	  dealt	  with	  the	  deliberative	  rhetor’s	  responsibility	  to	  understand	  many	  different	  political	  perspectives.	  For	  Aristotle,	  knowing	  exactly	  how	  to	  rhetorically	  reach	  out	  to	  people	  who	  are	  devoted	  to	  their	  sociopolitical	  movements	  is	  expressly	  the	  realm	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric.	  In	  his	  Rhetoric	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  section	  on	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  Aristotle	  spends	  some	  effort	  in	  explaining	  how	  to	  appeal	  to	  people	  who	  adhere	  to	  different	  governmental	  structures	  like	  democracy,	  oligarchy,	  aristocracy,	  etc.	  (see	  Cooper	  44-­‐45,	  Roberts	  2173,	  and	  Kennedy	  74).	  At	  first	  blush,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  democracy	  is	  just	  one	  form	  of	  government	  in	  a	  list	  for	  Aristotle,	  so	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  is	  not	  necessarily	  democratic.	  But	  as	  we	  look	  past	  the	  possible	  contexts	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  we	  notice	  what	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  actually	  does.	  If	  a	  rhetor	  knows	  how	  to	  relate	  to	  an	  individual	  in	  any	  form	  of	  government,	  suddenly	  the	  rhetor	  enjoys	  a	  democratic	  moment	  with	  that	  individual	  (regardless	  of	  the	  government	  type).	  Deliberation	  democratizes	  discussion,	  for	  deliberation	  relies	  on	  equal	  interlocutors	  to	  function	  as	  deliberation	  at	  all.	  Thus	  the	  longer	  a	  rhetor	  can	  deliberatively	  engage	  an	  individual	  in	  any	  form	  of	  government,	  the	  more	  democratic	  the	  conversation	  will	  become.	  So	  while	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  does	  not	  initially	  appear	  necessarily	  democratic,	  it	  actually	  emerges	  as	  being	  essentially	  democratic.	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Burdened	  as	  it	  is	  with	  cumbersome	  dialectical	  togetherness,	  deliberative	  rhetoric’s	  essential	  democratic	  nature	  apparently	  clashes	  with	  the	  traditional	  deliberative	  motive	  of	  expedient	  individualism.	  But	  this	  clash	  is	  apparent	  only.	  Upon	  closer	  examination,	  the	  apparent	  clash	  emerges	  as	  a	  causal	  relationship.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  democracy	  that	  fosters	  the	  very	  expedient	  individualism	  with	  which	  sympheron-­‐motivated	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  clashes.	  	  The	  democratic	  drive	  toward	  expedient	  individualism	  is	  especially	  evident	  in	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  more	  curious	  observations	  of	  American	  democracy.	  These	  observations	  include	  his	  musings	  on	  individualism	  and	  conformity.	  Kenneth	  Burke	  also	  observes	  some	  compellingly	  similar	  proto-­‐expedient	  phenomena	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  cult	  of	  empire,	  specifically	  in	  his	  ideas	  of	  fanaticism	  and	  dissipation.	  Burke’s	  notion	  of	  fanaticism	  parallels	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  notion	  of	  conformity,	  and	  Burke’s	  notion	  of	  dissipation	  parallels	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  notion	  of	  individualism.	  If	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  and	  Burke’s	  critiques	  of	  democracy	  are	  sound,	  then	  correctives	  to	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  share	  much	  with	  other	  peaceable	  solutions	  to	  the	  other	  problems	  of	  democracy.	  	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  critique	  of	  individualism	  in	  1830s	  America	  bears	  some	  striking	  parallels	  to	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency:	  “Individualism	  is	  a	  calm	  and	  considered	  feeling	  which	  persuades	  each	  citizen	  to	  cut	  himself	  off	  from	  his	  fellows	  and	  to	  withdraw	  into	  the	  circle	  of	  his	  family	  and	  friends”	  (587).	  The	  virtue	  of	  “self-­‐
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sufficiency”	  often	  found	  in	  democracies	  fuels	  this	  impulse.	  As	  the	  ability	  to	  satisfy	  basic	  needs	  spread	  through	  society,	  de	  Tocqueville	  argues,	  citizens	  in	  such	  circumstances	  will	  become	  less	  interested	  in	  each	  other	  and	  withdraw	  more	  into	  their	  individual	  interests.	  The	  danger	  here	  is	  that	  individualism	  may	  eventually	  merge	  with	  egoism,	  which	  de	  Tocqueville	  defines	  as	  “an	  ardent	  and	  excessive	  love	  of	  oneself	  which	  leads	  man	  to	  relate	  everything	  back	  to	  himself	  and	  to	  prefer	  himself	  above	  everything”	  (587).	  As	  individualism	  socially	  isolates	  people,	  such	  people	  may	  unintentionally	  find	  themselves	  focusing	  so	  much	  on	  their	  own	  needs	  that	  they	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  world	  around	  them	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  own	  wants.	  This	  is	  a	  step	  toward	  expediency	  as	  a	  motivational	  power.	  	  Paradoxically,	  democratic	  social	  conditions	  tend	  to	  foster	  conformity	  even	  while	  they	  foster	  individualism	  so	  that	  independent	  individuals	  appear	  more	  and	  more	  like	  one	  another.	  Such	  an	  assertion	  runs	  counter	  to	  some	  contemporary	  assumptions	  about	  democracies.	  	  For	  instance	  in	  their	  1997	  book,	  Disclosing	  New	  Worlds,	  Charles	  Spinosa	  (and	  company)	  suggest,	  “Since	  the	  liberal	  state	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  promote	  particular	  goods,	  the	  liberal	  society	  establishes	  a	  space	  where	  citizens	  may	  freely	  examine	  and	  even	  exchange	  their	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  for	  other	  such	  conceptions”	  (Spinosa,	  et	  al.	  71).	  Though	  Spinosa	  (et	  al.)	  do	  have	  critiques	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  liberal	  state,	  de	  Tocqueville	  poses	  some	  pointed	  difficulties	  with	  such	  liberalism.	  Specifically,	  de	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Tocqueville’s	  observations	  of	  individualism	  suggests	  that	  the	  “free	  .	  .	  .	  exchange”	  of	  ideas	  in	  a	  “liberal	  society”	  is	  actually	  not	  very	  free	  at	  all.	  	  Also,	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  observations	  provide	  nuance	  to	  Steven	  Brint’s	  claims	  about	  “activity-­‐based	  groups”	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  “belief-­‐based	  groups.”	  Brint	  believes	  that	  the	  pressure	  to	  conform	  is	  stronger	  in	  belief-­‐based	  groups	  than	  in	  activity-­‐based	  groups:	  “Members	  of	  activity-­‐based	  groups	  share	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  an	  activity	  without	  necessarily	  being	  required	  to	  conform	  in	  other	  respects.	  By	  contrast,	  belief-­‐based	  groups	  generally	  exert	  a	  stronger	  pressure	  on	  members	  to	  conform	  to	  prescribed	  norms	  and	  values.	  In	  most	  cases,	  respect	  for	  individuality	  is	  greater	  in	  activity-­‐based	  groups”	  (Brint	  11).	  Even	  so,	  I	  would	  suggest	  along	  with	  Tocqueville,	  the	  pressure	  to	  conform	  exists	  even	  in	  activity-­‐based	  groups.	  	  As	  de	  Tocqueville	  explains:	  Whenever	  social	  conditions	  are	  equal,	  the	  opinion	  of	  all	  bears	  down	  with	  a	  great	  weight	  upon	  the	  mind	  of	  each	  individual,	  enfolding,	  controlling,	  and	  oppressing	  him.	  .	  .	  .	  As	  all	  men	  grow	  more	  alike,	  each	  individual	  feels	  increasingly	  weak	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  rest.	  Since	  he	  can	  find	  nothing	  to	  elevate	  himself	  above	  their	  level	  or	  to	  distinguish	  himself	  from	  them,	  he	  loses	  confidence	  in	  himself	  the	  moment	  they	  attack	  him;	  [in	  a	  democratic	  society]	  it	  will	  always,	  therefore,	  be	  very	  difficult	  for	  a	  man	  to	  believe	  what	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  people	  reject	  or	  to	  profess	  what	  they	  condemn.	  (747-­‐48)	  	  For	  better	  or	  worse,	  conformity	  is	  a	  part	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  society.	  Merely	  allowing	  individual	  freedom	  and	  fostering	  equality	  does	  not	  weaken	  the	  power	  of	  social	  conformity.	  Indeed,	  freedom	  and	  equality	  impose	  their	  own	  certain	  flavor	  of	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conformity.	  The	  project	  facing	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  defend	  liberal	  democracy	  against	  the	  encroachment	  of	  expedient	  conformity	  does	  not	  involve	  merely	  ensuring	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  It	  also	  involves	  acknowledging	  democracy’s	  unique	  forms	  of	  conformity.	  And	  it	  also	  involves	  strategizing	  how	  such	  conformity	  may	  be	  harnessed	  to	  continue	  to	  foster	  and	  not	  harm	  the	  freedom	  and	  equality	  necessary	  to	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  But	  such	  efforts	  are	  hindered	  by	  the	  social	  pressures	  in	  a	  democracy	  that	  produce	  an	  alarming	  stasis	  of	  beliefs,	  so	  that	  truly	  original	  thought	  is	  next	  to	  non-­‐existent.	  Instead,	  in	  order	  to	  progress	  with	  what	  is	  already	  known	  and	  accepted,	  people	  in	  democratic	  conditions	  tend	  to	  refine	  the	  art	  of	  refining	  rather	  than	  creating	  new	  arts	  as	  de	  Tocqueville	  elucidates:	  Not	  that	  the	  human	  mind	  is	  idle	  [in	  democratic	  conditions],	  for	  it	  is	  constantly	  active;	  but	  it	  is	  much	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  infinite	  variations	  that	  flow	  from	  well-­‐known	  principles	  and	  in	  the	  discovery	  of	  new	  variations	  than	  in	  seeking	  new	  principles	  themselves.	  It	  shows	  great	  agility	  at	  turning	  on	  the	  spot,	  rather	  than	  plunging	  forward	  in	  any	  swift	  and	  direct	  movement;	  a	  gradual	  and	  sustained	  extension	  of	  its	  orbit	  of	  power	  is	  preferred	  to	  a	  sudden	  change	  of	  position.	  (744)	  	  This	  is	  true	  even	  of	  higher	  education.	  For	  example,	  this	  dissertation	  chapter	  (the	  one	  you’re	  reading	  right	  now)	  is	  a	  study	  of	  pulling	  together	  established	  and	  accepted	  ideas,	  playing	  them	  to	  a	  variant	  (but	  not	  revolutionary)	  tune,	  and	  drawing	  observations.	  I	  seek	  to	  expedite	  understanding	  of	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  by	  expediting	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  democratic	  conditions.	  Democracies	  are	  full	  of	  expediencies.	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The	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  also	  parallels	  a	  two-­‐fold	  difficulty	  of	  what	  Kenneth	  Burke	  calls	  the	  “cult	  of	  empire”	  (Grammar	  317).	  In	  its	  ugliest	  extremes,	  the	  cult	  of	  empire	  manifests	  in	  what	  Burke	  calls	  “fanaticism”	  and	  “dissipation”.	  These	  perspectives	  are	  anti-­‐critical	  in	  that	  they	  reduce	  pluralities	  of	  perspectives	  to	  singular	  perspectives.	  	  “By	  fanaticism,”	  Burke	  means,	  “the	  effort	  to	  impose	  one	  doctrine	  of	  motives	  abruptly	  upon	  a	  world	  composed	  of	  many	  different	  motivational	  situations”	  (Grammar	  318).	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  happens	  with	  democratic	  conformity	  that	  de	  Tocqueville	  observes	  above.	  In	  another	  essay,	  Burke	  recognizes	  that	  such	  fanaticism	  frequently	  manifests	  in	  unsophisticated	  teaching	  methods.	  Some	  teaching	  methods	  seek	  to	  indoctrinate	  students	  with	  “a	  narrowly	  partisan	  point	  of	  view	  in	  [controversial]	  subjects”	  (“Linguistic”	  283).	  A	  slightly	  less	  unsophisticated	  method	  of	  education	  seeks	  out	  other	  perspectives	  for	  students	  to	  learn	  but	  only	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  strengthening	  students’	  originally-­‐held	  perspectives.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  expediency	  is	  again	  used	  in	  its	  situational	  sense.	  	  The	  other	  difficult	  extreme	  in	  the	  cult	  of	  empire	  is	  dissipation,	  which	  often	  manifests	  as	  competition.	  By	  dissipation	  Burke	  means,	  “the	  isolationist	  tendency	  to	  surrender,	  as	  one	  finds	  the	  issues	  of	  world	  adjustment	  so	  complex	  that	  he	  merely	  turns	  to	  the	  satisfactions	  nearest	  at	  hand,	  .	  .	  .	  in	  general	  taking	  whatever	  opportunities	  of	  gratification	  or	  advancement	  happen	  to	  present	  themselves	  and	  letting	  all	  else	  take	  care	  of	  itself”	  (Grammar	  318).	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  Burke	  refers	  to	  merchants	  who	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often	  place	  themselves	  “wholly	  and	  trustingly	  in	  the	  market’s	  hands,	  as	  though	  its	  workings	  were	  a	  kind	  of	  automatic	  Providence”	  (318).	  Expediency	  in	  this	  sense	  takes	  on	  the	  added	  rhetoric	  of	  divine	  intervention	  (cf.	  Adam	  Smith’s	  invisible	  hand);	  deity	  is	  made	  subservient	  to	  expediency.	  	  In	  specific	  reference	  to	  dissipation,	  Burke	  explains	  that,	  “This	  temptation	  is	  always	  with	  us,	  partly	  because	  sound	  common	  sense	  admonishes	  that	  we	  should	  not	  burden	  ourselves	  with	  problems	  beyond	  our	  powers”	  (Grammar	  318).	  In	  this	  way,	  dissipation	  also	  parallels	  the	  democratic	  difficulties	  of	  individualism,	  which	  de	  Tocqueville	  observed.	  A	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  dissipation	  impulse	  emerges	  in	  the	  classrooms	  of	  a	  democracy.	  Burke	  explains	  how:	  Far	  too	  often,	  education	  is	  wholly	  under	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  promissory.	  The	  serious	  student	  enters	  school	  hoping	  to	  increase	  his	  powers,	  to	  equip	  himself	  in	  the	  competition	  for	  “success,”	  to	  make	  the	  “contacts”	  that	  get	  him	  a	  better-­‐paying	  job.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  “humanistic”	  aspect	  of	  the	  curriculum	  is	  usually	  approached	  in	  the	  same	  spirit,	  even	  by	  those	  who	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  opponents	  of	  the	  vocational	  emphasis.	  The	  courses	  are	  expected	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other	  to	  help	  students	  “get	  ahead”	  as	  individuals.	  (“Linguistic”	  271)	  	  Here	  we	  get	  a	  clear	  formulation	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  expediency.	  The	  temptation	  is	  to	  subvert	  education	  as	  a	  specifically	  human	  phenomenon	  (which	  helps	  humans	  progress	  in	  uniquely	  human	  ways)	  to	  education	  as	  a	  specifically	  economic	  phenomenon	  (which	  ultimately	  serves	  situational	  exigencies).	  And	  while	  humanistically	  leaning	  teachers	  may	  overcome	  or	  avoid	  this	  dissipative	  and	  competitive	  sort	  of	  temptation,	  many	  students	  enter	  and	  graduate	  through	  higher	  education	  still	  dealing	  with	  it	  (however	  consciously	  or	  ignorantly).	  This	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competition-­‐for-­‐self-­‐gratification-­‐sake	  impulse	  is	  a	  constant	  temptation	  in	  democracies	  for	  precisely	  the	  reasons	  outlined	  above	  and	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  	  But	  we	  can	  trace	  larger	  characteristics	  of	  democratic	  societies	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  Recall	  Steven	  Katz’s	  main	  societal	  critique	  of	  Nazi	  Germany.	  The	  main	  path	  of	  critique	  I’m	  following	  suggests	  that	  if	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  influenced	  insane	  and	  murderous	  Nazi	  policies,	  it	  did	  so	  by	  emerging	  from	  democratic	  social	  conditions.	  Nazi	  Germany,	  however,	  was	  a	  decidedly	  
undemocratic	  fascist	  state.	  However,	  no	  ethic	  has	  an	  a	  priori	  existence	  (as	  I	  take	  issue	  with	  Kant	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter);	  an	  ethic	  always	  depends	  on	  certain	  social	  conditions.	  Such	  conditions	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  environment	  from	  which	  Nazi	  Germany	  itself	  developed.	  	  The	  Prussian	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  later	  German	  Empire	  of	  the	  1800s	  were	  controlled	  by	  landed	  aristocracy.	  After	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  much	  of	  this	  control	  base	  shifted	  over	  into	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  in	  the	  1920s.	  Even	  with	  this	  aristocratic	  overtone,	  most	  of	  German	  history	  throughout	  the	  1800s	  and	  into	  the	  early	  1900s	  is	  a	  study	  in	  the	  social	  tensions	  generated	  by	  democracy	  and	  industry.	  Democratic	  social	  movements	  begun	  at	  around	  the	  same	  time	  as	  industrialization	  took	  hold	  in	  western	  German	  provinces	  in	  the	  early	  1800s	  (Dill	  89-­‐90).	  The	  tension	  between	  populist	  liberals	  and	  aristocratic	  conservatives	  continued	  to	  grow	  through	  the	  19th	  century.	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Throughout	  the	  1800s,	  such	  tension	  usually	  sided	  the	  populist	  liberals	  with	  industrial	  commerce	  on	  one	  side	  and	  aristocratic	  conservatives	  with	  agriculture	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  Prussian	  Kaisers	  during	  this	  time	  generally	  recognized	  that	  advances	  in	  industry	  held	  the	  key	  to	  future	  sustained	  power.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  King	  sometimes	  found	  himself	  siding	  against	  his	  own	  aristocratic	  political	  base.	  Bismark’s	  infamous	  Kulturkampf,	  for	  example,	  was	  ostensibly	  an	  anti-­‐Catholic	  program	  that	  targeted	  southern	  agrarian	  landowners.	  And	  while	  the	  drive	  for	  secularism	  was	  the	  most-­‐often	  cited	  rationale	  for	  this	  discrimination,	  the	  fact	  that	  southern	  agrarian	  aristocrats	  threatened	  the	  progress	  of	  northern	  industrialists	  certainly	  played	  an	  exigent	  role	  (Dill	  146-­‐47).	  Further,	  the	  German	  Empire	  itself	  was	  a	  constitutional	  monarchy	  even	  though	  the	  Kaiser	  frequently	  overrode	  the	  government’s	  democratic	  elements.	  So	  while	  democratic	  social	  conditions	  did	  not	  hold	  full	  sway	  over	  the	  German	  Empire,	  some	  form	  of	  democracy	  has	  been	  part	  of	  the	  German	  political	  scene	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1800s	  through	  present	  day,	  including	  the	  Nazi	  era.	  And	  certainly,	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  Nazi	  era,	  the	  most	  prominently	  democratic	  era	  of	  German	  politics	  was	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  (cf.	  Section	  109	  of	  The	  Constitution	  
of	  the	  German	  Republic	  which	  granted	  gender	  equality,	  totally	  vitiated	  titles	  of	  nobility,	  and	  granted	  legal	  equality	  to	  all	  Germans	  with	  no	  mention	  of	  race,	  religion,	  or	  creed;	  see	  also	  Peukert	  21-­‐51).	  And	  it	  was	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  that	  democratically	  voted	  Hitler	  and	  his	  National	  Socialists	  into	  power	  in	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  democratic	  votes	  of	  the	  modern	  age.	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The	  point	  of	  this	  (all	  too	  reductive)	  summary	  of	  German	  political	  history	  is	  this:	  democratic	  conditions	  permeated	  the	  social	  landscape	  of	  pre-­‐Nazi	  Germany.	  Leading	  up	  to	  the	  Nazi	  rise	  to	  power,	  German	  citizens	  faced	  many	  of	  the	  conditions	  which	  de	  Tocqueville	  observed	  in	  1830s	  America.	  While	  I	  do	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  political	  conditions	  were	  exactly	  similar	  in	  America	  and	  Germany	  through	  the	  1800s,	  I	  do	  suggest	  that	  both	  places	  experienced	  enough	  in	  common	  to	  serve	  as	  instructive	  analogues	  to	  each	  other.	  It’s	  at	  least	  conceivable	  how	  impulses	  of	  individualism	  and	  dissipation	  kept	  German	  citizens	  focused	  enough	  on	  their	  own	  concerns	  to	  look	  away	  from	  what	  was	  happening	  to	  their	  Jewish	  neighbors;	  how	  impulses	  of	  conformity	  and	  fanaticism	  imposed	  such	  heavy	  cultural	  pressure	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  Nazi	  ideology	  and	  Hitler’s	  election	  (probably	  the	  most	  popularly-­‐elected	  official	  in	  German	  history);	  how	  industrial	  pressures	  of	  both	  laborers	  and	  managers	  produced	  horrific	  technical	  documents	  (cf.	  the	  memo	  Katz	  references	  written	  by	  a	  Nazi	  bureaucrat	  who	  argued	  for	  more	  efficient	  parameters	  for	  gassing	  Jews,	  see	  Katz,	  “Ethic”,	  255-­‐56).	  The	  Nazi	  dilemma	  of	  expediency	  is	  not	  far	  removed	  from	  other	  democratic	  societies.	  	  Claiming	  that	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  are	  not	  much	  different	  from	  the	  residents	  of	  democracies	  is	  not	  new.	  Hannah	  Arendt	  famously	  asserted	  a	  similar	  view	  when	  she	  described	  Adolf	  Eichmann’s	  role	  in	  the	  Holocaust	  bureaucracy	  as	  being	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  “banality	  of	  evil.”	  Arendt	  observed	  Eichmann’s	  trial	  in	  Jerusalem	  and	  collected	  her	  observations	  in	  a	  book-­‐length	  study.	  In	  the	  book’s	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epilogue,	  Arendt	  explains	  why	  she	  focuses	  on	  Eichmann’s	  bureaucratic	  banality	  as	  core	  to	  the	  machinations	  of	  the	  Holocaust.	  Her	  explanation	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  negative	  democratic	  qualities	  of	  individualism,	  egoism,	  fanaticism,	  and	  dissipation	  as	  explored	  by	  de	  Tocqueville	  and	  Burke:	  when	  I	  speak	  of	  the	  banality	  of	  evil,	  I	  do	  so	  only	  on	  the	  strictly	  factual	  level,	  pointing	  to	  a	  phenomenon	  which	  stared	  one	  in	  the	  face	  at	  the	  trial.	  Eichmann	  was	  not	  .	  .	  .	  “a	  villain.”	  Except	  for	  an	  extraordinary	  diligence	  in	  looking	  out	  for	  his	  personal	  advancement,	  he	  had	  no	  motives	  at	  all.	  And	  this	  diligence	  in	  itself	  was	  in	  no	  way	  criminal	  .	  .	  .	  .	  He	  merely,	  to	  put	  the	  matter	  colloquially,	  never	  realized	  what	  he	  was	  doing.	  It	  was	  precisely	  this	  lack	  of	  imagination	  which	  enabled	  him	  to	  sit	  for	  months	  on	  end	  facing	  a	  German	  Jew	  who	  was	  conducting	  the	  police	  interrogation,	  pouring	  out	  his	  heart	  to	  the	  man	  and	  explaining	  again	  and	  again	  how	  it	  was	  that	  he	  reached	  only	  the	  rank	  of	  lieutenant	  colonel	  in	  the	  S.S.	  and	  that	  it	  had	  not	  been	  his	  fault	  that	  he	  was	  not	  promoted.	  .	  .	  .	  He	  was	  not	  stupid.	  It	  was	  sheer	  thoughtlessness—something	  by	  no	  means	  identical	  with	  stupidity—that	  predisposed	  him	  to	  become	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  criminals	  of	  that	  period.	  .	  .	  .	  That	  such	  remoteness	  from	  reality	  and	  such	  thoughtlessness	  can	  wreak	  more	  havoc	  than	  all	  the	  evil	  instincts	  taken	  together	  which,	  perhaps,	  are	  inherent	  in	  man—that	  was,	  in	  fact,	  the	  lesson	  one	  could	  learn	  in	  Jerusalem.	  But	  it	  was	  a	  lesson,	  neither	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  nor	  a	  theory	  about	  it.	  (287-­‐88)	  	  Similar	  to	  Arendt’s	  views	  are	  those	  of	  Holocaust	  historian	  Christopher	  Browning,	  whose	  historical	  study	  of	  the	  Polish	  Reserve	  Police	  Battalion	  101	  suggests	  that	  the	  everyman	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  were	  largely	  influenced	  by	  the	  pressing	  social	  conformity	  they	  faced:	  Everywhere	  society	  conditions	  people	  to	  respect	  and	  defer	  to	  authority,	  and	  indeed	  could	  scarcely	  function	  otherwise.	  Everywhere	  people	  seek	  career	  advancement.	  In	  every	  modern	  society,	  the	  complexity	  of	  life	  and	  the	  resulting	  bureaucratization	  and	  specialization	  attenuate	  the	  sense	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  of	  those	  implementing	  official	  policy.	  Within	  virtually	  every	  social	  collective,	  the	  peer	  group	  exerts	  tremendous	  pressures	  on	  behavior	  and	  sets	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moral	  norms.	  If	  the	  men	  of	  Reserve	  Police	  Battalion	  101	  could	  become	  killers	  under	  such	  circumstances,	  what	  group	  of	  men	  cannot?	  (189)	  	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  more	  that	  unites	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  with	  most	  of	  the	  peoples	  they	  fought	  than	  there	  is	  that	  separates	  them.	  And	  the	  great	  unifier	  tends	  to	  be	  the	  conformity	  and	  bureaucratization	  attendant	  to	  the	  equality	  of	  social	  conditions.	  	  Having	  painted	  such	  a	  dire	  picture	  of	  the	  problems	  facing	  democratic	  institutions,	  I	  hasten	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  solutions	  to	  these	  problems	  are	  available	  through	  the	  very	  conditions	  unique	  to	  democracy.	  Democracy	  provides	  the	  materials	  for	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  just	  as	  it	  provides	  the	  materials	  for	  an	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  	  Consider	  John	  Dewey’s	  famous	  assertion	  that	  “the	  cure	  for	  the	  ailments	  of	  democracy	  is	  more	  democracy”	  (146).	  Of	  course	  Dewey	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  merely	  multiplying	  the	  democratic	  conditions	  in	  which	  people	  may	  encounter	  the	  difficulties	  of	  democracy	  is	  itself	  the	  answer	  to	  democracy’s	  ailments.	  Rather,	  people	  who	  enjoy	  democratic	  social	  conditions	  need	  to	  be	  conscientiously	  democratic;	  by	  which	  Dewey	  means,	  diverse	  individuals	  need	  to	  participate	  in	  democracy	  as	  equals	  (even	  if	  not	  fully	  equally).	  Dewey	  observes	  that	  de	  Tocqueville	  “pointed	  out	  in	  effect	  that	  popular	  government	  is	  educative.	  .	  .	  .	  It	  forces	  a	  recognition	  that	  there	  are	  common	  interests,	  even	  though	  the	  recognition	  of	  what	  they	  are	  is	  confused;	  and	  the	  need	  it	  enforces	  of	  discussion	  and	  publicity	  brings	  about	  some	  clarification	  of	  what	  they	  are”	  (207,	  italics	  in	  original).	  Dewey	  expands	  on	  this	  by	  suggesting,	  “The	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essential	  need,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  methods	  and	  conditions	  of	  debate,	  discussion	  and	  persuasion.	  That	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  public.	  .	  .	  .	  this	  improvement	  depends	  essentially	  upon	  freeing	  and	  perfecting	  the	  processes	  of	  inquiry”	  (208).	  In	  other	  words,	  democratic	  conditions	  obligate	  those	  who	  live	  democratically	  to	  acknowledge,	  engage,	  and	  adapt	  to	  differing	  perspectives.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  social	  soup	  that	  sympheron	  emerges,	  for	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  stems	  from	  this	  basic	  democratic	  obligation.	  (For	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  use	  the	  phrase	  “ethic	  of	  bearing	  together”	  in	  place	  of	  sympheron	  as	  a	  useful	  synonym	  for	  
sympheron	  and	  a	  clear	  juxtaposition	  to	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  as	  Katz	  saw	  it.)	  	  Kenneth	  Burke	  picks	  up	  a	  similar	  vein	  of	  thinking;	  his	  admonitory	  stance	  toward	  democracy	  gives	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  a	  distinctly	  dialectic	  quality.	  In	  1941	  (and	  consistently	  thereafter),	  Burke	  argued	  that	  dialectic	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  rhetorical	  strategy	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  acknowledge,	  engage,	  and	  adapt	  to	  differing	  ethical	  perspectives.	  As	  such,	  dialectic	  and	  democratic	  social	  conditions	  flourish	  in	  tandem	  with	  each	  other.	  Burke’s	  formulation	  of	  dialectic	  extends	  from	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  tropological	  nature	  of	  language.	  In	  this	  way	  of	  understanding	  language,	  metaphor,	  metonymy,	  synecdoche,	  and	  irony	  represent	  different	  ways	  of	  perceiving	  the	  world.	  Burke	  interchanges	  “realistic”	  applications	  with	  each	  of	  these	  tropes	  in	  the	  respective	  forms	  of	  perspective	  (for	  metaphor),	  reduction	  (for	  metonymy),	  representation	  (for	  synecdoche),	  and	  dialectic	  (for	  irony).	  The	  most	  inclusive	  trope	  pair	  is	  irony/dialectic.	  Irony	  and	  dialectic	  arise,	  Burke	  suggests,	  “when	  one	  tries,	  by	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interaction	  of	  terms	  upon	  one	  another,	  to	  produce	  a	  development	  which	  uses	  all	  the	  terms”	  (Grammar	  512).	  Burke	  describes	  the	  unique	  genius	  of	  dialectic	  as	  occurring	  when	  an	  observer	  “considers	  the	  whole	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  participation	  of	  all	  the	  terms	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  any	  one	  participant”	  (Grammar	  513).	  Further,	  as	  perspectives	  “are	  thus	  encouraged	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  orderly	  parliamentary	  development,	  the	  dialectic	  of	  this	  participation	  produces	  .	  .	  .	  a	  ‘resultant	  certainty’	  [which]	  requires	  that	  all	  the	  sub-­‐certainties	  be	  considered	  as	  neither	  true	  nor	  false,	  but	  contributory.	  (Grammar	  513,	  italics	  in	  original).	  Burke’s	  use	  of	  “parliamentary”	  here	  is	  not	  happenstance.	  Dialectic/Irony	  is	  the	  most	  democratic	  of	  the	  master	  tropes	  because	  it	  is	  not	  just	  a	  perspective;	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  “perspective	  of	  perspectives”	  (Grammar	  512).	  It	  is	  a	  dialectical	  perspective	  which	  makes	  possible	  the	  perceiving	  and	  appreciating	  of	  divergent	  perspectives	  at	  the	  
same	  time.	  	  Burke	  went	  so	  far	  as	  describing	  democracy	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  dialectic.	  In	  his	  
Philosophy	  of	  Literary	  Form,	  Burke	  asserts	  that	  democracy	  is	  “a	  device	  for	  institutionalizing	  the	  dialectical	  process,	  by	  setting	  up	  a	  political	  structure	  that	  gives	  full	  opportunity	  for	  the	  use	  of	  competition	  to	  a	  cooperative	  end.	  “Allow	  full	  scope	  of	  the	  dialectical	  process,	  and	  .	  .	  .	  the	  protagonist	  of	  a	  thesis	  has	  maximum	  opportunity	  to	  modify	  his	  thesis	  .	  .	  .	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  antagonist’s	  rejoinders.”	  (Philosophy	  444).	  But	  Burke	  argues	  that	  such	  competitive	  cooperation	  should	  not	  necessarily	  be	  voluntary	  but	  mandatory:	  “The	  dialectical	  process	  absolutely	  must	  be	  unimpeded,	  if	  
	  	  
154	  
society	  is	  to	  perfect	  its	  understanding	  of	  reality	  by	  the	  necessary	  method	  of	  give-­‐and-­‐take	  (yield-­‐and-­‐advance)”	  (Philosophy	  444,	  italics	  in	  original).	  We	  must	  give	  up	  the	  freedom	  to	  not	  participate	  in	  a	  democracy	  if	  we	  want	  to	  enjoy	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  freedoms	  democratic	  conditions	  provide.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  democratic	  principles	  ought	  to	  be	  accepted	  unchallenged.	  Indeed,	  forcing	  individuals	  to	  accept	  democratic	  principles	  is	  itself	  not	  very	  democratic	  (much	  akin	  to	  bringing	  democratic	  government	  to	  a	  different	  country	  at	  gunpoint).	  Democracy	  ceases	  to	  be	  democratic	  when	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  salvation.	  This	  is	  because	  democracy-­‐as-­‐salvation	  accepts	  as	  inviolate	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  savior-­‐saved.	  But	  democracy	  is	  non-­‐hierarchical	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  egalitarian	  principles.	  There’s	  a	  strategic	  difference	  here	  between	  democratic	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  democracy.	  The	  salvation/hierarchical	  flavor	  of	  democracy	  would	  lean	  towards	  rhetoric	  of	  democracy	  –	  or	  rhetoric	  that	  supports	  democratic	  aims	  and	  ideals.	  Democratic	  rhetoric	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  harnesses	  dialectic	  to	  implement	  democracy	  
as	  a	  rhetorical	  strategy	  itself.	  Because	  of	  this,	  anyone	  who	  uses	  democratic	  rhetoric	  is	  dialectically	  obligated	  to	  acknowledge	  their	  own	  rhetorical	  strategies	  (i.e.	  dialecticism	  and	  democracy),	  which	  encourages	  audiences	  to	  engage	  dialectically	  with	  the	  very	  ideas	  of	  dialecticism	  and	  democracy.	  	  The	  relationship	  among	  dialectic,	  democracy,	  and	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  should	  be	  plain	  at	  this	  point.	  But,	  of	  course,	  whenever	  democracy	  is	  practiced	  in	  any	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form,	  the	  democratic	  populace	  is	  often	  beset	  with	  rhetorical	  trappings	  (whether	  in	  political,	  commercial,	  or	  religious	  forms).	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  dialectic	  participation	  serves	  (in	  Burke’s	  words)	  to	  teach	  such	  a	  populace	  how	  to,	  “discount	  such	  devices;	  and	  nothing	  less	  than	  a	  very	  thorough	  training	  in	  the	  discounting	  of	  rhetorical	  persuasiveness	  can	  make	  a	  citizenry	  truly	  free.	  .	  .	  .	  But	  we	  can	  say	  that	  
ideal	  democracy	  does	  allow	  all	  voices	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  dialogue	  of	  the	  state”	  (“Linguistic”	  285).	  Burke’s	  democratic	  arguments	  for	  dialectic	  (and	  dialectic	  arguments	  for	  democracy)	  specifically	  show	  that	  the	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  is	  overtly	  rhetorical	  in	  nature.	  	  If	  all	  this	  participation	  is	  making	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  sound	  inefficient,	  that	  is	  precisely	  the	  idea.	  In	  Counter-­‐Statement,	  Burke	  defines	  democracy	  alternately	  as	  a	  “system	  of	  checks	  and	  counter-­‐checks”	  or	  “a	  system	  of	  government	  based	  on	  the	  fear	  that	  central	  authority	  becomes	  bad	  authority”	  (Counter	  114).	  As	  such,	  democracy	  is	  “organized	  distrust,	  ‘protest	  made	  easy’,	  a	  babble	  of	  discordant	  voices,	  a	  colossal	  getting	  in	  one’s	  own	  way—democracy,	  now	  endangered	  by	  the	  apostles	  of	  hope	  [i.e.	  fascists]	  who	  would	  attack	  it	  for	  its	  ‘inefficiency’,	  whereas	  inefficiency	  is	  the	  one	  thing	  it	  has	  it	  is	  favor”	  (Counter	  114).	  Burke	  touts	  inefficiency	  as	  a	  virtue	  of	  democracy	  because	  democracy’s	  sluggishness	  both	  results	  from	  and	  fosters	  the	  very	  discordant	  discussion	  that	  tends	  to	  keep	  government	  from	  going	  bad.	  Accordingly,	  the	  ideal	  democrat	  as	  Burke	  conceives	  it	  is	  “the	  man	  who	  thinks	  of	  powers	  as	  something	  to	  be	  ‘fought,’	  has	  no	  hope	  in	  perfection—as	  the	  ‘opposition’,	  his	  nearest	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approach	  to	  a	  doctrine	  is	  the	  doctrine	  of	  interference.	  There	  is	  no	  absolute	  truth,	  he	  says,	  but	  there	  is	  the	  cancellation	  of	  errors”	  (Counter	  115).	  	  Thus,	  political	  difficulties	  are	  actually	  linguistic	  and	  rhetorical.	  Cries	  for	  more	  efficient	  government	  lead	  to	  silencing	  opposing	  views	  (if	  only	  because	  efficiency	  is	  by	  definition	  the	  successful	  pursuit	  of	  one	  course	  of	  action	  at	  the	  exclusion	  of	  others).	  This	  was	  the	  main	  initial	  triumph	  of	  the	  Nazi	  rise	  to	  power	  in	  1933.	  Hitler	  provided	  one	  voice	  for	  the	  previously	  discordant	  babble	  of	  the	  multi-­‐party	  Weimar	  Republic.	  But	  this,	  of	  course,	  meant	  that	  all	  other	  voices	  were	  silenced.	  The	  more	  voices	  (both	  in	  number	  and	  diversity)	  that	  participate	  in	  a	  particular	  government,	  the	  less	  efficient	  that	  particular	  government	  is.	  However,	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  carries	  with	  it	  this	  unforgettable	  benefit:	  the	  less	  efficient	  government	  is,	  the	  less	  likely	  that	  such	  government	  will	  pursue	  (however	  efficiently)	  disastrous	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  Burke’s	  additional	  thoughts	  on	  dialectic	  and	  democracy	  provide	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  divisions	  and	  connections	  between	  an	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  and	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together.	  In	  his	  essay,	  “The	  Rhetorical	  Situation,”	  Burke	  builds	  on	  his	  work	  in	  Rhetoric	  of	  Motives	  in	  which	  he	  situates	  rhetoric	  as	  identification.	  In	  “The	  Rhetorical	  Situation”,	  Burke	  considers	  identification	  under	  “three	  main	  heads”:	  identification	  by	  sympathy	  (what	  you’re	  for),	  identification	  by	  antithesis	  (what	  you’re	  against),	  and	  lastly,	  identification	  by	  inaccuracy	  (or	  alternately	  by	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unawareness	  or	  by	  false	  assumption).	  Burke	  suggests	  this	  last	  mode	  of	  identification	  gets	  “to	  the	  very	  roots	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  situation”	  (“Rhetorical”	  269).	  This	  is	  because	  identification	  by	  inaccuracy	  jumbles	  the	  dialectical	  process.	  When	  individuals	  identify	  with	  a	  specific	  person	  or	  program	  under	  false	  assumptions,	  what	  are	  actually	  divergent	  voices	  become	  one	  voice	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  subsumed	  voices	  (similar	  to	  what	  happened	  in	  Nazi	  Germany).	  As	  Burke	  explains,	  “The	  poignancy	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  situation	  attains	  its	  fullness	  in	  spontaneously	  arising	  identifications	  whereby,	  even	  without	  deliberate	  intent	  upon	  the	  part	  of	  anyone,	  we	  fail	  to	  draw	  the	  lines	  at	  the	  right	  places”	  (“Rhetorical”	  271).	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  sort	  of	  difficulty	  that	  arises	  from	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  	  A	  further	  moral	  quandary	  in	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  lies	  in	  the	  disjunction	  between	  subjective	  identity	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  sociopolitical	  movements.	  Burke	  locates	  the	  root	  of	  such	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  word	  “we”	  –	  e.g.	  “we”	  invaded	  Iraq,	  or	  “we”	  dropped	  the	  Bomb	  on	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki,	  or	  “Yes,	  ‘we’	  can!	  Yes,	  ‘we’	  can!	  Yes,	  ‘we’	  can!”	  This	  kind	  of	  identification	  becomes	  especially	  dangerous	  when	  individuals	  in	  a	  populace	  accept	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  government	  (however	  abusive	  or	  beneficial)	  merely	  
because	  they	  self-­‐identify	  with	  the	  government	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  government	  attitudes	  accord	  with	  their	  own.	  Think	  of	  the	  way	  that	  “patriot”	  has	  shifted	  in	  some	  American	  vernaculars	  away	  from	  one	  who	  seeks	  to	  overthrow	  the	  established	  government	  (ala	  Samuel	  Adams	  and	  the	  original	  Tea	  Party)	  to	  one	  who	  holds	  as	  inviolate	  the	  constitutional	  documents	  on	  which	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  current	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government	  reside	  (ala	  the	  current	  Tea	  Party	  movement).	  In	  this	  way,	  democratically	  united	  people	  (“we”)	  sometimes	  adamantly	  and	  ignorantly	  affirm	  an	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  very	  democracy	  that	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  destroys.	  	  Of	  course,	  identifying	  with	  sociopolitical	  movements	  may	  be	  beneficial	  if	  the	  citizens	  in	  a	  democratic	  society	  seek	  to	  alter	  the	  course	  of	  destructive	  governmental	  behavior	  through	  some	  sense	  of	  genuine	  collective	  guilt	  or	  responsibility.	  However,	  first	  among	  the	  considerations	  Burke	  stresses	  in	  dialectical	  inquiry	  is	  this:	  a	  “concern	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘identification’	  that	  prevails	  […]	  when	  ruler	  and	  subjects,	  however	  disparate	  their	  ways	  of	  living,	  feel	  themselves	  united	  in	  some	  common	  cause”	  (“Linguistic”	  269).	  The	  constant	  cautionary	  quality	  of	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together,	  then,	  is	  a	  vigilant	  suspicion	  of	  sociopolitical	  movements	  as	  such.	  	  Gerard	  Hauser	  makes	  a	  compellingly	  similar	  argument	  for	  the	  public	  space	  in	  which	  people	  and	  factions	  may	  voice	  disagreements:	  Conflict	  confronts	  us	  with	  the	  paradox	  of	  inventing	  a	  public	  space	  in	  which	  to	  disagree.	  Antagonists	  must	  cooperate	  in	  order	  to	  air	  their	  disagreements.	  .	  .	  .	  Without	  a	  space	  for	  disagreement,	  the	  we	  that	  is	  the	  discursively	  created	  basis	  of	  social	  and	  political	  relationship	  could	  not	  emerge.	  .	  .	  .	  These	  disagreements	  arise	  and	  lend	  themselves	  to	  rhetorical	  development	  only	  because	  there	  is	  a	  shared	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  significant	  even	  though	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  is	  framed	  and	  its	  implications	  are	  projected	  may	  be	  hotly	  contested.	  (152)	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I	  would	  go	  a	  step	  further	  than	  Hauser	  and	  suggest	  that	  the	  resulting	  “rhetorical	  development”	  of	  such	  cooperating	  disagreements	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  any	  kind	  of	  direct	  solution	  to	  any	  participant’s	  complaints.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  we	  see	  a	  perspective	  of	  Aristotle’s	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  that	  runs	  expressly	  counter	  to	  any	  ethic	  of	  expediency:	  whenever	  people	  are	  actively	  engaged	  in	  deliberating	  about	  getting	  something	  else	  done,	  they	  are	  not	  actually	  getting	  that	  thing	  done.	  Or	  rather,	  what	  gets	  done	  through	  the	  act	  of	  deliberation	  is	  the	  slowing	  down	  of	  getting	  other	  things	  done.	  This	  is	  the	  general	  benefit	  of	  Aristotle’s	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  specific	  genius	  of	  an	  ethic	  of	  bearing	  together	  (sympheron):	  people	  participating	  in	  social	  structures	  that	  encourage	  them	  to	  perpetually	  engage	  the	  divergent	  perspectives	  of	  others.	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  CHAPTER	  5:	  THE	  END	  OF	  INSTRUCTION:	  TELOS/SYMPHERON	  IN	  TECHNICAL	  WRITING	  AND	  VISUAL	  RHETORIC	  	  “[People]	  who	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  accomplishing	  something	  by	  speaking	  speak	  in	  a	  different	  way	  from	  [people]	  who	  believe	  that	  speaking	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  time.	  [Those]	  who	  use	  speech	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  their	  work,	  who	  are	  confident	  and	  fluent—aren’t	  necessarily	  more	  intelligent,	  or	  even	  more	  educated.”	  —Neal	  Stephenson,	  Cryptonomicom	  	  
	  
Introduction	  Up	  to	  this	  point	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  have	  briefly	  explored	  some	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  reappropriated	  notions	  of	  telos,	  symbouleutikon,	  and	  sympheron.	  This	  chapter	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  put	  some	  of	  these	  reappropriated	  theories	  into	  practice.	  The	  theoretical	  project	  underpinning	  this	  dissertation	  began	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Stephen	  Katz’s	  arguments	  about	  the	  ethic	  of	  expediency	  as	  it	  related	  to	  technical	  communication	  and	  composition.	  This	  chapter	  re-­‐approaches	  specific	  topics	  in	  technical	  communication	  and	  composition	  to	  see	  how	  these	  practices	  might	  fare	  with	  reappropriated	  notions	  of	  telos	  in	  place	  of	  purpose	  and	  sympheron	  in	  place	  of	  
expediency.	  Specifically,	  I	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  specific	  topics	  in	  technical	  communication	  and	  visual	  rhetoric	  and	  see	  what	  might	  develop	  in	  light	  of	  reappropriated	  notions	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron;	  since,	  those	  two	  terms	  respectively	  translated	  as	  end	  and	  expediency	  were	  particularly	  key	  to	  Stephen	  Katz’s	  arguments	  in	  “Ethic	  of	  Expediency.”	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In	  his	  essay	  “Ethic	  of	  Expediency,”	  Katz	  argues	  that,	  In	  the	  gruesome	  light	  of	  the	  holocaust,	  then,	  we	  should	  question	  whether	  expediency	  should	  be	  the	  primary	  ethical	  standard	  in	  deliberative	  discourse,	  including	  scientific	  and	  technical	  communication,	  and	  whether,	  based	  on	  Cicero’s	  advocacy	  of	  a	  rhetoric	  grounded	  in	  a	  knowledge	  of	  everything	  and	  Quintilian’s	  definition	  of	  the	  orator	  as	  “a	  good	  ‘man’	  skilled	  in	  speaking,”	  we	  can	  and	  should	  teach	  the	  panoply	  of	  ethics	  in	  deliberative	  discourse	  in	  our	  rhetoric	  and	  writing	  courses.	  (272)	  	  In	  other	  words,	  since	  expediency	  has	  been	  rhetorically	  used	  to	  justify	  horrific	  bureaucratic	  practices,	  should	  we	  not	  teach	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  ethics	  and	  ethical	  theories	  when	  we	  teach	  technical	  writing?	  Though	  many	  instructors	  of	  writing	  may	  morally	  sympathize	  with	  Katz’s	  suggestion,	  I	  have	  personally	  encountered	  significant	  institutional	  resistance	  to	  incorporating	  a	  robust	  curriculum	  of	  ethics	  in	  technical	  writing	  courses.	  	  When	  I	  first	  read	  Katz’s	  essay,	  I	  fielded	  Katz’s	  perspective	  to	  a	  colleague	  who,	  at	  the	  time,	  was	  involved	  in	  coordinating	  university-­‐level	  technical	  writing	  courses	  and	  instructors	  in	  a	  nationally	  recognized	  and	  respected	  university	  writing	  program.	  I	  fielded	  Katz’s	  perspective	  as	  a	  serious	  programmatic	  pedagogical	  suggestion	  that	  ethical	  theories—and	  not	  just	  situational	  ethical	  considerations—ought	  to	  be	  included	  in	  university	  level	  technical	  writing	  curriculum.	  I	  suggested	  that	  it	  might	  serve	  technical	  communicators	  well	  to	  know	  the	  differences	  in	  moral	  claims	  between,	  say,	  utilitarian	  claims	  and	  Kantian	  categorical	  imperatives.	  I	  reasoned	  that	  such	  knowledge	  might	  help	  technical	  communicators	  in	  adapting	  to	  differing	  ethical	  frameworks	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  if	  they	  could	  articulate	  differences	  in	  moral	  claims	  in	  general	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terms	  of	  principle	  as	  well	  as	  in	  practical	  terms	  of	  organizational	  needs	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  individual	  concerns	  (for	  an	  analogous	  argument	  see	  Hawthorne	  341-­‐56;	  Hawthorne	  argues	  that	  understanding	  abstract	  ethical	  theories	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  his	  technical	  writing	  students	  being	  able	  to	  formulate	  a	  practical	  code	  of	  ethics	  for	  their	  writing	  program).	  However,	  upon	  hearing	  this	  suggestion,	  my	  colleague	  immediately	  panned	  the	  idea	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  introducing	  ethical	  theories	  like	  that	  would	  be	  prohibitively	  complex	  in	  technical	  writing	  courses	  that	  were	  already	  strapped	  for	  time.	  Plus,	  this	  colleague	  pointed	  out,	  most	  technical	  writing	  students	  would	  resist	  learning	  abstract	  differences	  in	  ethical	  theories	  in	  a	  technical	  writing	  course,	  which	  should	  rightly	  focus	  on	  specifically	  technical	  writing	  issues.	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  this	  colleague	  is	  solidly	  opposed	  to	  ethics-­‐infused	  technical	  writing	  curricula	  in	  other	  senses,	  for	  I	  have	  not	  had	  another	  opportunity	  to	  discuss	  the	  matter	  further.	  	  But	  I	  found	  myself	  encountering	  a	  repeated	  similar	  concern	  when	  I	  was	  interviewing	  for	  tenure-­‐track	  positions	  at	  various	  universities.	  In	  interviews	  with	  hiring	  committees	  at	  three	  different	  universities	  with	  well-­‐developed	  writing	  studies	  programs,	  when	  the	  subject	  of	  my	  research	  in	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics	  came	  up,	  I	  was	  asked	  variations	  of	  this	  question:	  “How	  would	  you	  realistically	  incorporate	  the	  study	  of	  ethics	  throughout	  technical	  writing	  course	  work?”	  The	  first	  time	  I	  encountered	  the	  question,	  it	  honestly	  befuddled	  me	  for	  reasons	  I’ll	  cover	  below.	  Two	  of	  these	  three	  universities	  at	  which	  I	  encountered	  the	  question	  decided	  not	  to	  pursue	  my	  application	  precisely	  because	  my	  research	  and	  pedagogical	  agendas	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infused	  technical	  communication	  with	  the	  study	  of	  ethics.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  hiring	  committee	  chair,	  “your	  research	  agenda	  in	  ethics	  would	  be	  a	  tough	  sell	  to	  the	  Dean.”	  	  But	  why	  should	  this	  be	  so?	  As	  I	  related	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  flagship	  technical	  communication	  textbooks	  from	  Bedford	  St.	  Martins,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Pearson,	  and	  Wadsworth	  all	  contain	  fairly	  robust	  material	  on	  ethics	  in	  technical	  writing	  (See	  Bibliography	  for	  Anderson;	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan;	  Markel;	  and	  Tebaux	  and	  Dragga).	  In	  fact,	  the	  three	  textbooks	  by	  Anderson,	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan,	  and	  Markel	  specifically	  incorporate	  ethics	  as	  constant	  themes	  throughout	  each	  textbook.	  And	  Anderson’s	  and	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan’s	  books	  both	  refer	  to	  fairly	  complex	  ethical	  theories.	  For	  instance,	  in	  one	  section	  on	  ethics,	  Anderson	  refers	  to	  Kant	  and	  a	  reworked	  notion	  of	  universal	  law	  (141).	  And	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan	  directly	  references	  utilitarianism	  among	  other	  notable	  general	  theories	  of	  ethics	  (74).	  What	  is	  so	  odd,	  then,	  about	  a	  robust	  incorporation	  of	  ethics	  into	  technical	  writing	  instruction	  and	  practice?	  	  For	  one	  thing,	  I	  suspect	  it	  uncomfortably	  blurs	  institutional	  distinctions	  among	  disciplines	  (which	  is	  why	  my	  research	  agenda	  may	  be	  a	  “tough	  sell”	  for	  certain	  deans).	  And	  while	  interdisciplinary,	  multi-­‐disciplinary,	  and	  trans-­‐disciplinary	  initiatives	  are	  catching	  on	  in	  some	  universities,	  many	  other	  universities	  still	  lumber	  under	  the	  old	  disciplinary	  divisions	  along	  the	  hierarchical	  lines	  of	  schools,	  colleges,	  departments,	  and	  programs.	  Such	  a	  structure	  is	  simply	  easier	  to	  fund	  and	  manage.	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But	  I	  also	  suspect	  that	  the	  prospect	  of	  robustly	  incorporating	  ethics	  into	  a	  technical	  writing	  curriculum	  faces	  difficulty	  for	  another,	  more	  subtle,	  reason	  related	  to	  disciplinary	  distinction.	  The	  prospect	  of	  robustly	  integrating	  ethics	  in	  technical	  writing,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  significant	  body	  of	  literature	  supporting	  it,	  still	  faces	  difficulty	  because	  our	  writing	  institutions	  still	  tend	  to	  view	  such	  integration	  as	  a	  robust	  process	  instead	  of	  something	  that	  emerges	  naturally	  from	  rhetorical	  activity.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  a	  rephrasing	  of	  a	  problem	  I	  articulated	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  dissertation:	  traditionally,	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics	  are	  fundamentally	  distinct	  discursive	  projects	  and	  activities;	  thus	  those	  who	  are	  experts	  in	  one	  are	  slow	  to	  claim	  expertise	  in	  the	  other.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  incorporate	  ethics	  into	  technical	  writing	  already	  precludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  technical	  writers	  already	  engage	  in	  ethical	  practices	  by	  virtue	  of	  practicing	  technical	  writing.	  Yet,	  I	  argue,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  technical	  writers	  do	  even	  when	  they	  don’t	  realize	  it.	  So,	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  a	  number	  of	  actual	  examples	  of	  technical	  communication	  and	  visual	  rhetoric	  to	  guide	  my	  analysis	  of	  how	  a	  study	  of	  technical	  writing	  naturally	  leads	  to	  a	  study	  of	  ethics.	  	  In	  pursuing	  such	  a	  project,	  I	  should	  be	  clear	  about	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  and	  what	  is	  not.	  What	  is	  not	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  project	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  convince	  technical	  writers	  that	  they	  ought	  to	  behave	  in	  specifically	  ethical	  ways	  when	  faced	  with	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specific	  ethical	  dilemmas.	  Some	  of	  the	  textbooks	  I	  reference	  above	  already	  do	  this.	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan’s	  book	  is	  especially	  noteworthy	  in	  how	  it	  ends	  every	  chapter	  with	  different	  case	  studies	  involving	  different	  ethical	  dilemmas.	  	  What	  also	  is	  not	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  project	  is	  any	  sort	  of	  effort	  in	  extolling	  the	  virtues	  of	  a	  more	  complete	  training	  in	  ethical	  philosophies.	  It	  is	  an	  unavoidable	  institutional	  reality	  that	  we	  face	  that	  most	  teachers	  of	  writing	  simply	  do	  not	  encounter	  significant	  coursework	  in	  ethical	  philosophies	  as	  such	  when	  receiving	  their	  degrees.	  It	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation	  chapter	  to	  empirically	  analyze	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  various	  degree	  programs	  in	  terms	  of	  ethics	  instruction.	  At	  most,	  I	  can	  make	  what	  appears	  to	  me	  the	  commonsense	  argument	  that	  inasmuch	  as	  institutions	  of	  higher	  education	  have	  and	  value	  a	  general	  education	  program	  (first-­‐year	  writing,	  intro	  to	  history,	  college	  algebra,	  intro	  to	  chemistry,	  and	  so	  forth),	  those	  institutions	  could	  benefit	  from	  incorporating	  a	  general	  education	  ethics	  course.	  	  Finally,	  what	  is	  not	  at	  stake	  is	  any	  sort	  of	  dire	  observation	  about	  technical	  writing	  in	  the	  abstract.	  I	  covered	  enough	  dire	  implications	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  and	  I	  doubt	  I	  could	  get	  more	  dire	  or	  horrific	  than	  Stephen	  Katz’s	  analysis	  in	  “The	  Ethic	  of	  Expediency”	  of	  Nazi	  technical	  documents	  written	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  more	  gas	  chamber	  vans	  more	  efficient.	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However,	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  dissertation	  chapter	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  various	  technical	  writing	  and	  visual	  rhetoric	  practices	  lend	  themselves	  to	  ethical	  implications	  that	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  to	  the	  very	  modes	  of	  composition	  used.	  In	  each	  example	  below,	  I	  explore	  how	  attendant	  principles	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  specifically	  suggest	  already	  existent	  correctives	  to	  Katz’s	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  	  I	  begin	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  same	  Nazi	  memo	  written	  by	  Willy	  Just	  that	  Katz	  referenced	  in	  “The	  Ethic	  of	  Expediency.”	  In	  short,	  Just’s	  memo	  conveys	  very	  weak	  awareness	  and	  development	  of	  telos	  and	  symperhon.	  After	  Just’s	  memo,	  I	  will	  analyze	  three	  actual	  owner/instruction	  manuals	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  evident	  in	  each.	  Merely	  being	  conscious	  of	  principles	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  significantly	  changes	  the	  way	  that	  technical	  writers	  relate	  to	  their	  audiences	  as	  human	  beings	  in	  actual	  settings.	  This	  is	  a	  major	  step	  toward	  correcting	  the	  human-­‐ignoring	  aspects	  of	  Katz’	  ethic	  of	  expediency.	  Next,	  I	  will	  explore	  concerns	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  in	  some	  graphics	  analyses	  by	  statistician	  Edward	  Tufte	  that	  he	  published	  on	  his	  blog.	  Tufte	  is	  most	  interested	  in	  how	  statistics	  get	  visually	  displayed,	  so	  his	  examples	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  the	  more	  non-­‐visual	  technical	  writing	  examples	  and	  more	  expressly	  visual	  rhetoric	  examples	  used	  in	  technical	  writing.	  Finally,	  I’ll	  finish	  this	  chapter	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  telos	  and	  
sympheron	  elements	  in	  various	  graphics	  relating	  to	  issue	  of	  gun	  violence	  in	  America	  (these	  graphics	  were	  collected	  in	  the	  months	  after	  the	  Sandy	  Hook	  tragedy).	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Before	  proceeding,	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  review	  some	  principles	  of	  telos	  and	  
sympheron	  specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  awareness	  of	  each	  might	  apply	  to	  technical	  communication	  more	  generally.	  	  As	  I	  explored	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  telos	  is	  purpose-­‐completion,	  or	  those	  qualities	  of	  rhetorical	  situations	  that	  indicate	  how	  we	  know	  certain	  rhetorical	  situations	  have	  been	  completed	  and	  others	  have	  begun.	  In	  terms	  of	  technical	  writing,	  to	  identify	  qualities	  of	  telos	  is	  not	  just	  to	  ask,	  “Why	  am	  I	  writing	  this	  memo?”	  but	  to	  also	  ask,	  “What	  sort	  of	  rhetorical	  situation	  will	  be	  completed	  by	  the	  writing	  of	  this	  memo?”	  Telos	  in	  this	  sense	  has	  definite	  invention	  aspects.	  When	  a	  technical	  writer	  finds	  herself	  at	  loss	  with	  how	  to	  proceed	  with	  a	  white	  paper,	  she	  might	  consider	  her	  intended	  audience	  and	  ask,	  “What	  are	  we	  accomplishing	  here?”	  This	  basic	  element	  of	  telos	  is	  especially	  evident	  in	  deliberative	  symbouleutikon,	  for	  as	  Aristotle	  posits,	  deliberation	  is	  that	  mode	  of	  rhetoric	  that	  concerns	  itself	  with	  future	  action	  (see	  Kennedy	  48).	  	  A	  concern	  for	  imminent	  or	  future	  decisions	  is	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  technical	  communication.	  Richard	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan	  encourages	  technical	  writers	  to	  “look	  to	  the	  future”	  in	  the	  conclusions	  of	  memos	  (106),	  analytical	  reports	  (285),	  other	  technical	  reports	  (447),	  and	  in	  oral	  presentations	  (593).	  But	  merely	  looking	  to	  the	  future	  does	  not,	  in	  itself,	  demonstrate	  awareness	  of	  telos,	  for	  technical	  writers	  could	  very	  well	  look	  to	  the	  future	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  account	  for	  the	  fully	  causal	  nature	  of	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their	  writing	  (as	  when	  a	  white	  paper	  may	  look	  to	  the	  future	  in	  terms	  of	  sales	  but	  may	  ignore	  environmental	  impact).	  However,	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan’s	  general	  definition	  of	  technical	  communication	  captures	  the	  general	  telos	  of	  technical	  communication	  as	  “a	  process	  of	  managing	  technical	  information	  in	  ways	  that	  allow	  people	  to	  take	  action”	  (10).	  As	  a	  statement	  of	  principle,	  Johnson-­‐Sheehan’s	  definition	  includes	  in	  it	  an	  awareness	  that	  technical	  writing	  contributes	  causally	  to	  action-­‐taking	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  Being	  aware	  of	  and	  following	  all	  the	  available	  causal	  connections	  in	  such	  a	  relationship	  is	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  telos.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  being	  aware	  of	  telos	  invites	  technical	  writers	  to	  seriously	  consider	  the	  
future	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  influence	  on	  their	  writing—just	  as	  awareness	  of	  kairos	  invites	  writers	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  current	  rhetorical	  conditions.	  For	  instance,	  questions	  of	  
kairos	  might	  include	  the	  following:	  
• What is happening now that affects the appropriateness of how I phrase 
this memo? 
• What other elements in the current larger process of things affect what I 
include in this memo? 
• What other situational or contextual elements relate to the subject of this 
memo? 	  In	  other	  words,	  questions	  of	  kairos	  encourage	  writers	  to	  view	  their	  writing	  as	  part	  of	  the	  resulting	  conditions	  of	  broader	  rhetorical	  situations.	  By	  this	  I	  mean,	  to	  view	  writing	  in	  terms	  of	  kairos	  is	  to	  view	  it	  as	  an	  appropriate	  result	  of	  a	  larger	  situation.	  Viewing	  instances	  of	  writing	  in	  terms	  of	  current	  situation	  is	  very	  useful	  to	  writers,	  and	  we	  should	  continue	  to	  encourage	  writers	  to	  consider	  issues	  of	  kairos.	  In	  contrast,	  however,	  questions	  of	  telos	  might	  include	  the	  following:	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• What may happen as a result of this memo? (i.e. What happens after this 
leaves my influence?) 
• Inasmuch as this memo is part of a larger process, where and how will this 
process end? (i.e. How is this all going to end?) 
• What future implications might emerge if this memo becomes policy? (i.e. 
Where is this heading?) 	  In	  other	  words,	  questions	  of	  telos	  encourage	  writers	  to	  view	  their	  writing	  as	  part	  of	  the	  causal	  conditions	  of	  broader	  rhetorical	  situations.	  By	  this	  I	  mean,	  to	  view	  writing	  in	  terms	  of	  telos	  is	  to	  view	  it	  as	  a	  potential	  cause	  of	  future	  situations.	  I	  will	  explore	  more	  specific	  implications	  of	  telos	  in	  this	  sense	  in	  the	  examples	  below.	  	  Related	  to	  telos	  are	  similarly	  forward-­‐thinking	  concerns	  of	  sympheron.	  As	  I	  explored	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  sympheron	  is	  bearing-­‐together,	  or	  those	  qualities	  of	  rhetorical	  situations	  that	  serve	  to	  share	  rhetorical	  burdens	  among	  participants.	  Thus	  a	  question	  of	  sympheron	  might	  be	  something	  like,	  “In	  what	  ways	  are	  my	  objectives	  shared	  by	  other	  people	  involved?”	  In	  this	  sense,	  sympheron	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  Paul	  Anderson’s	  admonition	  that	  technical	  communicators	  must	  identify	  their	  stakeholders.	  “When	  you	  are	  defining	  your	  communication’s	  objectives,”	  Anderson	  asserts,	  you	  are	  (in	  part)	  identifying	  the	  people	  you	  will	  keep	  in	  mind	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  your	  writing	  effort.	  .	  .	  .	  [Y]ou	  begin	  by	  identifying	  your	  readers	  [and]	  you	  must	  also	  identify	  .	  .	  .	  the	  individuals	  who	  will	  gain	  or	  lose	  because	  of	  your	  message.	  Collectively,	  these	  people	  are	  called	  stakeholders	  because	  they	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  what	  you	  are	  writing.	  (90)	  	  Anderson	  goes	  on	  to	  use	  ethical	  arguments	  as	  to	  why	  technical	  communicators	  should	  consider	  all	  these	  stakeholders.	  But	  awareness	  of	  sympheron	  invites	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technical	  writers	  to	  think	  ahead	  rhetorically	  in	  terms	  of	  all	  those	  who	  will	  bear	  some	  burden	  related	  to	  their	  writing	  or	  to	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  their	  writing.	  As	  I	  will	  explore	  below,	  such	  rhetorical	  burdens	  range	  from	  barely	  consequential	  to	  quite	  sobering.	  	  
Telos/Sympheron	  and	  Just’s	  Memo	  In	  my	  first	  example,	  I	  look	  back	  at	  the	  Nazi	  memo	  central	  to	  Steven	  Katz’s	  observations	  in	  “The	  Ethic	  of	  Expediency.”	  The	  memo	  was	  written	  by	  a	  mid-­‐level	  Nazi	  bureaucrat	  named	  Willy	  Just	  who	  was	  “a	  dispatcher	  and	  welder	  for	  the	  SS	  motor	  pool”	  (Kalfus	  32).	  Katz	  got	  the	  partial	  text	  of	  Just’s	  memo	  from	  the	  published	  transcript	  of	  Shoah,	  a	  nine-­‐hour	  documentary	  about	  the	  Holocaust	  (Katz	  256).	  Just’s	  memo	  is	  also	  printed	  in	  the	  massive	  two-­‐volume	  collection	  Nazism:	  A	  History	  in	  
Documents	  and	  Eyewitness	  Accounts.	  The	  memo	  was	  originally	  written	  to	  Walter	  Rauff,	  who	  infamously	  “designed	  gas	  vans	  used	  to	  murder	  Jews	  and	  persons	  with	  disabilities”	  (“More”	  2).	  I	  include	  here	  just	  the	  text	  of	  the	  memo	  that	  Katz	  first	  encountered	  from	  the	  documentary	  (qtd.	  in	  Katz	  255-­‐56):	  Geheime	  Reichssache	  (Secret	  Reich	  Business)	  Berlin,	  June	  5,	  1942	  	  Changes	  for	  special	  vehicles	  now	  in	  service	  at	  Kulmhof	  (Chelmno)	  and	  for	  those	  now	  being	  built	  	   Since	  December	  1941,	  ninety-­‐seven	  thousand	  have	  been	  processed	  by	  the	  three	  vehicles	  in	  service,	  with	  no	  major	  incidents.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  observations	  made	  so	  far,	  however,	  the	  following	  technical	  changes	  are	  needed:	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First:	  The	  vans’	  normal	  load	  is	  usually	  nine	  per	  square	  yard.	  In	  Saurer	  vehicles,	  which	  are	  very	  spacious,	  maximum	  use	  of	  space	  is	  impossible,	  not	  because	  of	  any	  possible	  overload,	  but	  because	  loading	  to	  full	  capacity	  would	  affect	  the	  vehicle's	  stability.	  So	  reduction	  of	  the	  load	  space	  seems	  necessary.	  It	  must	  absolutely	  be	  reduced	  by	  a	  yard,	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  solve	  the	  problem,	  as	  hitherto,	  by	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  pieces	  loaded.	  Besides,	  this	  extends	  the	  operating	  time,	  as	  the	  empty	  void	  must	  also	  be	  filled	  with	  carbon	  monoxide.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  load	  space	  is	  reduced,	  and	  the	  vehicle	  is	  packed	  solid,	  the	  operating	  time	  can	  be	  considerably	  shortened.	  The	  manufacturers	  told	  us	  during	  a	  discussion	  that	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  van's	  rear	  would	  throw	  it	  badly	  off	  balance.	  The	  front	  axle,	  they	  claim,	  would	  be	  overloaded.	  In	  fact,	  the	  balance	  is	  automatically	  restored,	  because	  the	  merchandise	  aboard	  displays	  during	  the	  operation	  a	  natural	  tendency	  to	  rush	  to	  the	  rear	  doors,	  and	  is	  mainly	  found	  lying	  there	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  operation.	  So	  the	  front	  axle	  is	  not	  overloaded.	  	   Secondly:	  The	  lighting	  must	  be	  better	  protected	  than	  now.	  The	  lamps	  must	  be	  enclosed	  in	  a	  steel	  grid	  to	  prevent	  their	  being	  damaged.	  Lights	  could	  be	  eliminated,	  since	  they	  apparently	  are	  never	  used.	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  when	  the	  doors	  are	  shut,	  the	  load	  always	  presses	  hard	  against	  them	  as	  soon	  as	  darkness	  sets	  in.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  load	  naturally	  rushes	  toward	  the	  light	  when	  darkness	  sets	  in,	  which	  makes	  closing	  the	  doors	  difficult.	  Also,	  because	  of	  the	  alarming	  nature	  of	  darkness,	  screaming	  always	  occurs	  when	  the	  doors	  are	  closed.	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  useful	  to	  light	  the	  lamp	  before	  and	  during	  the	  first	  moments	  of	  the	  operation.	  	   Third:	  For	  easy	  cleaning	  of	  the	  vehicle,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  sealed	  drain	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  floor.	  The	  drainage	  hole's	  cover,	  eight	  to	  twelve	  inches	  in	  diameter,	  would	  be	  equipped	  with	  a	  slanting	  trap,	  so	  that	  fluid	  liquids	  can	  drain	  off	  during	  the	  operation.	  During	  cleaning,	  the	  drain	  can	  be	  used	  to	  evacuate	  large	  pieces	  of	  dirt.	  	   The	  aforementioned	  technical	  changes	  are	  to	  be	  made	  to	  vehicles	  in	  service	  only	  when	  they	  come	  in	  for	  repairs.	  As	  for	  the	  ten	  vehicles	  ordered	  from	  Saurer,	  they	  must	  be	  equipped	  with	  all	  innovations	  and	  changes	  shown	  by	  use	  and	  experience	  to	  be	  necessary.	  	   Submitted	  for	  decision	  to	  Gruppenleiter	  II	  D,	  SS-­‐Obersturmbannfuhrer	  Walter	  Rauff.	  Signed:	  Just	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In	  Katz’s	  treatment	  of	  this	  horrifying	  memo,	  he	  relates	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  mobile	  Saurer	  gas	  vans	  (which	  were	  precursors	  to	  the	  more	  permanent	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  gas	  chambers	  at	  death	  camps	  across	  the	  Third	  Reich)	  and	  gives	  a	  “brief	  rhetorical	  analysis	  of	  this	  memo	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  technical	  communication,	  argumentation,	  and	  style”	  (Katz	  256-­‐57).	  Katz	  gives	  a	  fairly	  boilerplate	  and	  almost	  completely	  accurate	  rhetorical	  analysis	  of	  the	  memo’s	  purpose	  statement,	  document	  design,	  technical	  accuracy,	  logical	  argument,	  and	  use	  of	  topoi	  such	  as	  cause/effect.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  dispute	  Katz’s	  first	  claim	  about	  the	  rhetorical	  nature	  of	  Just’s	  memo	  when	  he	  says,	  “By	  any	  formal	  criteria	  in	  technical	  communication,	  it	  is	  an	  almost	  perfect	  document”	  (256).	  As	  I	  will	  explore	  more	  below,	  Just’s	  memo	  conveys	  a	  grossly	  underdeveloped	  sense	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron.	  But	  some	  critics	  might	  argue	  that	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  are	  not	  “formal	  criteria	  in	  technical	  communication.”	  They	  are,	  however,	  formal	  criteria	  in	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  and	  Katz	  clearly	  connects	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  with	  technical	  communication	  using	  this	  memo	  as	  a	  working	  example	  of	  both:	  “Here,	  as	  in	  most	  technical	  writing	  and,	  I	  will	  argue,	  in	  most	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  expediency,	  on	  technical	  criteria	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end”	  (Katz	  257).	  Further,	  Katz	  suggests,	  “given	  the	  subject	  matter,	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  this	  memo	  is	  too	  technical,	  too	  logical.	  The	  writer	  shows	  no	  concern	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  his	  memo	  is	  the	  modification	  of	  vehicles	  not	  only	  to	  improve	  efficiency,	  but	  also	  to	  exterminate	  people”	  (257).	  In	  this	  way,	  Katz	  makes	  a	  somewhat	  accurate	  observation	  of	  telos	  while	  using	  misdirected	  notions	  of	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sympheron	  through	  his	  terminology	  of	  expediency	  that	  he	  inherited	  from	  the	  post-­‐Cicero	  rhetorical	  tradition.	  	  Katz	  is	  somewhat	  right	  in	  that	  Just	  shows	  no	  sympathetic	  concern	  that	  his	  memo,	  if	  followed,	  will	  make	  more	  efficient	  the	  mass-­‐murder	  of	  many	  more	  thousands	  innocent	  human	  beings.	  Upon	  closer	  reading,	  though,	  Just	  shows	  great	  bureaucratic	  concern	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  he	  uses	  euphemisms	  to	  dehumanize	  his	  victims	  and	  to	  rhetorically	  decriminalize	  his	  efforts	  to	  manufacture	  human	  death	  on	  a	  greater	  scale.	  By	  referring	  to	  his	  human	  victims	  as	  mere	  numbers,	  as	  “the	  load,”	  as	  “merchandise,”	  as	  “fluid	  liquids,”	  as	  “large	  pieces	  of	  dirt”—by	  using	  euphemisms	  in	  such	  carefully	  crafted	  yet	  horrific	  ways,	  Just	  shows	  awareness	  of	  the	  situational	  telos	  that	  Nazi	  administrators	  pursued	  during	  the	  Holocaust.	  The	  use	  of	  euphemism	  by	  Holocaust	  architects	  in	  official	  documents	  and	  speeches	  gained	  institutional	  traction	  following	  the	  infamous	  Wannsee	  Conference	  at	  which	  plans	  were	  formalized	  for	  the	  euphemistically	  titled	  “Final	  Solution”—the	  deportation	  and	  extermination	  of	  all	  Jews	  in	  countries	  controlled	  at	  the	  time	  by	  Germany.	  The	  conference	  chair	  (and	  main	  Holocaust	  architect)	  Reinhard	  Heydrich	  instructed	  Adolf	  Eichmann	  to	  record	  the	  conference	  minutes	  in	  euphemistic	  language	  (Longerich	  306).	  Though	  made	  official	  by	  meetings	  like	  the	  Wannsee	  Conference,	  using	  dehumanizing	  euphemisms	  to	  refer	  to	  Jews	  had	  a	  robust	  history	  in	  anti-­‐Semitic	  Nazi	  literature,	  as	  when	  Hitler	  in	  
Mein	  Kampf	  “describes	  the	  Jews	  as	  bacteria	  and	  vermin	  worthy	  of	  annihilation”	  (Kalfus	  31).	  This	  Nazi	  penchant	  for	  euphemism	  continued	  through	  most	  of	  the	  Third	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Reich’s	  technical	  communication	  documents	  that	  detailed	  the	  mass-­‐murder	  of	  Jews	  and	  other	  Holocaust	  victims	  (see	  Bergen	  168).	  	  However,	  even	  though	  Just’s	  memo	  reveals	  an	  awareness	  of	  a	  situational	  telos	  that	  utilized	  euphemism	  to	  advance	  a	  bureaucracy	  of	  death,	  the	  telos	  of	  Just’s	  memo	  fails	  to	  complete	  itself	  beyond	  the	  bureaucracy	  that	  instigated	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  Just’s	  memo	  fails	  to	  accurately	  and	  clearly	  detail	  his	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  mass-­‐murder,	  which	  is	  precisely	  what	  it	  was.	  In	  terms	  of	  sympheron,	  we	  might	  also	  say	  Just’s	  memo	  fails	  to	  recognize	  his	  victims	  as	  stakeholders	  in	  his	  technical	  practice.	  Indeed,	  by	  using	  technical	  euphemism	  to	  refuse	  to	  recognize	  his	  victims	  as	  stakeholders,	  Just	  thereby	  denies	  his	  victims	  their	  basic	  humanity.	  But	  this	  is	  a	  conscientious	  failure,	  for	  Just’s	  use	  of	  euphemism	  belies	  his	  complicit	  (however	  complacent)	  personal	  participation	  in	  the	  deaths	  of	  thousands	  of	  innocents.	  Indeed,	  Just’s	  memo	  could	  only	  ever	  exist	  as	  a	  technical	  document	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  it	  denies	  its	  full	  telos—i.e.	  genocide.	  In	  Katz’s	  observation,	  expediency	  thus	  emerges	  as	  the	  institutional	  motive	  of	  Nazi	  genocide.	  Conversely,	  Aristotle’s	  notion	  of	  sympheron	  is	  as	  far	  removed	  from	  Just’s	  rhetoric	  as	  Just’s	  memo	  is	  removed	  from	  common	  human	  decency.	  Just’s	  underdeveloped	  sympheron	  expressly	  manifests	  in	  his	  refusal	  to	  address	  his	  human	  victims	  as	  stakeholders	  in	  his	  technical	  communication—as	  fellow	  humans	  with	  whom	  he	  bears	  the	  burden	  of	  his	  murderous	  technical	  practices.	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I	  believe	  Just’s	  horrifically	  underdeveloped	  senses	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  are	  the	  heart	  of	  Katz’s	  critique	  that	  Just	  “shows	  no	  concern	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  his	  memo	  is	  the	  modification	  of	  vehicles	  .	  .	  .	  to	  exterminate	  people”	  (257).	  And	  while	  Katz	  laments	  that	  Just’s	  memo	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  writing	  that	  has	  become	  too	  rhetorical	  in	  Aristotle’s	  sense,	  reappropriated	  notions	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  indicate	  that	  Just’s	  memo	  may	  not	  have	  been	  rhetorical	  enough	  in	  Aristotle’s	  sense.	  	  Admittedly,	  Just’s	  memo	  is	  an	  extreme	  example—perhaps	  too	  easy	  of	  an	  example	  to	  explore	  issues	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  due	  to	  its	  tragic	  lack	  of	  either.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  Just’s	  “banality	  of	  evil”	  (to	  borrow	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  phrase)	  is	  a	  result	  of	  his	  underdeveloped	  senses	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron.	  But	  technical	  documents	  beyond	  the	  banality	  of	  evil—documents	  that	  appear	  merely	  banal—also	  illustrate	  varying	  awareness	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron.	  
 
Telos/Sympheron	  and	  Instruction	  Manuals	  In	  my	  next	  examples,	  I	  look	  at	  two	  instruction	  manuals	  for	  the	  Roku	  digital	  media	  receiver	  and	  player.	  These	  innocuous	  technical	  manuals	  for	  an	  entertainment	  device	  are	  worlds	  away	  from	  Just’s	  horrifying	  memo.	  The	  Roku	  device	  is	  a	  small	  electronic	  box	  about	  the	  size	  of	  a	  small	  square	  sandwich	  that	  connects	  to	  in-­‐home	  internet	  service	  and	  to	  a	  digital	  television	  screen.	  Over	  the	  internet,	  the	  Roku	  device	  accesses	  online	  third-­‐party	  “channels”	  of	  typically	  video	  content.	  By	  far	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  online	  service	  for	  a	  Roku	  device	  is	  the	  Netflix	  streaming	  video	  service.	  The	  Roku	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device	  has	  gone	  through	  several	  upgrades	  in	  the	  years	  it’s	  been	  on	  the	  market,	  but	  many	  of	  the	  basic	  procedures	  for	  connecting	  the	  device	  to	  the	  internet	  and	  to	  a	  television	  have	  remained	  largely	  the	  same.	  Despite	  having	  the	  same	  basic	  installation	  procedures,	  later	  Roku	  models	  have	  very	  different	  installation	  manuals	  than	  earlier	  models.	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  manual	  for	  an	  early	  model,	  the	  Roku	  HD	  2000C,	  and	  the	  manual	  for	  a	  second	  generation	  model,	  the	  Roku2	  XS	  3100X.	  Images	  of	  the	  manual	  cover	  for	  the	  2000C	  and	  a	  portion	  of	  “3	  |	  Connect	  to	  your	  network”	  from	  that	  manual	  are	  reproduced	  in	  Appendix	  A	  and	  B.	  Images	  from	  the	  manual	  cover	  for	  the	  3100X	  and	  a	  portion	  of	  “What	  to	  Do	  Step	  3”	  from	  that	  manual	  are	  reproduced	  in	  Appendix	  C	  and	  D.	  	  A	  few	  distinct	  characteristics	  of	  each	  manual	  are	  readily	  apparent.	  The	  2000C	  manual	  fits	  a	  number	  of	  traditional	  expectations	  that	  have	  plagued	  consumer	  technical	  manuals	  for	  years—pedantic,	  a	  sense	  of	  “bare-­‐bones”	  functionality,	  overtly	  technical	  in	  terminology,	  and	  visually	  technical	  as	  evidenced	  in	  the	  directly	  overhead	  photo	  of	  the	  device	  that	  almost	  invites	  measurement	  and	  other	  quantifying	  actions.	  The	  cover	  screams	  utility	  with	  its	  injunction,	  “Get	  Started	  /	  1.	  Plug	  in	  /	  2.	  Connect	  /	  3.	  Watch.”	  The	  instructions	  for	  connecting	  to	  the	  network	  begin	  in	  an	  equally	  staid	  manner:	  “To	  use	  your	  player,	  you	  must	  connect	  it	  to	  your	  home	  network.	  Typically	  customers	  connect	  to	  a	  wireless	  (or	  wired)	  router	  rather	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than	  directly	  to	  a	  broadband	  modem.”	  Even	  the	  “IMPORTANT”	  warning	  on	  the	  page	  manages	  to	  come	  off	  rather	  dull:	  “Don’t	  place	  anything	  on	  top	  of	  your	  Roku	  player.	  Placing	  objects	  on	  top	  of	  your	  player	  may	  interfere	  with	  the	  wireless	  signal,	  or	  cause	  the	  player	  to	  overheat.”	  	  In	  short,	  the	  2000C	  manual	  lacks	  a	  developed	  sense	  of	  telos.	  There	  is	  hardly	  any	  recognition	  whatsoever	  in	  the	  document	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  Roku	  2000C	  is	  connected,	  the	  user	  will	  immediately	  have	  fun	  with	  it.	  The	  2000C	  manual	  was	  written	  with	  traditional	  and	  typical	  notions	  of	  expediency	  in	  mind.	  In	  fact,	  we	  can	  just	  dust	  off	  some	  of	  Stephen	  Katz’s	  description	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Nazi	  memo	  in	  “Ethic	  of	  Expediency”	  and	  apply	  his	  description	  directly	  to	  this	  Roku	  2000C	  manual:	  “Here,	  as	  in	  most	  technical	  writing	  and	  .	  .	  .	  in	  most	  deliberative	  rhetoric,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  expediency,	  on	  technical	  criteria	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end”	  (257).	  The	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  device	  are	  the	  sole	  telos	  of	  the	  2000C	  manual,	  and	  the	  manual	  makes	  no	  genuine	  connection	  between	  the	  technicality	  of	  the	  device—which	  users	  tend	  to	  find	  droll—and	  the	  fun	  that	  users	  with	  have	  with	  the	  device—which	  is	  the	  telos	  that	  motivated	  the	  users	  to	  buy	  it!	  	  Related	  to	  this	  observation,	  the	  2000C	  manual	  also	  lacks	  elements	  of	  sympheron.	  The	  burden	  foisted	  on	  most	  consumer	  users	  of	  electronics	  is	  one	  of	  technical	  ineptitude.	  Most	  users	  do	  not	  know	  how	  to	  activate	  and	  use	  their	  devices	  right	  away,	  so	  they	  need	  manuals	  to	  help	  them.	  However,	  most	  instruction	  manuals	  typically	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tend	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  burden	  of	  technical	  ineptitude	  by	  making	  the	  activation	  process	  so	  technical	  as	  to	  remove	  a	  user’s	  sense	  of	  humanity	  from	  the	  activation	  process.	  Users	  are	  dehumanized	  in	  the	  instruction	  phase	  of	  a	  device	  and	  regain	  their	  humanity	  only	  after	  the	  device	  is	  functioning.	  This	  is	  the	  real	  burden	  foisted	  on	  users	  by	  most	  technical	  manuals.	  And	  traditional	  technical	  manuals	  lack	  a	  sense	  of	  
sympheron	  that	  would	  ease	  this	  burden	  for—or	  bear	  together	  the	  burden	  with—users.	  	  The	  3100X	  manual	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  a	  marvel	  of	  consumer	  telos	  and	  sympheron.	  Right	  away,	  the	  brightly	  colored	  cover	  shows	  a	  Roku	  device	  at	  an	  angle	  more	  akin	  to	  how	  users	  will	  see	  it	  on	  their	  TV	  stands.	  Also	  entirely	  absent	  from	  the	  3100X	  manual’s	  cover	  are	  the	  goose-­‐stepping	  orders	  from	  the	  2000C	  manual	  cover:	  “Plug	  in	  .	  .	  .	  Connect	  .	  .	  .	  Watch.”	  Instead,	  3100X	  users	  are	  greeted	  with	  an	  inviting,	  friendly,	  almost	  peppy,	  “Hi!	  Let’s	  get	  started.”	  Inside	  the	  manual	  in	  the	  directions	  to	  “Configure	  Your	  Network,”	  the	  3100X	  manual	  sustains	  the	  friendliness	  and	  adds	  a	  bit	  of	  sassy	  fun:	  “Step	  3	  establishes	  your	  network	  connection	  and	  brings	  out	  your	  inner	  geek.	  You	  can	  do	  it!	  Just	  choose	  wireless	  or	  wired	  and	  read	  on	  for	  instructions.”	  Further	  in	  the	  same	  step,	  there	  are	  a	  list	  of	  “Dos	  and	  Don’t	  on	  Where	  to	  Place	  You	  Roku	  Player.”	  Among	  the	  list	  is	  a	  warning	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  in	  the	  2000C	  manual	  but,	  oh	  so	  different:	  “DON’T	  place	  your	  player	  beneath	  anything;	  it	  may	  cause	  the	  player	  to	  overheat.	  Eeeeks.”	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From	  front	  to	  back,	  the	  3100X	  manual	  displays	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  telos.	  It	  shows	  a	  significant	  understanding	  as	  to	  what	  happens	  after	  the	  instruction	  manual	  is	  read,	  as	  to	  where	  this	  rhetorical	  situation	  is	  heading,	  and	  as	  to	  how	  this	  rhetorical	  situation	  will	  end.	  The	  manual	  establishes	  a	  reading	  and	  instructional	  atmosphere	  that	  fully	  anticipates	  the	  fun	  that	  users	  are	  going	  have	  with	  the	  device.	  The	  manual’s	  writer	  is	  so	  cognizant	  of	  telos-­‐concerns	  that	  she	  or	  he	  uses	  the	  genre	  of	  a	  technical	  manual	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  users’	  actual	  telos—to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  fun	  that	  the	  users	  will	  eventually	  experience	  with	  the	  device.	  	  In	  this	  same	  vein,	  the	  3100X	  manual	  also	  displays	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  sympheron.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  instructions	  in	  which	  the	  manual	  asserts	  that	  the	  most	  technical	  elements	  of	  the	  activation	  process	  “brings	  out	  your	  inner	  geek.	  You	  can	  do	  it!”	  In	  eight	  words,	  the	  manual	  accomplishes	  a	  mind-­‐boggling	  amount:	  It	  cashes	  in	  on	  American	  geek-­‐chic	  zeitgeist.	  It	  acknowledges	  and	  normalizes	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  users	  are	  intimidated	  by	  technical	  instructions.	  It	  encourages	  users	  to	  endure	  through	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  an	  experience	  users	  would	  rather	  not	  endure.	  In	  short,	  the	  manual	  bears	  together	  with	  the	  users	  the	  burden	  that	  technical	  instructions	  tend	  to	  foist	  on	  users.	  	  Roku	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  beginning	  to	  write	  technical	  manuals	  this	  way	  for	  consumer	  products.	  Giro,	  a	  sporting	  accessories	  company	  that	  specializes	  in	  helmets,	  portrays	  a	  similar	  attitude	  in	  the	  owner’s	  manual	  for	  one	  of	  their	  helmets	  intended	  for	  snow	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skiers	  and	  snowboarders	  (see	  Appendix	  E).	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  section	  of	  the	  manual	  that	  relates	  how	  to	  adjust	  the	  helmet’s	  chin	  straps,	  the	  manual	  includes	  
telos-­‐infused	  admonitions	  like	  this:	  “If	  the	  front	  [of	  the	  helmet]	  is	  too	  low,	  you	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  see	  hazards	  like	  cliff	  edges	  and	  young	  freestyle	  prodigies.”	  This	  sentence	  is	  humorous	  because	  it	  breaks	  the	  expected	  pattern	  of	  an	  instruction	  manual;	  thus,	  it	  participates	  in	  the	  very	  fun	  it	  anticipates	  its	  users	  will	  experience	  when	  they	  go	  alpine	  skiing.	  And	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  acknowledges	  the	  sorts	  of	  real-­‐world	  hazards	  users	  may	  experience	  on	  the	  slopes	  (like	  cliffs	  and	  hotdogging	  show-­‐offs).	  This	  manual	  also	  displays	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  sympheron	  in	  specific	  technical	  moments	  as	  when	  it	  reminds	  users,	  “If	  your	  straps	  aren’t	  adjusted	  right,	  your	  helmet	  won’t	  stay	  on	  properly,	  so	  pay	  attention.”	  With	  the	  admonition	  to	  “pay	  attention,”	  the	  manual	  contains	  a	  tacit	  recognition	  that	  normalizes	  the	  typical	  feeling	  that	  instructions	  are	  boring	  but	  necessary.	  Such	  fun	  and	  playfulness	  actually	  has	  a	  much	  more	  serious	  edge	  with	  the	  Giro	  helmet	  than	  with	  the	  Roku	  players.	  The	  Giro	  manual’s	  fun,	  sympathetic,	  and	  encouraging	  sense	  of	  sympheron	  serves	  to	  keep	  readers	  more	  engaged	  in	  reading	  the	  manual,	  which	  may	  result	  in	  more	  of	  its	  helmets	  being	  worn	  correctly,	  which	  may	  end	  up	  saving	  more	  lives.	  Thus,	  suddenly	  and	  somewhat	  abruptly,	  we	  arrive	  at	  ethics	  (or	  ethics	  confronts	  us)	  through	  entirely	  rhetorical	  practices.	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Telos/Sympheron	  and	  Visual	  Rhetoric	  Not	  all	  technical	  documents	  are	  about	  fun	  consumer	  products.	  Indeed	  most	  technical	  documents	  are	  not.	  Principles	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  may	  actually	  be	  more	  evident	  and	  identifiable	  in	  more	  serious	  examples.	  	  Noted	  statistician	  Edward	  Tufte	  keeps	  a	  regular	  blog	  on	  which	  he	  posts	  observations	  relating	  to	  statistical	  analysis	  or	  other-­‐things-­‐statistics.	  In	  a	  sobering	  post,	  Tufte	  addresses	  different	  strategies	  for	  displaying	  statistics	  relating	  to	  the	  survival	  rates	  of	  different	  types	  of	  cancer.	  In	  the	  blog	  post,	  Tufte	  reprints	  a	  simple	  table	  (Appendix	  F)	  that	  lists	  types	  of	  cancer	  in	  the	  left	  column	  and	  then	  lists	  the	  percentage	  survival	  rate	  for	  five	  years,	  ten	  years,	  fifteen	  years,	  and	  twenty	  years.	  The	  table	  originally	  appeared	  in	  a	  peer-­‐reviewed	  journal	  article	  in	  The	  Lancet	  medical	  journal.	  Tufte	  redrafts	  the	  information	  into	  an	  even	  sparser-­‐looking	  table	  that	  orders	  the	  data	  in	  descending	  rank	  of	  survival	  likelihood	  (Appendix	  G).	  At	  first	  blush,	  we	  might	  say	  the	  information	  in	  Tufte’s	  table	  is	  displayed	  in	  a	  pedantic	  manner	  typical	  to	  traditional	  technical	  writing.	  But	  Tufte	  makes	  the	  compelling	  observation	  that,	  “For	  most	  presentations,	  this	  table	  with	  its	  structure	  and	  reporting	  of	  standard	  errors	  will	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  see	  the	  cancer	  data”	  (Tufte).	  He	  then	  posts	  a	  different	  table	  of	  his	  own	  design	  with	  the	  same	  data	  (Appendix	  H).	  This	  table	  orders	  the	  types	  of	  cancer	  in	  the	  same	  descending	  order	  but	  visually	  portrays	  the	  shrinking	  likelihood	  of	  survival	  for	  each	  type	  of	  cancer	  with	  a	  sloping	  line	  connecting	  each	  of	  the	  5-­‐10-­‐15-­‐20	  year	  marks.	  As	  Tufte	  explains	  it,	  this	  new	  table	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design,	  “gives	  an	  idea	  of	  survival	  time	  gradients	  for	  each	  cancer.	  In	  the	  table-­‐graphic	  and	  in	  the	  original	  table,	  every	  visual	  element	  contributes	  directly	  to	  understanding”	  (Tufte,	  italics	  in	  original).	  	  Tufte	  then	  shifts	  his	  analysis	  directly	  into	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  graphic	  designs	  available	  in	  Microsoft’s	  PowerPoint	  presentation	  software.	  “Applying	  the	  widely-­‐used	  default	  designs	  for	  statistical	  graphics	  in	  PowerPoint	  to	  this	  nice	  straightforward	  table	  yields	  these	  analytical	  disasters	  [in	  Appendix	  I]”	  (Tufte).	  The	  analytic	  disasters	  in	  Appendix	  I	  are	  simply	  incomprehensible.	  The	  designers	  of	  the	  PowerPoint	  program,	  perhaps	  in	  some	  effort	  to	  “liven	  up”	  such	  graphics	  in	  presentations,	  created	  a	  default	  for	  statistical	  display	  that	  is	  confusingly	  complex.	  When	  entered	  the	  data	  into	  PowerPoint,	  Tufte	  derides	  The	  data	  explode	  into	  6	  separate	  chaotic	  slides,	  consuming	  several	  times	  the	  area	  of	  the	  table.	  Everything	  is	  wrong	  with	  these	  smarmy,	  nearly	  unreadable	  graphs:	  incoherent,	  uncomparative,	  low	  data-­‐density,	  encoded	  legends,	  color	  without	  content,	  logotype	  branding,	  chartjunk,	  indifference	  to	  content	  and	  evidence.	  (Tufte)	  	  Beyond	  being	  just	  a	  confusing	  mess	  of	  data.	  Tufte	  then	  makes	  a	  profound	  observation	  of	  telos:	  “these	  graphics	  would	  turn	  into	  a	  particularly	  nasty	  prank	  if	  ever	  used	  for	  a	  serious	  purpose,	  such	  as	  cancer	  patients	  seeking	  to	  assess	  their	  survival	  chances”	  (Tufte).	  Tufte’s	  critiques	  of	  PowerPoint’s	  automated	  graphics	  generator	  are	  about	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  just	  user	  readability	  or	  usability.	  Technical	  writers	  who	  foster	  traditional	  notions	  of	  expediency	  might	  merely	  ask,	  “Can	  readers	  read	  my	  graphics?”	  But	  technical	  writers	  who	  foster	  more	  developed	  notions	  of	  telos	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and	  sympheron	  (even	  if	  they	  don’t	  those	  exact	  terms)	  might	  instead	  ask,	  “What	  will	  reader	  do	  with	  these	  graphics?”	  And,	  “How	  do	  these	  graphics	  share	  or	  exacerbate	  the	  burdens	  of	  others	  involved?”	  	  Further,	  we	  can	  see	  elements	  of	  telos	  and	  sympheron	  competing	  with	  each	  other	  when	  we	  look	  at	  graphics	  used	  to	  portray	  data	  for	  particular	  political	  ends.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  tragedy	  at	  Sandy	  Hook	  Elementary	  School	  in	  Connecticut,	  politically	  charged	  graphics	  appeared	  in	  various	  online	  venues	  supporting	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  American	  gun	  violence	  debate.	  One	  such	  graphic	  is	  a	  chart	  designed	  by	  Max	  Fisher	  for	  the	  Washington	  Post	  (Appendix	  J).	  On	  the	  blog	  he	  writes	  for	  the	  
Washington	  Post,	  the	  chart	  in	  Appendix	  J	  appears	  under	  the	  headline,	  “Chart:	  The	  U.S.	  has	  far	  more	  gun-­‐related	  killings	  than	  any	  other	  developed	  country.”	  The	  chart	  takes	  a	  little	  unpacking	  to	  fully	  reveal	  its	  sense	  of	  telos.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  displays	  an	  underdeveloped	  sense	  of	  sympheron.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  the	  chart	  places	  more	  burden	  of	  interpretation	  on	  readers	  instead	  of	  clarifying	  its	  data	  completely	  from	  the	  start.	  Initially,	  the	  chart	  looks	  like	  the	  USA	  is	  by	  far	  and	  away	  the	  most	  gun-­‐violent	  developed	  country	  just	  like	  the	  article	  title	  says.	  But	  the	  fine	  print	  on	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  chart	  indicates	  that	  the	  charts	  lists	  all	  the	  countries	  who	  are	  part	  of	  the	  “Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development,	  excluding	  Mexico.”	  Why	  would	  Fisher	  exclude	  Mexico	  from	  the	  chart?	  Well,	  a	  table	  from	  gunpolicy.org	  relating	  Mexico’s	  gun	  deaths	  per	  100,000,	  indicates	  that	  Mexico’s	  gun-­‐violence	  rate	  is	  about	  three	  times	  greater	  than	  America’s	  (Appendix	  K).	  Max	  Fisher	  eventually	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acknowledges	  this	  disparity	  in	  the	  text	  of	  his	  blog	  article,	  but	  the	  headline	  combined	  with	  the	  chart	  uncover	  what	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  pro-­‐gun-­‐control	  telos	  laced	  perhaps	  with	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  expediency	  than	  sympheron.	  	  But	  a	  similarly	  designed	  anti-­‐gun-­‐control	  graphic	  fares	  much	  worse	  (Appendix	  L).	  The	  chart	  in	  Appendix	  L	  has	  its	  earliest	  online	  appearance	  on	  another	  news	  blog,	  this	  one	  written	  by	  Kyle	  Baker	  for	  the	  right-­‐wing	  Conservative	  Daily	  News	  under	  the	  article	  title	  “Gun	  Control	  Statistics	  that	  Reasonable	  People	  Should	  Know.”	  The	  most	  obvious	  problem	  with	  this	  chart	  is	  that	  the	  statistics	  on	  it	  are	  patently	  false.	  It	  employs	  visual	  tactics	  similar	  to	  Max	  Fisher’s	  chart	  from	  the	  Washington	  Post,	  including	  small-­‐print	  references	  on	  the	  bottom,	  which	  purportedly	  indicate	  that	  the	  information	  from	  the	  chart	  was	  gathered	  from	  “Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control,	  FBI,	  U.S.	  Federal	  Government.”	  This	  chart	  completely	  favors	  expediency	  over	  sympheron	  because	  the	  burden	  of	  fact-­‐checking	  is	  foisted	  entirely	  on	  readers.	  The	  most	  recent	  “Deaths	  and	  Mortality”	  statistics	  released	  by	  the	  CDC	  are	  from	  2010	  and	  are	  available	  on	  its	  website	  (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm).	  The	  data	  is	  difficult	  to	  wade	  through,	  but	  it	  becomes	  readily	  evident	  that	  the	  CDC	  does	  not	  keep	  track	  of	  deaths	  caused	  by	  tobacco	  use	  and	  medical	  errors	  (which	  are	  at	  best	  ancillary	  causes).	  More	  careful	  reading	  of	  the	  CDC’s	  stats	  reveals	  that	  all	  the	  numbers	  on	  the	  chart	  relating	  to	  health-­‐related	  deaths	  are	  simply	  false.	  Further,	  the	  FBI	  keeps	  an	  online	  publicly	  accessible	  database	  of	  homicide	  stats	  in	  America	  from	  1980-­‐2010	  (located	  here:	  http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr/asp/off_selection.asp)	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A	  Closing	  Thought	  on	  Blaberon	  This	  chapter	  has	  been	  nothing	  but	  practical,	  focusing	  as	  it	  has	  on	  actual	  technical	  writing	  examples.	  But	  these	  examples	  indicate	  profound	  theoretical	  implications	  as	  well.	  If	  anything,	  the	  examples	  of	  weak	  sympheron	  in	  this	  chapter	  reveal	  what	  may	  be	  current	  examples	  of	  what	  Aristotle	  called	  blaberon.	  As	  Jacques	  Ranciere	  explains,	  in	  ancient	  Greek,	  blaberon	  has	  two	  accepted	  meanings:	  	  in	  one	  sense	  it	  is	  the	  lot	  of	  unpleasantness	  that	  falls	  to	  an	  individual	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  whether	  it	  be	  through	  a	  natural	  catastrophe	  or	  human	  action,	  and	  in	  the	  other,	  it	  is	  the	  negative	  consequence	  that	  an	  individual	  suffers	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  action	  or,	  more	  often,	  the	  action	  of	  another.	  (3)	  	  For	  Aristotle,	  blaberon	  was	  the	  negative	  possible	  motive	  of	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  while	  sympheron	  was	  the	  positive	  motive.	  In	  the	  George	  Kennedy	  translation	  of	  Aristotole’s	  rhetoric,	  blaberon	  is	  translated	  simply	  as	  harmful	  (49).	  And	  Aristotle	  admits	  that	  deliberative	  orators	  are	  always	  keen	  to	  portray	  their	  own	  motives	  in	  terms	  of	  symperhon	  and	  not	  blaberon.	  In	  Kennedy’s	  translation,	  right	  after	  Aristotle	  describes	  both	  sympheron	  (which	  Kennedy	  translates	  as	  advantageous)	  and	  
blaberon	  (i.e.	  harmful),	  Aristotle	  admits	  that	  deliberative	  orators	  often	  “would	  never	  admit	  that	  they	  are	  advising	  things	  that	  are	  not	  advantageous”	  even	  if	  what	  they	  were	  advising	  were	  actually	  harmful	  (i.e.	  blaberon).	  	  Aristotle’s	  observation	  that	  deliberative	  orators	  often	  misbehave	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  condoning	  such	  behavior.	  Instead,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  Aristotle	  merely	  recognizes	  that	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  always	  functions	  under	  the	  promissory	  of	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sympheron	  even	  in	  instances	  that	  advance	  blaberon	  motives.	  Because	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  is	  under	  the	  promissory	  of	  sympheron,	  Aristotle	  asserts	  “that	  we	  must	  not	  persuade	  what	  is	  bad”	  and	  the	  expediency	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  seek	  is	  “the	  enlightened,	  long-­‐term	  advantage	  to	  the	  audience,	  not	  immediate	  expediency”	  (Kennedy	  49).	  As	  I’ve	  explored	  in	  previous	  chapters	  and	  in	  this	  chapter	  above,	  I	  would	  replace	  “audience”	  with	  “everyone	  involved”	  and	  thus	  more	  fully	  round	  out	  the	  term	  
sympheron	  as	  a	  motive	  for	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  (symbouleutikon).	  Anything	  less	  than	  the	  benefit	  of	  all	  stakeholders	  involved	  will	  necessarily	  involve	  some	  amount	  of	  
blaberon	  towards	  someone	  involved	  in	  or	  affected	  by	  a	  deliberative	  decision.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  weak	  sympheron	  examples	  in	  this	  chapter,	  this	  notion	  of	  blaberon	  is	  more	  than	  merely	  the	  opposite	  of	  advantageous.	  Instead,	  these	  reappropriated	  notions	  of	  sympheron	  and	  blaberon	  suggest	  that	  the	  post-­‐Cicero	  order	  of	  deliberative	  motives	  may	  be	  simply	  reversed.	  For	  nothing	  seems	  as	  antithetical	  to	  
sympheron	  than	  situational	  and	  immediate	  expediency.	  And,	  as	  Katz	  rightly	  observes,	  situational	  and	  immediate	  expediency	  emerges	  as	  the	  source	  of	  much	  harm—blaberon—caused	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  others.	  
	  	  
188	  
	  	  	  	  CHAPTER	  6.	  THE	  END	  OF	  A	  DISSERTATION:	  SYMBOULEUTIKON	  AND	  INDOCTRINATION	  (OR,	  HOW	  ONE	  ENDS	  A	  STUDY	  OF	  ENDS)	  	  “One	  repays	  a	  teacher	  badly	  if	  one	  always	  remains	  nothing	  but	  a	  pupil.”	  —Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols	  	  	  Writing	  a	  dissertation	  largely	  about	  ends	  makes	  ending	  the	  document	  a	  bit	  tricky.	  A	  conclusion	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  telos	  for	  a	  dissertation,	  but	  it	  also	  ought	  to	  reveal	  awareness	  of	  the	  future	  that	  these	  ideas	  will	  inhabit	  beyond	  and	  after	  the	  dissertation—i.e.	  where	  is	  all	  this	  going?	  Also,	  in	  one	  sense,	  a	  dissertation	  is	  the	  telos	  of	  a	  PhD	  program—it’s	  what	  completes	  the	  degree.	  But	  in	  a	  different	  sense,	  every	  mature	  graduate-­‐level	  writer	  understands	  that	  a	  dissertation	  does	  not	  complete	  something	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  a	  means	  to	  some	  other	  completion	  or	  sets	  of	  completions.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  dissertation	  is	  its	  own	  sort	  of	  beginning	  of	  a	  career	  in	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  a	  significant	  end	  of	  a	  career	  of	  learning.	  	  In	  another	  more	  universal	  sense,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  one	  completion	  merely	  serves	  as	  a	  means	  toward	  another	  completion	  and	  so	  on	  down	  the	  line	  until	  the	  utter	  completion	  of	  all	  things,	  which,	  I	  hope,	  is	  not	  for	  a	  long,	  long	  time.	  For	  when	  there	  is	  nothing	  more	  to	  complete,	  all	  purpose	  will	  have	  fled	  the	  universe	  with	  nothing	  to	  remember	  and	  nothing	  to	  do	  the	  remembering.	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Both	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  and	  Kenneth	  Burke	  situate	  their	  personal	  philosophies	  in	  such	  a	  universe.	  As	  I’ve	  noted	  elsewhere	  (Sproat	  335-­‐36),	  Nietzsche	  despairs	  while	  Burke	  seems	  to	  almost	  rejoice:	  “How	  pitiful,	  how	  shadowy	  and	  fleeting,	  how	  purposeless	  [i.e.	  lacking	  telos]	  and	  arbitrary	  the	  human	  intellect	  appears	  within	  nature,”	  Nietzsche	  writes,	  “There	  were	  eternities	  when	  it	  did	  not	  exist;	  and	  someday	  when	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  there,	  not	  much	  will	  have	  changed.	  For	  that	  intellect	  has	  no	  further	  mission	  leading	  beyond	  human	  life.	  It	  is	  utterly	  human,	  and	  only	  its	  owner	  and	  producer	  takes	  it	  with	  such	  pathos	  as	  if	  the	  world	  hinged	  upon	  it”	  (“On	  Truth”	  246).	  Kenneth	  Burke,	  however,	  follows	  this	  same	  line	  of	  thinking	  with	  a	  slightly	  more	  positive	  turn:	  Presumably	  the	  realm	  of	  non-­‐symbolic	  motion	  was	  all	  that	  prevailed	  on	  this	  earth	  before	  our	  kind	  of	  symbol-­‐using	  organism	  evolved,	  and	  will	  go	  sloshing	  about	  after	  we	  have	  gone.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  note	  that,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  by	  evolving	  our	  kind	  of	  organism,	  the	  wordless	  Universe	  of	  non-­‐symbolic	  motion	  is	  able	  to	  comment	  on	  itself.	  (“Questions”	  334)	  	  That	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  shallow	  joy,	  but	  being	  as	  tiny	  as	  we	  are	  against	  the	  infinite	  vastness	  of	  the	  lifeless	  universe,	  we	  could	  at	  least	  recognize	  what	  a	  singular	  thing	  it	  is	  to	  be,	  effectively,	  talking	  stardust.	  Thus	  the	  economy	  of	  language,	  on	  a	  universal	  scale,	  reveals	  language-­‐using	  creatures	  to	  be	  very	  precious	  things	  indeed,	  for	  the	  stars	  are	  many,	  but	  the	  talking	  specs	  of	  stardust	  are	  few	  in	  comparison.	  To	  survive	  their	  brief	  moment	  in	  the	  bleak	  intergalactic	  night,	  humans	  bring	  their	  wills	  together—in	  symbouleutikon—and	  thus	  reveal	  worlds	  without	  end.	  Toward	  that	  end,	  I	  find	  myself	  latching	  onto	  symbouleutikon	  as	  a	  guiding	  metaphor	  for	  how	  to	  proceed	  beyond	  and	  after	  this	  dissertation.	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I	  wrote	  this	  dissertation	  primarily	  as	  a	  student	  and	  teacher	  of	  writing.	  As	  such,	  I	  will	  tend	  to	  use	  the	  ideas	  in	  this	  dissertation	  towards	  those	  ends.	  Specifically,	  as	  I	  consider	  the	  idea	  of	  symbouleutikon	  as	  part	  of	  a	  telos	  that	  will	  complete	  itself	  after	  this	  dissertation,	  likewise	  I	  consider	  my	  students’	  writing	  as	  part	  of	  a	  telos	  that	  will	  complete	  itself	  after	  they	  attend	  the	  classes	  in	  which	  I	  teach	  them.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  writing	  my	  students	  do	  after	  my	  class	  will	  tend	  to	  matter	  more	  than	  any	  writing	  they	  do	  in	  my	  class.	  So	  I	  face	  this	  question:	  do	  I	  assign	  writing	  projects	  that	  bring	  my	  students’	  wills	  in	  congress	  with	  other	  wills	  beyond	  our	  classroom?	  In	  other	  words,	  do	  I	  assign	  projects	  that	  engage	  my	  students	  in	  the	  world	  beyond	  the	  university?	  If	  I	  believe	  anything	  I’ve	  written	  here,	  then	  the	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  is,	  “I	  better.”	  	  The	  obligation	  to	  symbouleutikon—to	  engage	  my	  students	  with	  the	  world	  beyond	  our	  classroom	  is	  unapologetically	  ideological.	  Indeed,	  symbouleutikon	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  to	  the	  driving	  telos	  of	  my	  teaching	  philosophy:	  My	  most	  pressing	  concern	  as	  an	  instructor	  is	  that	  students	  learn	  to	  think	  critically	  and	  to	  communicate	  clearly	  those	  critical	  thoughts.	  I	  realize	  that	  “critical	  thinking”	  is	  at	  once	  both	  a	  timeless	  and	  embattled	  pedagogical	  concept,	  but	  for	  many	  reasons,	  it	  best	  characterizes	  my	  teaching	  philosophy.	  I	  consider	  critical	  thinking	  in	  its	  most	  basic	  form	  to	  be	  the	  conscientious	  perception	  of	  any	  one	  thing	  in	  terms	  of	  any	  other	  distinctly	  different	  thing—what	  Kenneth	  Burke	  calls	  perspective	  by	  incongruity.	  In	  short,	  students	  write	  critically	  when	  they	  consider	  old	  ideas	  in	  new	  ways	  (and	  vice	  versa),	  when	  they	  suspend	  final	  judgment	  while	  seeking	  out	  reasoned	  discourse,	  and	  when	  they	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embrace	  non-­‐violent	  divergence	  as	  an	  essentially	  democratic	  ideal.	  This	  definition	  of	  critical	  thinking	  has	  developed	  from	  my	  scholarly	  work	  in	  which	  I	  address	  the	  unavoidable	  interconnectedness	  of	  humans	  and	  societies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  benefits	  and	  problems	  of	  democratic	  social	  conditions.	  Thus	  in	  my	  teaching,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  me	  that	  students	  learn	  to	  view	  themselves	  as	  parts	  of	  larger	  communities,	  not	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  communication	  but	  also	  contribution.	  Accordingly,	  I	  am	  a	  strong	  advocate	  of	  service	  learning	  and	  civic	  engagement	  in	  composition	  courses.	  	  I	  have	  been	  teaching	  writing	  courses	  for	  nine	  years.	  And	  I’ve	  been	  including	  various	  sorts	  of	  civic	  engagement	  aspects	  in	  my	  writing	  courses	  for	  about	  seven	  of	  those	  years.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  those	  seven	  years,	  I	  have	  used	  different	  service-­‐based	  approaches	  to	  civic	  engagement	  that	  I	  can	  classify	  in	  two	  broad	  categories:	  writing	  
about	  service	  and	  writing	  as	  service.	  This	  distinction	  both	  simplifies	  and	  nuances	  Thomas	  Deans’s	  now	  well	  known	  three-­‐way	  division:	  writing	  about	  the	  community,	  writing	  for	  the	  community,	  writing	  with	  the	  community	  (Deans	  15-­‐20).	  Deans’s	  work	  is	  invaluable	  in	  helping	  us	  realize	  that	  there	  are	  necessary	  distinctions	  and	  different	  ways	  of	  valuing	  assorted	  approaches	  to	  writing	  and	  civic	  engagement.	  Especially,	  his	  work	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  increasing	  number	  and	  quality	  of	  discussions	  about	  developing	  sustainable	  community	  partnerships.	  This	  is	  so	  much	  the	  case,	  that	  I	  have	  observed	  (mostly	  anecdotally)	  a	  current	  trend	  in	  which	  the	  “writing	  for	  the	  community”	  and	  “writing	  with	  the	  community”	  approaches	  are	  being	  favored	  over	  Deans’s	  articulation	  of	  “writing	  about	  the	  community.”	  Indeed,	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because	  of	  our	  increased	  awareness	  of	  our	  ethical	  obligations	  to	  foster	  long-­‐term	  community	  partnerships,	  de-­‐emphasizing	  “writing	  about	  the	  community”	  approaches	  to	  civic	  engagement	  projects	  carries	  some	  moral	  implications	  with	  it	  as	  well.	  	  The	  moral	  implications	  are	  these:	  in	  our	  efforts	  to	  foster	  long-­‐term	  community	  partnerships,	  we	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  forget	  the	  transient	  nature	  of	  most	  writing	  instructors	  (grad	  students,	  adjuncts,	  lecturers,	  etc.).	  The	  economic	  reality	  is	  that	  most	  graduate	  programs	  in	  American	  English	  departments	  exist	  to	  supply	  the	  cheap-­‐yet-­‐highly-­‐educated	  labor	  necessary	  to	  teach	  so	  many	  sections	  of	  low-­‐class-­‐size	  composition	  courses.	  As	  much	  as	  we’d	  like	  to	  think	  otherwise,	  the	  materialist	  reality	  is	  that	  most	  English	  grad	  students	  exist	  to	  support	  first-­‐year	  writing	  and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  Thus	  civic	  engagement-­‐minded	  writing	  program	  administrators	  face	  this	  dilemma:	  how	  do	  we	  establish	  ethically	  sound	  long-­‐term	  relationships	  between	  instructors	  and	  community	  partners	  with	  an	  instructor	  pool	  that	  is	  largely	  temporary	  and	  transitory?	  	  This	  economic	  reality	  is	  what	  underpins	  my	  basic	  distinction	  between	  “writing	  about	  service”	  and	  “writing	  as	  service.”	  Only	  tenured	  long-­‐term	  faculty	  members	  in	  rhetoric,	  composition,	  writing,	  and	  other	  fields	  have	  the	  economic	  leisure	  to	  weigh	  the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  how	  to	  establish	  long-­‐term	  community	  partnerships—i.e.	  partnerships	  that	  would	  make	  more	  ethical	  use	  of	  Deans’s	  “writing	  for	  the	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community”	  and	  “writing	  with	  the	  community.”	  Both	  of	  those	  approaches,	  I	  would	  simply	  collect	  under	  the	  head	  of	  “writing	  as	  service.”	  	  But	  what	  of	  those	  transient	  composition	  instructors	  who	  want	  to	  be	  civically	  minded	  in	  their	  composition	  courses?	  Or	  in	  my	  terms,	  what	  of	  those	  part-­‐time	  instructors	  who	  value	  symbouleutikon?	  I	  have	  been	  teaching	  writing	  and	  civic	  engagement	  as	  a	  part-­‐time	  instructor,	  adjunct	  instructor,	  or	  as	  a	  grad	  student	  instructor	  for	  the	  last	  seven	  years	  at	  four	  different	  institutions.	  If	  the	  term	  “service-­‐learning”	  were	  a	  spectrum	  as	  Andrew	  Furco	  suggests	  (Furco	  10),	  I	  have	  found	  myself	  institutionally	  limited	  to	  implementing	  student	  writing	  more	  on	  the	  “learning”	  side	  of	  service	  learning	  and	  less	  on	  the	  “service”	  side.	  This	  was	  only	  the	  case	  because	  the	  transitory	  nature	  of	  my	  employment	  limited	  me	  in	  my	  ability	  to	  establish	  long-­‐term	  community	  partners.	  	  But	  even	  establishing	  long-­‐term	  community	  partners	  is	  not,	  in	  itself,	  a	  guarantee	  of	  more	  ethically	  sound	  service-­‐learning	  practices.	  For	  example,	  think	  of	  the	  dilemma	  community	  partners	  face	  after	  years	  of	  collaboration	  with	  faculty	  members	  who	  suddenly	  change	  institutions	  or	  get	  promoted	  into	  administrative	  positions	  away	  from	  service-­‐learning	  teaching.	  Almost	  all	  community	  partner	  relationships	  will	  eventually	  end.	  For	  these	  and	  other	  reasons,	  I’m	  inclined	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  ethical	  burden	  facing	  service-­‐learning	  instructors	  is	  not	  the	  length	  of	  their	  community	  partner	  relationships	  but	  the	  care	  with	  which	  they	  plan	  ahead	  for	  their	  exit	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strategies.	  Long-­‐term	  community	  partnerships	  foster	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  
symbouleutikon	  among	  instructors,	  students,	  and	  community	  partners.	  But	  shorter-­‐term	  partnerships	  can	  foster	  an	  equally	  valuable	  sort	  of	  symbouleutikon	  among	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  instructors,	  students,	  and	  community	  partners.	  	  With	  an	  eye	  toward	  this	  end,	  I’ve	  developed	  a	  dialogical	  approach	  to	  service	  learning	  writing	  that	  has	  deeply	  ethical	  implications	  but	  is	  yet	  sustainable	  for	  me,	  and	  I	  argue,	  for	  all	  such	  transient	  teachers	  of	  writing.	  It	  has	  three	  simple	  components:	  
1. Students engage in community service in just about any sort of task or activity—
using volunteer networks already in place that rely on transient volunteer labor. 
2. Students qualitatively interview people associated directly or tangentially with the 
concerns of their service sites. 
3. Students use these interviews in their invention strategies for a wide array of 
writing projects that could be writing about, for, or with the community. 	  This	  last	  aspect	  illustrates	  how	  simplifying	  the	  distinction	  between	  “writing	  about	  service	  and	  “writing	  as	  service”	  actually	  provides	  more	  nuance	  to	  Deans’s	  three-­‐way	  categorization.	  In	  my	  approach,	  students’	  initial	  service	  is	  not	  their	  writing.	  Thus	  their	  projects	  always	  begin	  from	  the	  frame	  of	  writing	  about	  service.	  However,	  as	  students	  engage	  with	  the	  perspectives	  of	  people	  somehow	  associated	  with	  their	  service	  sites,	  they	  may	  find	  themselves	  drawn	  toward	  projects	  that	  directly	  help	  their	  service	  sites.	  Instructors	  with	  sufficient	  flexibility	  and	  energy	  could	  advise	  student	  projects	  that	  could	  fit	  in	  any	  of	  Deans’s	  categories.	  But	  all	  of	  these	  potential	  projects	  begin	  with	  the	  simple	  qualitative	  interviewing	  assignment	  that	  engages	  students	  with	  perspectives	  outside	  of	  their	  typical	  university	  life.	  In	  a	  word,	  the	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interviewing	  assignment	  involves	  students	  in	  symbouleutikon.	  A	  copy	  of	  the	  Perspective	  Interview	  Assignment	  that	  I	  designed	  for	  this	  approach	  is	  located	  in	  Appendices	  N	  and	  O.	  Included	  in	  the	  assignment	  sheet	  are	  options	  for	  both	  service-­‐learning	  and	  non-­‐service-­‐learning	  variations	  of	  the	  project.	  Notice	  that	  my	  non-­‐service-­‐learning	  variation	  is	  closer	  to	  what	  Deans	  calls	  “writing	  about	  the	  community,”	  but	  even	  in	  the	  non-­‐service-­‐learning	  variation,	  students	  could	  still	  work	  toward	  a	  range	  of	  projects	  that	  could	  lead	  toward	  writing	  for	  or	  with	  the	  community.	  	  In	  engaging	  students	  with	  real-­‐world	  exigencies	  beyond	  the	  classroom,	  I	  conscientiously	  nudge	  them	  away	  from	  traditional	  genreless	  genres	  of	  classroom	  writing	  like	  the	  argument	  paper,	  the	  analysis	  paper,	  and	  the	  nigh-­‐ubiquitous	  research	  paper.	  I’m	  not	  alone	  in	  shifting	  university	  writing	  projects	  away	  from	  genreless	  genres.	  A	  2009	  survey	  of	  first-­‐year	  composition	  courses	  completed	  by	  166	  WPAs	  revealed	  that	  only	  about	  6%	  of	  first-­‐year	  writing	  courses	  taught	  the	  traditional	  research	  paper	  genre;	  this	  is	  a	  long	  way	  down	  from	  83%	  in	  a	  1961	  survey	  and	  78%	  in	  a	  1982	  survey	  (Hood).	  In	  her	  analysis	  of	  her	  survey,	  Carra	  Leah	  Hood	  opines	  that	  the	  “genreless	  form	  [of	  the	  traditional	  research	  paper	  assignment]	  could	  be	  considered	  its	  most	  significant	  virtue—as	  the	  traditional	  research	  paper	  assignment	  specifically,	  and	  simply,	  provides	  the	  occasion	  for	  students	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  set	  of	  transferable	  research	  skills,	  genre	  conventions	  not	  among	  them”	  (Hood).	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Though	  her	  view	  may	  reflect	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  current	  WPA	  practices,	  Hood	  is	  still	  in	  good	  company	  of	  sorts.	  Jacques	  Derrida	  holds	  a	  similar	  (albeit	  more	  nuanced)	  view	  of	  genreless	  genres:	  “every	  text	  participates	  in	  one	  or	  several	  genres,	  there	  is	  no	  genreless	  text;	  there	  is	  always	  a	  genre	  and	  genres,	  yet	  such	  participation	  never	  amounts	  to	  belonging.	  And	  not	  because	  of	  an	  abundant	  overflowing	  or	  a	  free,	  anarchic,	  and	  unclassifiable	  productivity,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  trait	  of	  participation	  itself”	  (Derrida	  65).	  In	  other	  words,	  no	  matter	  how	  genreless	  student	  projects	  are,	  those	  very	  projects	  will	  always	  participate	  in	  some	  genre	  or	  another	  even	  if	  it	  is	  only	  by	  way	  of	  a	  “set	  of	  transferable	  research	  skills”	  as	  Hood	  asserts.	  And	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  limited	  participation	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  belonging	  to	  a	  certain	  genre	  is	  not	  problematic	  for	  Derrida	  because	  even	  a	  text	  that	  expressly	  participates	  in	  just	  one	  genre	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  a	  genre,	  either.	  This	  is	  because	  genre	  classification,	  for	  Derrida,	  is	  an	  inescapably	  subjective	  activity	  and	  every	  text	  inescapably	  singular.	  	  If	  Derrida	  is	  right—that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  genreless	  genre—the	  problem	  of	  genre	  in	  composition	  classes	  does	  not	  go	  away.	  For	  if	  Derrida	  is	  correct,	  then	  students	  still	  participate	  in	  genres	  even	  though	  they	  may	  lack	  awareness	  of	  the	  genres	  they	  participate	  in.	  That	  lack	  of	  student	  awareness—of	  being	  aware	  of	  human	  conversations	  outside	  the	  classroom—does	  little	  to	  bring	  a	  student’s	  will	  in	  congress	  with	  wills	  beyond	  the	  classroom.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  does	  little	  to	  engage	  students	  ideologically	  with	  writing	  beyond	  classroom	  writing.	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I	  mentioned	  earlier	  that	  my	  effort	  to	  engage	  students	  outside	  the	  classroom	  is	  unapologetically	  ideological.	  Apropos	  to	  education	  and	  ideology,	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  made	  a	  striking	  claim	  about	  “self	  interest	  properly	  understood”	  in	  democratic	  social	  conditions.	  After	  observing	  an	  oddly	  socially	  constructive	  mode	  of	  self-­‐interest	  at	  play	  in	  1830s	  American	  culture,	  de	  Tocqueville	  asserts,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  self-­‐interest	  as	  it	  is	  preached	  in	  America	  is	  obvious	  in	  all	  its	  aspects	  but	  it	  contains	  a	  great	  number	  of	  truths	  so	  clear	  that	  all	  you	  have	  to	  do	  to	  convince	  men	  is	  to	  educate	  them.	  Hence,	  give	  them	  education	  at	  any	  price,	  for	  the	  century	  of	  blind	  sacrifice	  and	  instinctive	  virtues	  is	  already	  distant	  from	  us	  and	  I	  see	  the	  time	  drawing	  near	  when	  freedom,	  public	  peace,	  and	  social	  order	  itself	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  do	  without	  education.	  (613)	  	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  formulation	  of	  self-­‐interest	  is	  a	  close	  cousin	  to	  
symbouleutikon.	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  my	  dialogical	  approach	  to	  civic	  engagement	  writing	  unapologetically	  engages	  ideology	  in	  education.	  	  Asserting	  ideology	  in	  education	  has	  a	  long	  and	  uncomfortable	  tradition.	  More	  recently,	  the	  work	  of	  Louis	  Althusser	  has	  served	  as	  a	  critical	  backdrop	  for	  many	  contemporary	  critiques	  of	  ideology	  in	  classrooms.	  At	  times,	  these	  critiques	  take	  an	  anti-­‐ideological	  edge—as	  if	  ideology	  itself	  is	  somehow	  out	  of	  sync	  with	  the	  goals	  and	  purposes	  of	  education.	  But	  Althusser	  did	  not	  critique	  ideology	  per	  se.	  He	  merely	  critiqued	  ideology	  that	  reifies	  harmful—namely	  bourgeois—state	  ideological	  apparatuses.	  This	  is	  especially	  evident	  when	  Althusser	  describes	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  reproduction	  of	  labor	  and	  ruling	  ideologies:	  the	  reproduction	  of	  labour	  power	  requires	  not	  only	  a	  reproduction	  of	  its	  skills,	  but	  also,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  reproduction	  of	  its	  submission	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to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  established	  order,	  i.e.	  a	  reproduction	  of	  submission	  to	  the	  ruling	  ideology	  for	  the	  workers,	  and	  a	  reproduction	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  the	  ruling	  ideology	  correctly	  for	  the	  agents	  of	  exploitation	  and	  repression,	  so	  that	  they,	  too,	  will	  provide	  for	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  ‘in	  words’.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  reproduction	  of	  labour	  power	  thus	  reveals	  as	  its	  sine	  qua	  non	  not	  only	  the	  reproduction	  of	  its	  ‘skills’	  but	  also	  the	  reproduction	  of	  its	  subjection	  to	  the	  ruling	  ideology	  or	  of	  the	  ‘practice’	  of	  that	  ideology,	  with	  the	  proviso	  that	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  say	  ‘not	  only	  but	  also’,	  for	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  forms	  and	  under	  the	  forms	  of	  ideological	  subjection	  that	  provision	  is	  made	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  skills	  of	  labour	  power.	  (132-­‐33)	  	  Althusser	  also	  argued	  that	  avoiding	  ideology	  is	  impossible	  because	  ideology	  is	  part	  of	  how	  humans	  consciously	  orient	  themselves	  with	  fellow	  humans	  and	  their	  surrounding	  environments.	  For	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  Ideological	  State	  Apparatuses	  represent	  the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  must	  necessarily	  be	  realized,	  and	  the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  ruled	  class	  must	  necessarily	  be	  measured	  and	  confronted,	  ideologies	  are	  not	  ‘born’	  in	  the	  Ideological	  State	  Apparatuses	  but	  from	  the	  social	  classes	  at	  grips	  in	  the	  class	  struggle:	  from	  their	  conditions	  of	  existence,	  their	  practices,	  their	  experience	  of	  the	  struggle,	  etc.	  (185-­‐86).	  	  From	  Althusser’s	  view,	  state	  ideological	  apparatuses	  cannot	  be	  abolished,	  but	  harmful	  bourgeois	  apparatuses	  can	  be	  replaced	  with	  more	  humane	  proletariat	  apparatuses.	  	  Althusser’s	  observations	  about	  the	  unavoidable	  nature	  of	  ideology	  are	  similar	  to	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  observations	  about	  indoctrination	  in	  education.	  In	  1939,	  Burke	  responded	  to	  an	  article	  written	  by	  John	  Dewey	  protégé	  William	  Heard	  Kilpatrick.	  In	  this	  brief	  essay,	  Burke	  uses	  the	  topic	  of	  “indoctrination	  in	  education”	  to	  extend	  and	  clarify	  his	  earlier	  thoughts	  on	  democracy	  (found	  in	  Counter-­‐Statement).	  Burke	  finds	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Kilpatrick’s	  categorical	  resistance	  to	  indoctrination	  troublesome	  because	  of	  Kilpatrick’s	  emphasis	  on	  democracy.	  “I	  take	  democracy	  to	  be	  a	  device	  for	  institutionalizing	  the	  dialectic	  process,”	  claims	  Burke,	  “Allow	  full	  scope	  of	  the	  dialectical	  process,	  and	  you	  establish	  a	  scene	  in	  which	  the	  protagonist	  of	  a	  thesis	  has	  maximum	  opportunity	  to	  modify	  his	  thesis,	  and	  so	  mature	  it,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  antagonist’s	  rejoinders”	  (Philosophy	  444).	  Burke	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  “I	  should	  want	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  all-­‐important	  desirability	  of	  full	  opportunity	  for	  the	  enacting	  of	  the	  dialectic	  process	  should	  be	  absolutely	  affirmed	  and	  indoctrinated”	  (Philosophy	  444,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  Burke	  chides	  Kilpatrick	  for	  assuming	  that	  Kilpatrick	  could	  somehow	  be	  involved	  in	  education	  and	  not	  be	  involved	  in	  indoctrination:	  “is	  not	  Dr.	  Kilpatrick	  doing	  precisely	  this	  [i.e.	  indoctrination]	  in	  pleading	  so	  persuasively	  for	  ‘the	  free	  play	  of	  intelligence?’”	  (Philosophy	  444).	  And	  later	  in	  the	  essay,	  Burke	  gets	  to	  the	  “heart”	  of	  the	  matter	  with	  a	  striking	  analogy:	  “to	  attempt	  eliminating	  the	  problem	  of	  bad	  doctrine	  by	  eliminating	  doctrine	  per	  se	  is	  like	  trying	  to	  eliminate	  heart	  disease	  by	  eliminating	  hearts”	  (Philosophy	  447).	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  cry	  “No	  Indoctrination!”	  is	  to	  cry	  for	  ignorance	  of	  indoctrination.	  Indoctrination	  in	  education	  is	  unavoidable,	  so	  Burke	  sides	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  indoctrination	  that	  seeks	  to	  constantly	  engage	  and	  understand	  every	  form	  of	  indoctrination	  including	  itself.	  The	  political	  and	  social	  manifestation	  of	  this	  “doctrine”	  is	  democracy;	  the	  educational	  manifestation	  is	  symbouleutikon—or	  dialogical	  civic	  engagement.	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The	  barriers	  to	  openly	  acknowledging	  ideology	  in	  education	  are	  legion.	  The	  world	  is	  full	  of	  Kilpatricks	  who	  would	  laugh	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  embracing	  an	  openly	  ideological	  agenda	  in	  regards	  to	  classrooms,	  students,	  pedagogy,	  course	  content,	  etc.	  Even	  faculty	  who	  tend	  to	  have	  civically	  minded	  sympathies	  tend	  to	  hesitate	  to	  be	  actually	  open	  about	  using	  their	  classrooms	  as	  ideological	  arenas—or	  at	  least	  to	  overtly	  state	  that	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  is	  ideologically	  based.	  In	  addition,	  if	  students	  think	  teachers	  are	  overtly	  ideological	  in	  their	  classrooms,	  students	  tend	  to	  refuse	  to	  engage	  and	  thus	  tend	  to	  settle	  in	  to	  the	  less-­‐critical	  indoctrinations	  they’re	  familiar	  with.	  	  My	  introduction	  to	  Katz’s	  “Ethic	  of	  Expediency”	  is	  good	  anecdotal	  evidence	  for	  this.	  I	  have	  learned	  by	  sad	  experience	  that	  some	  faculty	  who	  teach	  professional	  writing	  and	  who	  are	  otherwise	  bright	  and	  critically	  insightful	  would	  rather	  shut	  out	  an	  overtly	  democratic	  doctrine	  in	  deference	  to	  the	  “No	  Indoctrination”	  indoctrination.	  .	  .	  even	  though	  a	  doctrine	  of	  dialogical	  civic	  engagement	  sets	  students	  on	  paths	  to	  engage	  and	  understand	  all	  doctrines	  including	  itself.	  	  Dialogical	  civic	  engagement	  as	  symbouleutikon,	  as	  a	  deliberative	  rhetorical	  doctrine	  that	  engages	  all	  other	  doctrines,	  has	  all	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  “No	  Indoctrination!”	  indoctrination	  with	  additional	  benefits.	  Specifically,	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  
symbouleutikon	  benefits	  from	  a	  refreshing	  dose	  of	  honesty	  by	  removing	  unnecessary	  doublespeak	  in	  the	  ways	  we	  conceive	  of	  our	  roles	  in	  education	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  ideology.	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As	  educators,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  any	  choice	  between	  “to	  indoctrinate”	  or	  “to	  not	  indoctrinate”—much	  like	  anyone	  who	  puts	  print	  or	  ink	  to	  paper	  does	  not	  have	  a	  choice	  of	  whether	  to	  design	  or	  not.	  Design	  is	  a	  forgone	  conclusion	  in	  any	  work	  with	  documents.	  And	  indoctrination	  is	  a	  forgone	  conclusion	  in	  education.	  We	  can,	  however,	  choose	  the	  form	  of	  indoctrination	  we	  advocate.	  By	  advocating	  
symbouleutikon—or	  dialogical	  civic	  engagement—by	  overtly	  valuing	  the	  constant	  interchange	  of	  opposing	  voices,	  we	  conscientiously	  preserve	  the	  ability	  to	  keep	  any	  one	  doctrine	  from	  holding	  dictatorial	  power	  and	  thus	  silencing	  opposing	  voices.	  What	  former	  democratic	  thinkers	  naively	  believed	  we	  could	  avoid,	  i.e.	  indoctrination,	  emerges	  as	  the	  vehicle	  by	  which	  all	  the	  damaging	  effects	  of	  indoctrination	  can	  be	  avoided.	  Toward	  the	  future	  work	  of	  that	  end,	  I	  submit	  the	  end	  of	  this	  dissertation.	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  E:	  Selection	  from	  instruction	  manual	  for	  Giro	  helmet	  (http://www.giro.com/skin/frontend/enterprise/giro/images/giro/collections/news/snow-­‐usa.pdf)	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Appendix	  L:	  Gun	  Control	  Stats,	  Compare	  Ten	  Big	  “Killers”	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Kyle	  Becker,	  December	  19,	  2012	  http://www.conservativedailynews.com/2012/12/gun-­‐control-­‐statistics-­‐that-­‐reasonable-­‐people-­‐should-­‐know/	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Appendix	  N:	  Perspective	  Interview	  Assignment,	  Page	  1	  	  
Perspective	  Interview	  Assignment,	  Part	  I	  (Service	  Learning)	  	  As	  you	  fill	  service	  hours	  at	  your	  service	  location,	  pay	  attention	  to	  which	  employees	  or	  workers	  seem	  to	  be	  making	  most	  of	  the	  organizational	  or	  administrative	  decisions.	  Also	  pay	  attention	  to	  which	  employees	  or	  workers	  seem	  to	  be	  most	  involved	  in	  different	  aspects	  of	  your	  service	  location’s	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations.	  Also	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  individuals	  who	  seem	  to	  be	  benefitting	  most	  from	  the	  service	  performed	  at	  your	  service	  location.	  Also	  consider	  which	  community	  organizations	  or	  which	  faculty,	  departments,	  or	  programs	  on	  campus	  employ	  or	  involve	  individuals	  who	  may	  concern	  themselves	  with	  topics	  that	  directly	  relate	  to	  concerns	  at	  your	  service	  location.	  	  From	  these	  pools	  of	  individuals,	  identify	  five	  specific	  people	  with	  whom	  you	  think	  you	  might	  be	  able	  to	  schedule	  a	  thirty-­‐minute	  interview.	  	  On	  the	  appropriate	  course	  website	  discussion	  thread,	  list	  these	  individuals,	  their	  occupations,	  their	  connection	  to	  topics	  related	  to	  your	  service,	  and	  their	  contact	  information	  (ideally	  phone	  and	  email).	  	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  were	  volunteering	  at	  an	  animal	  shelter,	  I	  might	  consider	  the	  facility	  manager	  or	  a	  long-­‐serving	  volunteer	  or	  a	  University	  researcher	  in	  animal	  science	  or	  an	  employee	  in	  the	  local	  government’s	  animal	  control	  or	  someone	  who	  has	  adopted	  multiple	  animal	  companions	  from	  the	  animal	  shelter.	  
	  
Perspective	  Interview	  Assignment,	  Part	  I	  (Non-­‐Service	  Learning)	  	  Think	  of	  five	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  that	  are	  difficult	  for	  you	  to	  accept	  or	  understand.	  These	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  should	  be	  currently	  legal	  or	  conceivably	  could	  be	  legal	  (i.e.	  if	  it	  is	  not	  legal,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  people	  who	  currently	  actively	  campaign	  to	  make	  it	  legal).	  	  Please	  be	  honest.	  These	  beliefs	  can	  deal	  with	  religion,	  politics,	  race,	  diet,	  cultural	  traditions,	  family	  practices,	  sexual	  orientation,	  gender,	  technology,	  education,	  economics,	  campus	  policies,	  local	  or	  state	  laws,	  or	  any	  other	  perspective	  that	  you	  find	  odd	  or	  difficult	  to	  understand.	  	  Now	  find	  a	  campus	  or	  local	  community	  organization	  that	  involves	  people	  who	  advocate	  each	  of	  those	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  	  On	  the	  appropriate	  course	  website	  discussion	  thread,	  list	  these	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  with	  their	  relevant	  organizations	  and	  the	  phone	  number	  and	  email	  address	  for	  a	  person	  at	  that	  organization.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  accept	  or	  understand	  vegetarianism,	  I	  would	  try	  to	  find	  some	  student	  group	  that	  advocated	  vegetarianism	  and	  find	  out	  who	  at	  the	  group	  could	  answer	  questions	  for	  me.	  
	  	  
229	  
Appendix	  O:	  Perspective	  Interview	  Assignment,	  Page	  2	  	  
Perspective	  Interview	  Assignment,	  Part	  II	  	  
GOAL	  Record	  and	  write	  a	  1000-­‐word	  report	  on	  a	  30-­‐minute	  interview	  with	  someone	  selected	  from	  Part	  I.	  	  
MEANS	  
1. Once I have approved at least one of your 
options in Part I of this assignment, write a 
list of questions you would like to ask your 
interviewee (see attached example 
questions). You should write questions that 
try to sincerely understand your 
interviewee’s perspective. I must approve 
your questions before you do your 
interview. 
2. Arrange an interview with your interviewee. 
Be honest with your contact about the nature 
of the interview (i.e. that this is part of an 
assignment for a writing class and that the 
interview will last about 30 minutes). If your 
interviewee asks, supply your proposed 
questions ahead of time so your interviewee 
knows what sorts of questions to expect. 
3. Before you arrive for the interview, ask your 
interviewee for permission to record the 
interview. If your interviewee gives 
permission, be sure to plan ahead to bring a 
device with recording capabilities. If your 
interviewee does not give permission to 
record, ask if you can take notes on a laptop 
or pad of paper. Respect your interviewee’s 
preferences. 
4. When you arrive for the interview, thank 
your interviewee for taking the time for you 
and explain again the purposes of your 
interview. Take some field notes (e.g. details 
about the setting, interviewee’s dress, facial 
expressions, appearance, and demeanor). 
5. Pay attention to the time. If you still have 
questions to ask after your 30 minutes is 
finished, tell your interviewee, “Well, our 30 
minutes are up. I still have a few more 
questions, but we can just end now if you 
prefer.” Do not try to pressure your 
interviewee. 	  
OUTCOMES	  (SERVICE	  LEARNING)	  Write	  a	  1000-­‐word	  report	  about	  your	  interview.	  
1. Your report should use your interview notes 
and transcript to answer these questions: 
a. Which of your interviewee’s specific 
concerns did you find yourself sympathizing 
with? Why? 
b. Which of your interviewee’s specific concerns did 
you find yourself disagreeing with? Why? 
c. What about the interview or interviewee fit with 
how you expected the interview to go? 
d. What about the interview or interviewee surprised 
you? 
e. What are the most pressing concerns this person 
has about topics related to your service? 
2. Write your report as if you were just telling the 
story of the interview. Begin with your reasons for 
pursuing the service you’re doing this semester. 
Talk a bit about your interviewee. And then relate 
the most relevant details about the interview. It is 
perfectly acceptable to use long block quotes from 
your interviewee’s responses (this is why 
recording equipment will be very valuable). 
3. Use MLA format 
4. Save your document as a DOCX, RTF, or PDF. 
Attach your document to the appropriate 
discussion thread on the course website. 
 
OUTCOMES	  (NON-­‐SERVICE	  LEARNING)	  Write	  a	  1000-­‐word	  report	  about	  your	  interview.	  
1. While writing your report, remember this 
admonition from Anthony Weston: “Ask not 
which side is right, but what each side is right 
about.” 
2. Your report should use your interview notes and 
transcript to answer these questions: 
a. Which of your interviewee’s specific 
values/reasons/justifications/perspectives did you 
find yourself sympathizing with? Why? 
b. Which of your interviewee’s specific 
values/reasons/justifications/perspectives did you 
find yourself still disagreeing with? Why? 
c. What about the interview or interviewee fit with 
how you expected the interview to go? 
d. What about the interview or interviewee 
surprised you? 
3. Write your report as if you were just telling the 
story of the interview. Begin with your perspective 
on the subject and why you believe what you do. 
Talk a bit about your interviewee. And then relate 
the most relevant details about the interview. It is 
perfectly acceptable to use long block quotes from 
your interviewee’s responses (this is why 
recording equipment will be very valuable). 
4. Use MLA format Save	  your	  document	  as	  a	  DOCX,	  RTF,	  or	  PDF	  with	  a	  file	  name	  that	  includes	  the	  course	  number,	  your	  last	  name,	  and	  the	  words	  “Perspective	  Interview.”	  Attach	  your	  document	  to	  the	  appropriate	  discussion	  thread	  on	  the	  course	  website
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on College Composition and Communication. New Orleans, April 2008. 
 
Featured Session Presentation 
 
With Joel Overall. “The 25th Anniversary Edition of Conversations with Kenneth 
Burke.” Featured Session. Kenneth Burke Society 2011 Conference: Kenneth 
Burke, Rhetoric, and Social Change. Clemson, May 2011. 
 
Regional and Special Interest Conference Presentations 
 
 “What Happens in Kenneth Burke Scholarship Stays in Kenneth Burke 
Scholarship.” Kenneth Burke Society at CCCC Special Interest Group. Las 
Vegas, March 2013. 
 
 “Kenneth Burke in St. Louis.” Kenneth Burke Society at CCCC Special Interest 
Group. St. Louis, March 2012.   
 “The Ethic of ‘Bearing Together:’ Sympheron and the Expediency of Democratic 
Inefficiency.” Kenneth Burke Society 2011 Conference: Kenneth Burke, 
Rhetoric, and Social Change. Clemson, May 2011. 
 




 “War and Its Purification.” 10th Annual Graduate Interdisciplinary Symposium 
on the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. Purdue University, April 2009. 
 
 “The Dramatistic in Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘On Truth and Lying in an Extra Moral 
Sense.’” New Directions in Critical Theory Conference. University of 
Arizona, March 2007. 
 
 “Conventional Fiction.” Annual Conference of the Utah Academy of Sciences, 
Arts and Letters, Snow College. Utah, April 2006. 
 
 “Fantastic, Fantasy, and Inner-contextual Verisimilitude in Philip K. Dick's 
Ubik.” International Conference on the Fantastic in the Arts. Ft. Lauderdale, 
March 2006. 
 
 “Literary Experience Vis-à-vis the Aesthetics of Fantasy: A Comparative Study 
of Walter Benjamin and J.R.R. Tolkien.” Annual Conference of the Utah 
Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters. Southern Utah University, April 2004. 
 
 “The Mythic Quest: Post-Campbell American Science Fiction's Pursuit for 
Validation.” Life, the Universe & Everything: The Marion K. “Doc” Smith 
Symposium on Science Fiction and Fantasy. Brigham Young University, 
February 2002. 
 
Panel or Session Chair 
 
Kenneth Burke Society at CCCC Special Interest Group, Las Vegas, March 2013.   
Secondary Orality and Digital Mobocracy. Conference on College Composition 
and Communication. St. Louis, March 2012. 
 
Kenneth Burke Society at CCCC Special Interest Group, St. Louis, March 2012. 
 




Technical Communication and Civic Engagement (Upper Division) 
 
Worksite Internship Practicum: Professional Writing (English 490, Purdue) 
This is an online, distance learning, supplemental course for students undertaking 
summer internships in almost any field or discipline. The course focuses on the 
writing and communication student interns experience and provides them a forum 
to discuss on-the-job observations with other student interns. 
 
Business Writing for Entrepreneurs (English 420E, Purdue) 
In this course, business students develop and craft workable entrepreneurial projects. 
These begin with elevator pitches and culminate in team-based business plans for 
original businesses. 
 
Business Writing: Service Learning (English 420, Purdue) 
This course is offered to juniors and seniors from a wide range of professional 
disciplines. Coursework focuses on professional genres such as the memo and white 
paper. The final project is a team-based unique project in which students work 
closely with community partners in filling a specific need for a local business or 
organization. Past projects have included small advertising campaigns, menu 







Technical Communication and Civic Engagement (First-Year) 
 
Accelerated First-Year Composition: Engaging in Public Discourse (English 108, 
Purdue) 
In this course, first-year students complete approximately 30 hours of community 
service in a wide range of fields. The writing projects for the course are based on 
their service experiences. Past projects include profiles based on qualitative 
interviews of service providers/recipients, evaluations of related local resources 
(whether private or government), research projects that situate students’ service in 
larger national or international contexts, and memoirs about students’ service 
experiences. 
  
First-Year Composition: Business Leaders Learning Community (English 106, 
Purdue) 
This first-year writing course involves less intense projects that are similar to those in 
the upper division business writing courses at Purdue (see above). 
 
First Year Composition: EPICS Learning Community (English 106, Purdue) 
EPICS stands for Engineering Projects in Community Service. The first-year 
engineering students enrolled in this course are simultaneously enrolled in 
engineering courses in which they complete engineering related projects for local 
community organizations. The writing projects in this course are based on the 
students’ service much like Accelerated First-Year Composition above. 
 
Intensive Writing: Service Learning (Honors 150, BYU) 
As I taught this course, this first-year course is almost identical to Accelerated First-
Year Composition: Engaging in Public Discourse above. The only significant 
difference is the inclusion of two course-specific, BYU-published textbooks—a 
collection of readings assembled by the program director and a writing guide 




First-Year Composition: Rhetorical Situations/Real Texts (English 106, Purdue) 
This course utilizes primary texts and real-world contexts as invention material for 
students’ writing projects. 
 
First-Year Composition: Writing Your Way at Purdue (English 106, Purdue) 
This course utilizes students’ experiences as first-year Purdue students as invention 
material for students’ writing projects. 
  
First-Year Composition (English 111, Ivy Tech) 
This course incorporates a uniform curriculum and text common to all Ivy Tech first-
year composition courses. Required projects include rhetorical analyses, memoirs, 
research projects, and arguments. 
 
Intensive Writing: Research Writing (Honors 150, BYU) 
This course utilizes two course-specific, BYU-published texts to facilitate the teaching 
of a broad range of possible writing projects with academic research as the primary 
focus. 
 
Ethics and Philosophy 
 
Ethics & Values: Sociopolitical Ethics (Philosophy 2050, UVU) 
In this multi-disciplinary general education ethics course, students read pertinent 
works from historical and contemporary theorists. Through papers and in-class 
quizzes, students bring these works to bear on a range of historical and 






Ethics & Values: Science Fiction & Ethics (Philosophy 2050, UVU) 
In this course, students consider theoretical ethics works in light of dilemmas and 
situations discussed in a range of dystopian or otherwise sociopolitical-themed 
science fiction short stories. 
 
Introduction to Logic and Philosophical Writing (Philosophy 1250, UVU) 
This course introduces students to systematic reasoning in philosophical contexts. 
Projects include short and long papers of logical analysis and philosophical 
argument. 
 
Introduction to Philosophy (Philosophy 1000, UVU) 
This course introduces students to a range of influential ideas in the history of 
Philosophy. 
 




Community Resource Coordination, Worksite Internship Practicum: Professional 
Writing, Department of English, Purdue, 2011-2012 
Work entailed assisting Professor Jennifer Bay in further designing the Worksite 
Internship Practicum. I also coordinated with local businesses, organizations, and 
Purdue’s research park in order to better inform local interns about receiving 
University credit for their internships. 
 
Accelerated First-Year Composition: Engaging in Public Discourse, Pedagogical 
Initiatives Committee, Department of English, Purdue, 2010-2011 
I was part of the original committee of faculty and PhD students who redesigned 
Purdue’s Accelerated First-Year Composition course to incorporate service learning. 
 
Philosophy 2050: Ethics and Values, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, 
Utah Valley University, 2008 
By request of the department head3, I composed the initial draft of the rewritten 
departmental course guidelines for Philosophy 2050, an inter-disciplinary general 




Panelist, Dissertation Prospectus Forum, Department of English, Purdue 
University, December 2011 
 
Speaker, Thesis Prospectus Session, Department of English, Brigham Young 
University, February 2008 
 
Learning Community Instructor 
 
Business Leaders Community, Purdue University, 2012 
 
Explorers Learning Community, Purdue University, 2011 
 
EPICS Learning Community, Purdue University, 2009 
 




Job Placement Representative. GradSEA: The Graduate Student English 










Proposal Reviewer, International Association for Research on Service-Learning 
and Community Engagement (IARSLCE) Conference 2012 
 
Planning Committee, Computers and Writing 2010, 2008-2010 
 
Fundraising Committee, Computers and Writing 2010, 2009-2010 
 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY SERVICE 
 
Service Learning Instructor, Accelerated First-Year Writing: Engaging in Public 
Discourse, Purdue University, 2009-2012. 
Oversaw and facilitated the community service hours and individual projects of 
approximately 140 students (15-20 students per semester). 
 
Content Developer, Celery Bog Webcam Instructions, Lilly Nature Center, Parks 
and Recreation, West Lafayette, Indiana, 2012. 
Worked with a team of fellow graduate students to improve the public usability and 
accessibility of an online-controlled webcam that overlooks the Celery Bog Nature 
Area. 
 
Merit Badge Counselor, Boy Scouts of America, Troop 391, Wabash Valley 
District, Sagamore Council, Lafayette, Indiana, 2012. 
Advised boy scouts (ages 12-17) for the following merit badges: Scholarship, 
Reading, Public Speaking, Communications, Citizenship in the Community, 
Citizenship in the World, Citizenship in the Nation, American Cultures, American 
Heritage, American Labor, Music, Theater, Bugling, Art, Cinematography, 
Wilderness Survival, Hiking, Camping, Backpacking, Orienteering, Geocaching, 
Emergency Preparedness, Cooking, Salesmanship 
 
Service Learning Instructor, Business Writing, Purdue University, 2009-2011. 
Oversaw and facilitated the community service hours and individual projects of 
approximately 120 students (20-40 students per semester). 
 
Seminary Teacher, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Lafayette 2nd 
Ward, West Lafayette, Indiana, 2009-2011. 
Taught daily early morning religious education classes to approximately 25 young 
men and women ages 14-18 in my congregation. 
 
Neighborhood Chair for Brigham Young University, 2001–2002. 






Enos, Richard. Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle. Rev. ed. Clemson: Parlor. 2011. 
 
Miller, Bernard Allan. Rhetoric’s Earthly Realm: Heidegger, Sophistry, and the 
Gorgian Kairos. Clemson: Parlor. 2011. 
 
Smudde, Peter M., ed. Humanistic Critique of Education: Teaching and Learning as 
Symbolic Action. West Lafayette: Parlor. 2010. 
 








Tardy, Christine M. Building Genre Knowledge. West Lafayette: Parlor. 2009. 
 
Other Professional Work 
 
Principal Content Developer, “The Rhetorical Situation.” Purdue Online Writing 
Lab. April 2012. Web. http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/625/01/ 
This is the current Online Writing Lab resource that explains rhetorical situations. As 
of October 11, 2013, this resource is the top hit in Google and Bing searches for 
“rhetorical situation.” 
 
Publisher Representative, Parlor Press, Conference on College Composition and 
Communication; San Francisco, 2009; Louisville, 2010; Atlanta, 2011; St. Louis, 
2012 
Work entailed representing Parlor Press to convention attendees and other 
publishers, setting up and taking down Parlor Press display booth, and processing 
book orders. 
 
Digital Editor and Digital Transfer Project Lead. KB: A Conversation with Kenneth 
Burke. Dir. Harry Chapin. Kenneth Burke Society, 2011. DVD. 
This short documentary was originally filmed by folk-rock musician and Academy 
Award-winning documentarian, Harry Chapin, who was also Kenneth Burke’s 
grandson. I headed the project to transfer this documentary from VHS to digital, add 
optional subtitles, repackage it as a DVD, and arrange for the Kenneth Burke Society 
to sell and distribute those DVDs. 
 
Designer. “MLA 7th Edition Formatting and Style Guide.” Purdue Online Writing 
Lab. April 2010. PowerPoint. Web. 
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/747/15/ 
This PowerPoint presentation compiles and condenses material from the main 
Online Writing Lab MLA formatting resource. 
 
Instructor. Missionary Training Center. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints. Provo, Utah. 1999. 
Instructed LDS men and women ages 19-25 from various cultural and national 
backgrounds in communication, leadership, and interpersonal skills. 
 
Work in Progress 
 
Digital Editor and Digital Transfer Project Lead. Conversations with Kenneth Burke: 
The 1986 Iowa Interviews (25th Anniversary Edition). Dir. Clarke Rountree. DVD. 
This eight-hour collection of interviews with Kenneth Burke is an entirely different 
video project from the similarly named documentary directed by Harry Chapin 
above. But like the Chapin project, this project will transfer footage from analog to 
digital, add optional subtitles, repackage it as a multi-DVD set, and arrange for the 
Kenneth Burke Society to distribute those DVD sets.  
 
Editor and Project Lead. Kenneth Burke at Washington University in St. Louis. CD. 
This project collects previously archived audio material of a 1970 reading and a 1971 
discussion with Kenneth Burke while he was the Visiting Hurst Professor at 
Washington University in St. Louis (WUSTL). I am securing permission from the 
Kenneth Burke Foundation to repackage these recordings as a CD and arrange for 









AP Reader, English Language Exam, Educational Testing Service, 2009-present 
 
Conference on College Composition and Communication, 2007-present 
 
Rhetoric Society of America, 2007-present 
 
Rhetoric Society of America at Purdue, 2009-present 
Cofounder & Vice President, 2009-2010; President, 2010-2011 
 
Modern Language Association, 2012-present 
 
Kenneth Burke Society, 2007-present 
 
Kenneth Burke Student Association, 2011-present 
Cofounder, 2011 
 





Introduction to Composition Studies (Shirley Rose) 
Issues in Composition: Classical Era (Richard Johnson-Sheehan) 
Issues in Composition: Modern Era (Patricia Sullivan) 
Issues in Composition: Postmodern Era (Thomas Rickert) 
Empirical Research Methodologies (Patricia Sullivan) 
 
Technical Communication / Professional Writing 
Professional Writing Theory (Michael Salvo) 
Professional Writing Practicum (Patricia Sullivan) 
Computers and Rhetoric (Samantha Blackmon) 
Archives and Digital Humanities (Jennifer Bay and Patricia Sullivan) 
Experiential Learning and Civic Engagement (Jennifer Bay) 
 
Philosophic Rhetoric 
Kenneth Burke and Contemporary Rhetoric (David Blakesley) 
Public Rhetorics (Thomas Rickert) 
Refashioning Burke’s Parlor (David Blakesley) 
Introduction to Semiotics (Floyd Merrell) 
Seminar in Ethics: Immanuel Kant (Patrick Kain) 
 
Brigham Young University 
 
Rhetoric and Composition 
Rhetorical Theory and Criticism (Gregory Clark) 
Early American Rhetoric/American Lit Pre-1865 (Gregory Clark) 
History of Rhetoric (Nancy Christiansen) 
Basic Composition Theory and Pedagogy (Gary Hatch) 
Composition Pedagogy (Brett McInelly) 
 
Critical Theory/Other 
Theoretical Discourse (Matthew Wickman) 
Creative Writing Theory (Lance Larsen) 
Heidegger and the Scottish Novel (Matthew Wickman) 
